{PIZ (HUA10) 316} The perceived and the remembered are continuous throughout an ongoing perception; without a continuous identifying synthesis, the continuity of the remembered with the currently perceived and remembered would not be constituted for consciousness. Moreover, nothing about a tone as initially given excludes the sense "having already been in progress", except in cases where the circumstances of its beginning are themselves given, as when I speak or attack string with bow, etc.

noematic sense. See contents of mental processes; "contents" of conscious processes, objects of conscious processes;

{ID1 (HUA3) m267} Each noema has a "content," viz., its "sense", and refers through that to its " object".

{ibid. m269-270} To every noema there belongs an "object" with a certain noematic content which is explicable through a description that remains within definite limitations, excluding, for example, all "subjective" expressions (such as 'perceptual', 'clearly intuitive', 'memorial'), viz., a description of "the object meant as it is meant". This description would include statements about its near and far sides, as well (in the relevant cases) as statements about the predicates of its "value". The predicates attributed in the description all are with quotes; they are not predicates of the thing or value-thing pure and simple but rather are predicates of a noema.

The framework within which such a description moves delimits a quite fixed content in every noema. It yields a closed set of formal or material "predicates" and of "predicates" determinate as well as indeterminate <emptily meant> with respect to their content. These define in their modified signification the "content" <noematic sense?> of the noema's object-core.

noesis and noema. See noematic sense; contents of mental processes; "contents" of conscious processes, objects of conscious processes.

{ID1 (HUA3.1), 298-299, m268-269} The full noesis refers to the full noema as its intentional and full What. But it is clear that this reference cannot be the one which is referred to in speaking of the reference by consciousness to what is intentionally objective for it. For each noetic moment, specifically each thetically noetic one, corresponds to a moment in the noema and by doing so is distinguished from the complex of thetic characters which belong to their noematic core. Thetic character thus varies depending on whether the ego refers to its object as certainly being, likely to be, wished for, etc., and this variability shows that talk about the reference of consciousness (and esp. about the orientation of consciousness) to its object refers to an inmost moment of the noema; this moment is not the core (in the objective sense) itself but is rather something that makes up the necessary central point of the core and that functions as "bearer" for noematic properties belonging specifically to it, viz., for the noematically modified properties of "what is meant as such". If we look more closely at this then we discover that "content" and "object" are to be distinguished not just for "consciousness" (i.e., for the intentional mental process) but for the noema considered in its own right. The noema also refers to an object and possesses a "content" "whereby" it refers to an object: and this object is the self-same as that of the noesis, as the parallelism continually confirms.

nominal forming [nominale Formung]. See categorial acts; categorial objects and sensuous objects; state of affairs [Sachverhalt]; Objectivating [Ojektivierung]; categorial form contrasted with subjectively relative traits; objects [Gegenstände] and objectivating [Vorstellen].

<Forming rather than transforming is meant here since the possibility is held open that what undergoes forming had no form (in the relevant sense) at all before that. The adjective "nominal" is used as if "to form nominally" were synonymous with the phrase "to form in giving a name to". The adjective also carries something of the same connotation as it carries in the phrase 'nominal value' or when 'nominal definition' is contrasted with 'real definition'. What undergoes forming in the relevant sense is not perfectly like itself prior to its having been so formed although the thing now formed and some of its traits will be or at least may be identical to the thing and its traits prior to being so formed. So far as this identical core is concerned, the change is nominal rather than real. "Forming nominally" is in this respect like what Husserl later calls simply "objectivating", i.e., actional doxic monothetic intending. It confers the form expressed by 'this' impartially upon its intended object as a whole, with its open horizon of yet unexplicated meaning {see categorial acts}. It corresponds in this respect quite closely to the function of assertion in Heidegger insofar as assertion is a pointng out. However, pointing out, as Heidegger discusses it, is only said to occur as a moment in an asserting; Heidegger does not speak of it as if it might occur without any intention to explicate what is pointed out, though it would be quite absurd of him to deny that pointing out could occur without being followed in fact by explication, as if Dasein could not terminate without completing the explication.

Husserl's description of categorial forming is misleading without the addition that although sensuous content is unchanged, categorial forming does alter the object in that it has now been objectivated or judged or collected, etc. by so and so whereas this was not the case before. This fact, though a fact about the object's relation to a certain subject, is no less true than facts about the object's real, perceivable determinations.

Through categorial forming some new senses accrue which the object did not have before: it is not retrospectively identified as 'having been judged about by so and so' before (unless it happens to have been) although nothing mitigates against its being intended as having been judged about by others before or having had precisely the same judgment made about it before by persons other than so and so or against the judgment's existing timelessly {see timeless (being)}. Yet neither the judgment nor the object judged about acquires such a sense necessarily for any ego whatsoever whose existence has as part of its meaning "being in the world together with real things." Neither is bound to be intended automatically by any being-in-the-world whatsoever as having these senses. The objects as categorially formed for this particular ego are not bound to be intended as having been present implicitly in the object; an object so intended would in fact be a material absurdity {see categorial objects and sensuous objects}. The moments of sense which accrue to it just by and necessarily by this historical, factual act differ in this respect from the moments which accrue to an object's sense necessarily through the ego's having for the first time been conscious of some mental process which would not occur in its stream of consciousness, such as 'having had sensuous appearances other than those retained in memory.' The act through which this sense arises institutes it primally for this ego; however, having sensuous appearances regardless of this ego comes, through the instituting, to belong essentially to every real object within openly infinite horizons, past and future.>

{HUA19/2, 685ff.} Speaking generally, we may say initially that Objectivating acts considered on the one hand just by themselves and on the other hand the "self-same [dieselben]" Objectivating acts as they function when constituting the points of reference for references of whatever kind are not truly the self-same [dieselben]; they differ phenomenologically in respect of that which we have called the intentional stuff [intentionale Materie]. <Here and throughout the Logical Investigations Husserl appears to use 'objektivierend' and vorstellend' as synonyms to refer to all of those mental processes that he will later term "doxic" (often rendered in these notes by 'cognitive'). When this latter term is introduced it will be used to refer to any consciousness whatsoever in so far as what it is conscious of is intended in some modality of being or existence, and Husserl will introduce along with the term 'doxic' a differentiation between passive (automatic) mental processes in which the ego does not engage and active (actional, exigent) mental processes wherein the ego does engage. The word 'act' will then be applied only to mental processes in so far as they are active. moreover, only the actively doxic mental processes will then be said to be "vorstellend [objectivating]" or "objectivierend" [Objectivating]", and they alone will be conceived to be processes through which even the most simply categorially formed objects are there (are constituted) for the ego. This differentiation will make possible a much needed distinction between doxic mental processes that do and those that do not necessarily include a consciousness of categorial form. This differentiation will enable phenomenology to avoid the intellectualism that is otherwise implicit in the position adopted by Husserl in Logical Investigations.> The sense of the respective intentions [Auffassungssinn] differs, and there is a corresponding difference in signification when the intentions are appropriately expressed: it isn't as if some intermediary piece were shoved in between indifferent objectivations [Vorstellungen, more traditionally "ideas"] so as to bind ideas {Vorstellungen] that are fastened to one another only externally. Instead, through nominal acts, a predicatively formed state-of-affairs or other categorially formed object may very well be given us directly, as the object in simple perception is. In polythetic synthetic acts, an already constituted object is made a member of a reference while the meaning which constitutes it remains completely unchanged. The phenomenological change which perception undergoes through nominal formation goes unnoticed in the perception just because the novel form is something that includes the whole of the previously constituted act-sense [Auffassungssinn] and that imparts to it a new role. The perception remains perception; the object is given just as it was given; it "simply" is "posited in reference". This sort of forming which is involved in synthetic functioning does not change the object itself and so is attributed to our "mere" subjective activity so that we overlook the formative act when engaged in phenomenological reflection, oriented as it is toward clarifying cognition. <Husserl notes {HUA19/2, 686:9-16} that, for simplicity's sake, he misrepresented in the previous (viz., Fifth) Investigation individuated sensuous perceiving that is not included in any higher level process as its foundation as if it were equivalent to a nominally functioning process.>

{HUA19/2, 685-687} Therefore, the state-of-affairs is indeed the self-same state-of-affairs within both the subjectivistic and the nominal function generally, and that self-same state-of-affairs is also constituted at the lowest founding level through the self-same ongoing process in original intuition as the process through which that state-of-affairs was constituted when the process was not included in the higher level process. Yet when involved in such a higher, more complex process, the state-of-affairs is constituted by that more complex process wherein it functions as reference-member with a novel form (with the costume suited to its role, so to speak), a form evinced by the nominal form when the state-of-affairs is given suitable expression.

non-doxic mental processes. See affective mental processes [Gemütserlebnisse]; Object [Objekt].

Nothingness [Nichtsein]. See truth and Being [Sein]; Absurd. the.

{HUA19 (Logische Untersuchungen) B126} Falsity and Nothingness are the correlates involved in absurdity, which is the counterpart of evidence . Absurdity is the vivid experiencing [erleben] of utter conflict between intention and quasi-fulfillment in contrast to the utter agreement involved in evidence. Falsity and Nothingness are the precise counterparts of truth and Being  respectively. Phenomenological clarification of these concepts requires first of all the precise delineation [umschreiben] of the negative ideal of ultimate disappointment.

Object [Objekt]. See objects [Gegenstände] and objectivating [Vorstellen].

objects [Gegenstände] and objectivating [Vorstellen]. See pre-"objective" unities; contents of mental processes; "contents" of conscious processes, objects of conscious processes.

<The concept that Husserl expresses by the term seems to be coordinate with that expressed by 'res' as used by Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (980-1037), for whom ens denotes whatever exists whereas whatever a truth can be enunciated about is denoted by res {Maurer, Medieval Philosophy 94–95}>

{PPMF 13} In general logical parlance, any subject whatever of true predications is an object. In this sense, therefore, every phenomenon is also an object. Within this widest concept of object, and specifically within the class of individual objects, Objects and phenomena stand in contrast with each other. All Objects, all natural Objects, for example, are objects foreign to consciousness. Consciousness does, indeed objectivate them and posit them as actual, yet the consciousness that experiences them and takes cognizance of them bestows upon its own phenomena the sense of being appearances of Objects foreign to consciousness and knows these "extrinsic" Objects through processes that take cognizance of their sense. Those objects that are neither conscious processes nor immanent constituents of conscious processes we therefore call Objects in the pregnant sense of the word. This places two separate sciences in the sharpest of contrasts: on the one hand, phenomenology the science of consciousness as it is in itself; on the other, the "Objective" sciences as a totality.

{HUA17,77–78 (m64)} The concept of an object formal logic - when developed in radical purity - lacks everything that makes possible a differentiating either of truths or of evidences. This concept of an object (and of evidence) is the most universal and is the concept of any substrate whatever of possible determining predications. Consequently, it cannot make even such universal distinctions as that between individual and categorial objects, or that between "mere things", valuable objects, practical goods, etc.; nor can it make any distinction between universalities drawn from individual objects - the universalities called genera and species in the usual sense - and other universalities.

{Husserl, Hua. 18 231 (mA229, B228–29)} There are no limits at all to what can be objectivated. There are no limits whatsoever to the set of objects so that 'object' is the most inclusive of terms. This is part of what is meant when it is thought that being an object is somehow arbitrary; it is perhaps the whole of what is legitimately thought by means of the word 'arbitrary' when so applied. Many go on then — through a sort of category error — to maintain that what is an object must be in some way a matter of convention and that it follows that whatever is an object must be taken for an object by someone or posited as an object by someone. <Why is this link so irresistible to the modern mind? HYPOTHESIS: Its roots go, just as one would suspect, all the way back to the identification of what-is-not as a mere matter of convention. PARMENIDES wants to identify what-is with what is truly thought and argues that the objects of erroneous belief exist only for the erroneous belief and so for some belief; therefore, whatever is-not is an object merely of erroneous thought (PLATO: of mere opinion), is mere seeming. This was a non sequitur; where did the error lie? 'What is falsely believed in' is taken as coordinate with 'what is not,' refusing to acknowledge that there are also true beliefs concerning whatever there are erroneous beliefs about: truth he will have it concerns only what-is. Parmenides wants to deny that there are objects. This is question begging. How is it related to the Sophistical doctrine that its being believed is a sufficient condition for a sentence to be true? The doctrine would make it impossible that a belief not be true.>

That there are no limits to the sorts of objects that can be collected and that the number of collections to which something belongs is without limit is at least part of what is meant by saying that collections are arbitrary, and it very well may be all that is legitimately meant thereby. There can be no ill-formed collections; collecting can go wrong only by including the self-same member more than once.

{Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: Vorlesungen 1906/07 52–55}

Object [Objekt]. See Objectivating; value [Wert]; valuing, [Werten]; affective mental processes [Gemütserlebnisse]; contents of mental processes; "contents" of conscious processes, objects of conscious processes.

{1908/09: HUA28, 339-340} The class of Objects is the class of entities: object and state of affairs, being and not-being, truth and untruth; all that pertains to Objectivating acts, in whatever way we further clarify the concepts pertaining to these words. Valuing acts, on the other hand, are not "directed" toward Objects but toward values. Value is not what is; value is something relating to being or not-being but belonging in another dimension. As such, states of values are not merely states of affairs, for even when we speak of both sides analogously in terms of being directed toward, being directed is, in the case of states of values, still something teleological-normative. That we speak of valuing shows that values are objects . Here it should be said: values are something Objectivatable; values as Objects, however, are Objects of certain Objectivating acts, and they constitute themselves, as Objects in this sense, through such Objectivating acts [Objektivationen] that build upon valuing acts; valuing acts themselves, however, do not constitute values as Objects. Valuing acts as such are "directed" toward something, yet not toward Objects, instead what belongs to their nature is only that this, its directedness, can be Objectivatingly grasped and then Objectivatingly judged and determined. What is to be emphasized above all is the directing-itself which is peculiar to the essence of the non-Objectivating acts is not directing-itself toward the objects of the underlying doxa [Vorstellungen], the perceptions, judgings, etc.

{Husserl: Shorter Works 12 f.; AV (HUA25) 72 f. ; see also ID1 (HUA3) 225 f. m187 f.}} In his Freiburg Inaugural Lecture, Husserl speaks of "Objects in the pregnant sense": "Those objects that are neither conscious processes nor immanent constituents of conscious processes we therefore call Objects in the pregnant sense of the word." All Objects are objects foreign or extrinsic to consciousness. There all natural Objects are said to be objects foreign^[7] to consciousness; it would seem, however, that eidetic objects of all kinds would also be Objects. Among individual objects, those that are foreign to consciousness are Objects, and this class of individual Objects excludes all phenomena. <Is the class of phenomena coordinate with the class of objects that can be adequately given or is it limited to just the class of objects that are or have been adequately given? On the other hand, such objects are non-phenomenal as straightforwardly intended but are phenomenal as reflectively intended, i.e., intended in any way at all >

{[Husserl: Shorter Works 14; AV (HUA25) 73} He then distinguishes "on the one hand, phenomenology, the science of consciousness as it is in itself; on the other, the "Objective" sciences  as a totality. And psychology, specifically the descriptive psychology of the phenomena of consciousness, is identified as an Objective science. As such, it is not science of pure consciousness and so is not pure phenomenology. Psychology is not a proper science of phenomena because it draws on psychological experiencing which links immanent reflection to experience of the e/external. In psychological experience , the psychic is given as event within the cohesion of Nature.

{ibid. 13; AV 73} To the objects, which are obviously correlated to each other, of these contrasted sciences there correspond two fundamentally different types of experience and of intuition generally: immanent experience and Objective experience, also called "external" or transcendent experience.

Objectivating [Objektivieren]. See nominal forming [nominale Formung].

{1908/09 HUA28, 340 emphasis added} Perhaps it sounds disturbing, but it may well be best to say that Objectivating acts are indeed "directed" toward Objects even if they be so directed not genuinely but rather teleologically (normatively). <Husserl is still using Objectivieren as a term coordinate with Vorstellen rather than differentiating — as he soon would — the former as a subclass of the latter.>

Objective attitude. See natural attitude; Objective science and the life-world.

The natural attitude includes the Objective scientific attitude. The Objective attitude considers what it investigates as occurring within the world in Heidegger's sense.

In psychology the Objectivistic attitude begets the notion that mental events occur somehow in an organism. As Objects mental events occur in minds, and minds are conceived just as of animals belonging to some species. The same is true of what is thought about Objectivistically. What an ego thinks of is conceived Objectivistically as belonging also to animals of some biological species. That an animal of the species Homo sapiens thinks of Yellowstone Park is generously admitted. But, since Yellowstone Park cannot be part of some human or otherwise rational animal — who obviously would fit easily inside the park — what is being thought about "immediately" and perhaps even perceived "immediately" be must be not the actual park but just the park as viewed by this human animal, this person's idea of the park. Each person who thinks about the Park necessarily does so by way of some idea which represents the park to that person. This is how thinking in the Objectivistic pattern comes to conceive what it calls The Mind to be insulated from contact with the rest of the world so that The Mind is interpreted as if it were out of touch with the things it believes in, as if it were unable to base its beliefs on the things themselves. What Husserl termed the Objectivistic attitude sets those involved in it up skepticism about ever knowing a belief to be true (with the possible exception of beliefs that are strictly about "relations between ideas"). {See the entry "setting-up [Ge-stell]" in Heidegger Notes.} The Objectivistic attitude finds the best ground for beliefs to be Expert Opinion, the judgment of the technician whose beliefs have stood the practical test because they work.

At its most generous, Objectivistic thinking grants even that there are Objective facts about these ideas which it has invented. There is a truth about them; there is just no Objective scientific method (yet) for establishing what that truth is: we do not yet know enough about how the nervous systems of such animals function.

Each person is then even assigned an idea of the world, a worldview or Weltanschauung, perhaps even a plurality of them for varying occasions. Magnanimously, the Objectivistic thinker will even be tolerant of worldviews of the laity, those not scientifically schooled.

The Objectivistic attitude is linked to a widespread attitude in Western life . And is prevalent worldwide among intellectuals and among the power elite who operate cultural institutions. It is not simply a result of dualistic thinking on the part of a few perverse philosophers. Overcoming it requires more than just frequent Descartes bashing. Nor ought anyone to think that religious institutions are something else again. Religion and the Objectivistic attitude are of the same mold. Priest and Expert are quite thoroughly homologous. It should surprise no one that William James authored The Will to Believe in his and in Objectivism's pragmatic dotage.

Objective science and the life world. See Object [Objekt]; Objective attitude.

{Crisis (HUA6) § 34} The conception, by now become traditional, that all science must be science of what is Objective must be rejected if the life world is to be investigated scientifically. The life-world requires a different sort of discipline, one which does not overlook the differences between those characteristics of a thing which are themselves presented and those which are presentiated. In the attitude of Objective science, these differences are overlooked as being irrelevant and as concerning what is merely subjective. <The natural attitude includes the Objective scientific attitude. The Objective attitude considers what it investigates as occurring within the world in Heidegger's sense. In psychology this begets the notion that mental events occur somehow in an organism. As Objects mental events occur in minds , and minds are parts of animals belonging to some species. The same is true of what is thought about. What an ego thinks of is conceived Objectivistically as belonging also to animals of some biological species. That an animal of the species homo sapiens thinks of Yellowstone Park is generously admitted. But, since Yellowstone Park cannot be part of some human animal — who obviously would fit easily inside the park — what is being thought about and perhaps even perceived must be not the actual park but just the park as viewed by this human animal, this person's idea of the park. Each person who thinks about it necessarily does so by way of some idea which represents the park to that person. At its most generous, Objectivistic thinking grants even that there are Objective facts about these ideas which it has invented. There is a truth about them; there is just no Objective scientific method (yet) for establishing what that truth is: we do not yet know enough about how the nervous systems of such animals function. Each person is then even assigned an idea of the world, a worldview or Weltanschauung, perhaps even a plurality of them for varying occasions. Magnanimously, the Objectivistic thinker will even be tolerant of worldviews of the laity, those not scientifically schooled. The Objectivistic attitude is linked to a widespread attitude in Western life. It is not simply a result of dualistic thinking on the part of a few perverse philosophers. Overcoming it requires more than just frequently to bash some straw Descartes.>

objects in the narrow sense. See valuing [Werten], value predicates [Wertprädikate] and  value properties [Werteigneschaften]; Objectivating.

{1914 HUA28, 72:20 ff.} Only Objectivating acts refer to objects in the proper sense, to beings or to non-beings, whereas valuing acts refer to values and, more exactly, to positive and negative values.{1908/09 HUA28, 255:27 ff.} In the narrow sense, objects may be either objects that are not states-of-affairs [Nicht-Sachverhalten] or else states of affairs.

ontology, formal. See ontology, of the real (of realities); real [real].

{FTL (HUA17) 278 (m240)} Conceived as analytics, formal ontology relates with empty universality to any possible world whatever. It is unlike ontology in the sense, ontology of realities [ungleich der Ontologie in realen Sinne] in that it does not develop this idea of any possible world in the direction of a world of essentially necessary structural forms — which would be forms in a new sense, such as the "form" of the allness [Allheit] of realities, including the allness "forms" space and time, or such as the "formal" articulation of a world into regions of realities. Such forms of the ontology of realities are to be understood very differently from the sort of forms investigated by formal ontology such as the form of any possible world at all.

ontology of the real (of realities). See real [real]; ontology, formal.

{FTL (HUA17) 278 (m240 and E)} Ontology of realities develops the idea of any possible world in the direction of a world of essentially necessary structural forms — which would be forms in a new sense, such as the "form" of the allness [Allheit] of realities, including the allness "forms" space and time, or such as the "formal" articulation of a world into regions of realities. Here, 'form' refers to something very different from what it refers to in formal ontology .

ontology, universal.

The attempt to survey the relationships between objects of all kinds (irrealities to realities, ontic traits to axiotic traits, formal traits to material traits, etc.) from every side and attain systematic cognition of all that actually or possibly exists leads to the highest philosophic problems, those of a universal ontology. {FTL (HUA17) 177 (m151 and E)}

originary [originär]. See perception, sensuous.

To return to the things themselves does not always mean to return to them as they are adequately given to intuitive consciousness. For some very important sorts of objects (all real objects, for example), there is no such consciousness to return by way of. And for such objects, the return is by way of originary consciousness of objects of the kind.

originary givenness of real objects contrasted with that of eide.

{IP (HUA2) 35 f. (m35 in E)} In the first sense is the sense of the phrase 'originary givenness' it is, for example, said of sensuous intuition that it is originary in that it is conscious of what is sensed as itself given or presented in person. Husserl applies the term sense perception only to sensing of the kinds traditionally called "external": thus to visual perceiving, auditory perceiving, tactile perceiving, etc. Moreover, he discusses these in Ideas I principally insofar as they are ways of being conscious of transcendent Objects. Although such perceivings are called intuitions they are not intentive processes of a sort termed "evidence." This is because their objects cannot be given adequately. But since their objects are given, though inadequately, they are said to be (inadequate) intuitions. Since sensory perceiving is nevertheless called "originary" consciousness, this discussion seems to establish that calling it originary does not connote that what is so designated is evidence in the proper Husserlian sense of the word. Indeed, it is likely that its not being adequate intuition of its object may well be what differentiates sensory perceiving (and empathy since it must be founded on intendings whose objective sense could be originarily only sensuously) from the other forms of consciousness called "originary." Though it is not complete or perfect intuition of its object and so is not evidence so far as the truth of judgments about its object are concerned, sensory perceiving is nevertheless the most originary way of being conscious of its object. What calling it originary connotes about sensory perceiving may be just that it is what makes other ways of being conscious of the same object or the same sort of object (remembering it, clearly imagining it both of which are also called intuitions of their objects) possible. That this is at least part of the connotation is also suggested by the fact that empathy seems to be called originary even though it is neither evidence nor intuition with regard to the mental processes of which it is conscious; it is what makes possible other ways in which the ego may be conscious of mental processes that cannot themselves be presented at all.

A second sense of originarity is discerned in the intuition of eide, eidetic seeing. This sort of originary consciousness has in common with sensory perceiving that its object is itself given or presented in person. Something that differentiates eidetic seeing from sensory perceiving is that the object is not spatial and so has no adumbrations and no perspectival appearances. If it is given at all it is given in toto. So here it would seem that givenness is always adequate, complete. (This is a trait which eide have in common with that which is perceived reflectively: a fact which, Husserl thinks, contributed to the confusion whereby eide came to be misconceived as immanent constituents of the mind.) Hence, it would seem that there can be eidetic seeing that is adequate intuition of the relevant eidos and so is able to be evidence for the truth of judgments about what is eidetically seen.

ownness, sphere of. See NLPW.

{CM (HUA1) 124 f. (m124 in E)} Is the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within herself a peculiar ownness. It is achieved by effecting within the universal transcendental sphere, a peculiar kind of epoche with respect to the phenomenological residuum. Through this epoche we disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity. The effect is reduction to my transcendental sphere of peculiar ownness, to my transcendental concrete I-myself, by abstraction from everything that transcendental constitution gives me as Other.

What is specifically peculiar to me as ego, my concrete being as a monad, purely in myself and for myself with an exclusive ownness, includes my every intentionality and therefore in particular the intentionality directed to what is other; for reasons of method, the synthetic effect of such intentionality (the actuality for me of what is other) shall at first remain excluded from the theme. Within this pre-eminent intentionality there becomes constituted for me the new existence-sense that goes beyond my monadic very-ownness; there becomes constituted an ego, not as "I myself", but as mirrored in my own ego, in my monad. The second ego, however, is not simply there and strictly presented; rather is she constituted as "alter ego". The "Other", according to his own constituted sense, points to me myself. The Other is an analogue of my own self and yet again not an analogue in the usual sense.

{CM (HUA1) 126 (m126 in E)} A property of the transcendental phenomenon "world" is that of being given in harmonious straightforward experience; accordingly it is necessary to survey this world and pay attention to how something alien makes its appearance as jointly determining the sense of the world and, so far as it does so to exclude it abstractively.

perception [Wahrnehmung].

{LU#6 (HUA19/2) §45, 674 (mA 618, B₂ 146)}Every perception grasps its object directly. <NB: Since the passage is from Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl's use of 'grasping' here does not imply, as it would in works published later, that perceiving is always actional.>

{ibid.} That a sensuous perception is simple means that the object is immediately given in the sense that it is constituted as what is perceived with this definite objective content and not through <actional> relating, connecting, or otherwise articulated [gegliederten] acts which would be founded through other acts that would bring other objects to perception. <In subsequent terms, what is here said to be perceived simply is something, however complex, that is perceived and grasped together and objectivated. Thus, it is intended as a single this [Heidegger: , 'unifold' in several translations] even though the unity thus initially intended may have many members. Note that an object so grasped doxically and so intended simply need not be a perceived object.>

{ibid. 675:19} Every simple perception can function, either alone or with other acts, as founding act for new acts whether they include it or just presuppose it, acts which temporalize [zeitigen] a novel consciousness, presupposing essentially the original one, of something Objective. Insofar as such novel acts occur [be they acts of conjunction, disjunction, of definite or indefinite grasping of a particular (this-<as?>-something), of generalizing of simple or referential or connecting cognizing] what arises thereby are not just any subjective mental processes and not acts in general that are attached to the original one but are, on the contrary, acts which constitute novel Objects: there arise acts whereby something appears as actual and itself given in such a way that what hereby appears simply was not yet and could not yet be given in the founding act. On the other hand, however, the novel Object is grounded in the old one; the novel one refers objectively to the one appearing through the grounding act. The novel act's mode of appearing is essentially characterized by this reference. Such acts belong to a sphere of Objects which can appear "in person" only through acts founded in this way.

{ibid. 677} Unity of perception comes about as immediate fusion of the partial intentions and without any novel act intentions entering in and must come about in this way. Throughout the course even of continuously varying perceiving of the selfsame thing what occurs is just this sort of fusion of partial acts into the one act not a separate act of its own founded in the partial acts.

The course of the acts is a unity through which the discriminable acts are fused into one act and that a perception <where perceivings are included among the constituent mental processes>. In its course we continually perceive one and the same object. The continuing perception is founded in the sense of being a whole founded through its parts but not in the sense of a resulting whole having a new act-character <as would be the case where an affective act is founded on a doxic one>. The components of the doxic perceiving are still doxic perceivings with the same sort of positional character as the whole which they found. An act quite like any one of the components could occur apart from this particular course of perceivings. Here no quite new Object of consciousness comes to be constituted.

{ibid. 678 f.} Through such a continuous perceiving, the object meant is continuously the self same and the constituent acts are unitary through coinciding, but what is Objective throughout this process is exclusively the sensuous object never its identity with itself. Only when the continuous perceptual process becomes the basis for a new act that articulates the several perceptions and posits their objects in relation does the unity of continuity between the several component perceptions serve as origin for a consciousness of identity. Only then does the identity itself become objective. The coinciding moment that links the acts serves no as representing content for a novel perception which is founded in the articulated perceptions and alone makes possible the consciousness: what is now and was perceived is one and the same. The act of identification is indeed a consciousness of a novel Object. It is an act of the group, "categorial." This is a novel "object" that can come to appearance only through a novel consciousness of Objectivity. It can only be "itself grasped" or "given" through a founded act of this sort. {ibid. 679:29 ff.} The concept of the sensuous or the real can now be defined thus: whatever is real is possible object of some simple perception.

perception, sensuous. See originary [originär].

Husserl applies the term sense perception only to sensing of the kinds traditionally called "external:" thus to visual perceiving, auditory perceiving, tactile perceiving, etc. Moreover, he discusses these in Ideas I principally insofar as they are ways of being conscious of transcendent Objects. Although such perceivings are called intuitions they are not intentive processes of the sort termed "evidence." This is because their objects cannot be given adequately. But since their objects are given, though inadequately, they are said to be (inadequate) intuitions.

Since sensory perceiving is nevertheless called "originary" consciousness, this discussion seems to establish that calling it originary does not connote that what is so designated is evidence in the proper Husserlian sense of the word. Indeed, It is likely that its not being adequate intuition of its object may well be what differentiates sensory perceiving (and empathy since it must be founded on intendings whose objective sense could be originarily only sensuously) from the other forms of consciousness called "originary."

Though it is not complete or perfect intuition of its object and so is not evidence so far as the truth of judgments about its object are concerned, sensory perceiving is nevertheless the most originary way of being conscious of its object. What calling it originary connotes about sensory perceiving may be just that it is what makes other ways of being conscious of the same object or the same sort of object (remembering it, clearly imagining it both of which are also called intuitions of their objects) possible. That this is at least part of the connotation is also suggested by the fact that empathy seems to be called originary even though it is neither evidence nor intuition with regard to the mental processes of which it is conscious; it is what makes possible other ways in which the ego may be conscious of mental processes that cannot themselves be presented at all.

phantasy.

{HUA10} No matter what its content, phantasying is consciousness of contents modalized so as to exclude position in world time. What is phantasied has no definite position relative to whatever is seriously given. So there is no possibility of a continuous transition from perception to phantasy. Every primal impression must be identified as occurring within a continuum in which it either was protended or will be retended. <This is why Brentano's conception of time failed.>

phenomenology, transcendental.  See presuppositions, absolute freedom from; life-world [Lebenswelt].

Husserl wrote In ID1 {m2-4} that the preeminent task of the book would be to develop a method of phenomenological reductions such as would set aside the cognitive limits that are essential to inquiry that is natural, would redirect the narow orientation of interest that is characteristic of natural inquiry so as to attain the the open horizon of "transcendentally" purified phenomena and so attain to the field of phenomenology proper. That the procedure would start out from psychology would be required by the inherent commonality of subject matter.

Psychology is an experiential science and that entails first, that it is a science of matters of fact in Hume's sense and secondly that it is a science of the real. The phenomena which, functioning as psychological "phenomenology", it treats are real occurrences such that if they actually exist then they fit into the single spatio-temporal world (as the omnitudo realitatis) along with the real subjects to whom they belong.

In contrast, pure or transcendental phenomenology is to be established not as science of fact <of the Real> but rather as science of essence (as "eidetic" science): as a science that seeks exclusively to establish "essential <that is, eidetic> cognitions" and not any "facts" whatsoever. The pertinent <sort of> reduction, which leads from the psychological phenomenological phenomenon to the pure "essence" or that leads in predicative thinking from factual ("empirical" universality to "essential" universality is eidetic reduction. <The interpolated phrase 'sort of' is needed since Husserl distinguishes sharply between the two sciences, psychological phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology and holds that the former as well as the latter has and needs its pure or a priori discipline.>

In contrast, the phenomena of transcendental phenomenology are to be characterized as irreal. Other Reductions, the specifically transcendental ones, "purify" phenomenological phenomena of that which makes them real and integrates them into the real "world" and into any real world at all. Our phenomenology is to be an essential discipline dealing with transcendentally reduced phenomena rather than with real phenomena. In place of the usual single differentiation between sciences of the real and sciences of the ideal (or between empirical sciences and a priori sciences), two distinctions are to be employed here, corresponding to the two pairs of opposites: fact and essence on the one hand and on the other hand real and non-real. This twofold distinction will find its detailed justification in the second book. There it will be shown that the concept of reality needs a basic limitation whereby a distinction will have to be established between real being and individual being (temporal being at large). The transition to pure essence yields essential cognition of real objects on the one side and on the other essential cognition of the irreal, i.e., of the other spheres. All "mental processes" are, when transcendentally purified, irreal, posited beyond all integration into the "actual world".These transcendental irrealities are precisely what phenomenology investigates but investigates not as singular particularities but in "essence". To what extent transcendental phenomena are nonetheless accessible to investigation as single facts and what relation such an investigation of facts might have to the idea of metaphysics can be assayed only in the concluding series of investigations. {Concerning this issue see the entry "phenomenology, transcendental".}

{CRISIS (HUA6) § 52 (e178 f.)} The "Heraclitean flux" of constituting life cannot be treated descriptively in its individual facticity. There can be no analog to an empirical science of fact for transcendental being and life, no inductive science based on experience alone, in the sense of establishing individual transcendental correlations as they factually occur and disappear…

{ID1 (HUA3) m2-4} Thus the pair, real/non-real seems to dichotomize what-there-is and is perhaps synonymous with real/irreal. The irreal encompasses both the transcendental and the eidetic. The transcendental and the eidetic are mutually exclusive regions of the irreal; the transcendental being characterized as individual and as temporal while members of the eidetic are neither individual nor temporal. There is no pretense here, however, that the eidetic, the transcendental, and the real would exhaust what-there-is. Some way will need to be found for differentiating between the temporal being of the members of the transcendental (which occurs without any integration into the actual world) and the temporal being of real occurrences.

Within the real, a distinction is drawn between all real occurrences and real occurrences just insofar as they exist actually [wirkliches Dasein haben]. A real occurrence seems to be considered to be actual insofar as it integrates into some spatio-temporal world, the latter being omnitudo realitatis.

The whole of phenomenology is nothing more than scientific self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity, an examination that at first proceeds straightforwardly and therefore with a certain naïveté of its own, but later becomes critically intent on its own logos; it is a self-examination that goes on from the fact to the essential necessities, the primal logos from which everything else that is "logical" originates.

philosophy. See being, absolute.

{HUA28, 182:23} Obviously, philosophy must, as science of the absolute, be divided into two parts.

{HUA28, 229:19-24 and fn. 2} First, pure or a priori philosophy: it embraces a complex of doctrines, of pure or rational disciplines <formal disciplines!> — pure logic, pure mathesis, pure natural science, pure theory of space and time, pure theory of the essence of the mental, individual as well as social, pure value theory, pure theory of practice as well as the respective noetic disciplines and the higher disciplines built up thereon, ultimately and supremely the purely teleological theory of being and the theory of god (so that even this last is also an a priori discipline, treating an idea, not an actuality.) {HUA28, 182:23-33} One way to understand the idea of absolute cognition as the conception of a pure idea is to understand it as the idea of a most perfect cognition in general, hence in abstraction from all facticity. What we are thereby conceiving is the system of pure, of a priori philosophical disciplines. But the idea of absolute cognition can also be understood in a second way.

{ibid. 182:22-38} Second, metaphysics  as absolute science of factual actuality, a science thoroughly grounded in the purely philosophical disciplines, which provide it, naturally, basic founding principles, pure norms and ideals for the clarification of meaning, not existential premises. This is the idea of absolute cognition understood as the idea of most perfect cognition concerning the fact of this world. This idea need not imply that we presuppose a Nature in the sense of the various natural scientific cognitions as we learn them in school, as if we had on hand vorwegnähmen> whose development would be the goal of absolute cognition to begin with. Instead, we take as given the fact of certain definite experiences, certain perceptions, memories, etc. and the fact that certain cognitions have them as their starting points on whose ground a sphere of factual existence can be become progressively more determinate, through the progress of science a Nature with such and such natural laws.

physis, pure. See subjectiveness [Subjectivität]; natural (the) [das Dingliche], and the corporeal [das Korperliche].

polythetic acts, relation of to monothetic acts. See thesis [Thesis].

{ID1 (HUA3) 81 f., m65 f.} If an intentional mental process is actional, carried out in the manner of the cogito, then the subject (the "ego" is directed through it to the intentional object. There then belongs to the cogito itself and immanent to it a "directedness toward" the intentional Object, a directedness that emanates from the "ego" and so can never be lacking. This ego-regard varies with the act: in liking it is liking directedness; in willing it is willing directedness; in fancy it is fancying directedness; etc. By this is meant that this having something in mental regard, in the mind's eye, belongs to the essence of the cogito, of the specific act as such; it must not be mistaken for a different act in any proper sense, especially not any perceiving (not in any sense, however broad) nor with any sort of act that is akin to perceiving. It should be noticed that being intentional Object of some consciousness (taken as the full correlate of that consciousness) is not at all the same thing as being an Object grasped…

…In the broadest sense grasping coincides with heeding something, noticing it, whether in an especially wakeful way or in passing. Such heeding or grasping is not the mode of the cogito at large, is not the same as the mode of actionality as such. More precisely, it is a particular mode of act, one which every consciousness, or every act that does not yet have it can take on. If it does so then its intentional Object is not just one of which there is consciousness and being in mental regard; it is rather grasped, noticed Object. We cannot, to be sure, be turned toward a thing but in the manner of grasping, and the same is true of any object which can be objectivated simply: turning toward (even if in fiction) is eo ipso "grasping," "attending to."

But in the act of valuing we are turned toward the value, in the act of joy to what inspires joy, in the act of love to the loved, in acting to the action. And we are then so turned without grasping any of all that. The intentional Object (what is valued, enjoyed, loved, hoped for as such, the action as action) only comes to be object-grasped when there is an "objectivating" that turns to it in its own right [erst in einer eigenen "vergegenstandlichenden" Wendung]. In being turned valuingly to something there is implicit the grasping of the something: however, the intentional correlate of the valuing act is not of the mere something but the value-bearing something or the value proper (about which we shall speak in more detail. Thus, "to be turned valuingly to something" does not mean to have the value and what belongs to it as object in the special sense of the object grasped the way as we must have it <i.e., grasped doxically, objectivatingly> if we are to predicate about it, and the same for all logical acts that would relate to it. <NOTE that the same would be true in any active striving (action, Handlung) the ego adverts to and is busied with the striving itself: its goal, its in-order-to-motive, and with whatever means to the goal are co-intended, including the action itself. Through the action the ego is turned toward all this but is turned toward it strivingly rather than in a manner which objecitvates any of these things.> In acts like valuing, therefore, there is an intentional Object in a double sense: the mere "something" and the full intentional Object are distinct, and correspondingly there is a double intentio, perhaps a two-fold being-turned-toward; within the unity of a single cogito a double cogito is interwoven. If the ego is directed toward something through an act of valuing then the being directed toward the thing itself is an attending to it as object, a grasping of this something. She is also "directed" toward the value but is just not directed toward the value in a grasping way. Both objectivating the affair and the co-functioning valuing of it occur actionally. Clearly the former, the objectivating of the affair, is a different way of heeding (a different way graspingly to objectivate the object) when it founds a being directed valuingly from heeding that occurs without serving this function. It is important to note that the matter is this simple only in simple acts of valuing. As a rule, acts of feeling and willing (striving) are founded at higher levels, and the intentional Objectivity is correspondingly manifold, and there are multiple ways in which the Objects implicit in the unitary overall Object undergo or could undergo advertance as well. Be that as it may, the following principle holds.

Every act in the pregnant sense is governed by a way of heeding [Modus der Achtsamkeit]. Wherever the act in question is not a simple ontic-consciousness [Sachbewustsein <doxic monothetic consciousness>], wherever a further consciousness that "takes-position"  toward the state of affairs is founded in such a simple consciousness, the state of affairs and the full intentional Object (e.g., the "matter" and "value") split as do, respectively, heeding and having-in-ones-mental-regard.

position taking. See taking-position, position-taking [Stellungnahme].

possibility, attractive [anmutliche] and open [offene]. See certainty, pure and impure; possibility, open [die offene Möglichkeit]; Absurd, the.

{HUA11, 42:11-17} With the sense which it has for apprehension, what arises through the seen front may predelineate for the back something definite but ambiguously rather than univocally. When, for example, we are unsure whether what we see is a full-thing or a sort of façade, the result is a conscious conflict which is played out among the empty fore-indications [Vordeutungen]. Modalities arising from conflict are fundamentally different in essence from the modality of open specification. {HUA11, 44:3-11} From a primal mode of simple naive certainty there arises a closed and exactly delimited group of modalities (possibilities). These are modalizations by virtue of conflict between a demand [Forderung] that was originally simply certain and counter demands. Problematic consciousness with its problematic possibility belongs to this group.

{HUA11, 43:10-17} Problematic possibilities are possibilities that are in question as to their factuality (not as to their possibility): interrogative intention is the intention, arising through doubt, to decision for one of the attractive members of the doubt. Interrogation, questioning arises only where attraction and counter-attractions, for and against which something speaks, are in counter-play. However, the most direct expression for modalities of this type is attractive possibilities.

{ibid. 42:14,21} Here, it makes sense to speak of uncertainty. Only here does it make sense to speak of being inclined one way or another. Here, the normal ego-act of perception is modalized through the acts we call attractions of belief. {ibid.:30-43:1} On the objective side, we speak here of being attraction. This means that the affection goes out, issues from the objects, that the object and its antagonist, its alternate, both attract as being the object. The sense itself has inclination to be. [Der Sinn selbst hat Neigung zu sein.] Considered apart from the ego what it is that thus attracts her is called possible. The inclination to be distinguishes attractive possibilities from open possibilities . <The sense, the object with its objective sense, has a tendency toward being, in abstraction from its relation to the ego. However, the passage seems to imply, the object is simply possible, has Geltung . In relation to the ego, it attracts her to posit it, to execute thesis .>

{HUA11, 44:12-21} Problematic (attractive) possibilities and only these possibilities <and these apparently only when considered in their relation to the ego> arise with varied weights [mit einem verschiedenen Gewicht]: what attracts is more or less attractive. This is true of all such possibilities even when they are manifold [vielfältig] <attract to execution of a polythetic act?> Conflict [Widerstreit], which is the splitting [Spaltung] of one consciousness into reciprocal inhibition [Hemmung], also creates a unity which noematically is the unity of the opposition [Gegeneinander], the unity of the possibilities that are thus bound to one another.

{HUA11, 45:31-35 and fn}Husserl includes under attractive possibilities the case of a single determinate possibility with its negation as counter-possibility. There might be only one <attractive> possibility that is conscious, i.e., only one stands out yet is nevertheless not "certain" while the others or quite indeterminate others are "unconscious" which would mean that they are not awakened, but even though counter-possibilities are not awakened the inhibition is still there. <In this sense inhibition can be an empty consciousness of counter-possibilities.>

<The negation as counter-possibility seems here to imply possibility of cancellation through a now unspecified but nevertheless determinate possibility. The negation must nonetheless be relevant to the problematic possibility. Can givenness of nothing at all, the Absurd , be a counter-possibility (to anything at all>? Givenness that does not mesh into the world at all? Is that perhaps a possibility problematic (attractive) in the sense of being an alternative which is there for the ego but is there for her as unattractive, repulsive, to which anything at all is to be preferred, a possibility of which she wants no part, which she takes position affectively and, perhaps, conatively — against (see position-taking and attractive possibility)?

Husserl appears to deny this possibility when he writes that negation is always a cancellation that is partial and occurs on the basis of a continuing doxic certainty, ultimately on the basis of the all-embracing [universalen] world-certainty. {EU §21a, p.98 ff.} Yet he does not assert that negations are necessarily partial; the 'always' here may express the fact that any actual negating will always be partial; the Absurd always remains a possibility.

Is there not a sense in which taking position against is itself testimony for what is thus rejected, at least for its possibility?

The occurrence of a precategorial  consciousness of attractive possibilities indicates that the awareness of competing, alternative possibilities is not an invention of the intellect, as Bergson had argued in his discussion of determinism and as Schutz, following Bergson, seems to have thought.>

{EU,, 104} Through the conflict of attractive possibilities, normal perception with its simple belief-certainty is modalized into the experience of belief-attractions. On the noematic side, we speak of being-attraction. From the object there issues an affecting whereby it attracts the ego as being and being thus, just as does its enemy in the conflict <Fink-game?>. What attracts in this way we call possible (considered without reference to the ego). A concept of possibility originates correlative to the conflict of inclinations to believe. Being-possible, i.e., possibility, is therefore a phenomenon which shows up just as negation does even in the prepredicative sphere and is most at home there. In this case it is problematic possibilities that lie in conflict with one another. They could also be called ambiguous [fragliche] possibilities since dubitative intention to decide for one of the attractive members of the alternation is questioning intention. Only where attractions and counter-attractions for which and against which something speaks are in play is there anything questionable <at issue? FraglichkeUL. However, the expression best suited for this type of possibility is 'attractive possibility'.

Only such possibilities can involve probability. For one of the two sides, the inclination to believe or, more precisely the being-attraction can be the greater, the other the lesser: "it is probable that it is a person;" more speaks for its being a person. Probability denotes the weight that belongs to the ontic attraction. What attracts is more attractive or is less so, and the same holds for all of the, perhaps manifold, problematic possibilities that belong within one and the same conflict and that are synthetically linked through it: for even the mutual conflict, the splitting of a consciousness into mutually inhibition, generates a unity. Noematically it is the unity of the opposition of the competing alternatives, of the possibilities bound to one another through the competition.

possibility, open [die offene Möglichkeit]. See possibility, attractive [anmutliche] and open [offene]; infima species; universals, purely material, <conceptually> formed, and purely formal.

{EU, §21c, p. 105 (see also PP (HUA9,), 39:35-40:23; m in E)} The occurrence of open possibilities is grounded [begründet] through the structure of perception when throughout its course perception proceeds unbroken, without inhibition. What is intentionally predelineated through the apperceptive horizon is predelineated not as possible but as certain. <Heidegger calls the understanding of world that is implicit in unbroken circumspective explication of entities "unauthentic understanding, and that indeed in the modus of its purity [uneigentlichen Verstehen und zwar im Modus seiner Echtheit". {SZ §32, p. 148} Awareness of potentialities to use equipment as open possibilities does not show such potentialities to be attractive and to depend upon the ego's assigning herself to these potentialities. Thus, the relation of the ego's decisions to alternative possible worlds remains obscure so long as the potentiality to do so remains open rather than attractive.> Despite this certainty, there are always possibilities implicit in such predelineations — and even whole ranges [Umfänge] of manifold possibilities. Such predelineation is an indefinite universality [unbestimmte Allgemeinheit]. The universality is a noetic character of consciousness that points ahead emptily and is correlatively a sense-character for what is predelineated. The pointing ahead, like all other intending involved in normal perception, has the modus of naive certainty, but it has this modus precisely with respect to what the pointing ahead brings to consciousness and precisely with that sense with which it brings it to consciousness. And what such a consciousness brings to consciousness is an indefinite universality.

Every merely illustrative [veranschaulichende] making present prior to actual taking cognizance must have, with respect to the quasi-determining content, a modalized certainty character. This uncertainty has the peculiarity that what is given through it, a color, e.g., is given adventitiously and is something adventitious which cannot be replaced by just anything but can be replaced only by any other thing of its kind (the kind in question), viz., by any other color. In other words, the universal indefiniteness has a sphere of free variability.

Whatever falls within this sphere is implicit and all members of this sphere are implicit in the same [gleicher] way, are co-comprehended [mit umspannt] <in the predelineating? in the illustrating?>, even though not positively motivated, not positively predelineated. Each is member of an open range of closer determinations which can fit the framework and, beyond that, are completely uncertain: this is what is comprised in the concept of open possibility.

{PP (HUA9,), 43:6-10; m in E} Open possibility carries no inclination [Neigung] with it. An open possibility does not commend itself [sich anmutet] as existent, no demand is made upon it, not even a demand inhibited by counter-demands. There is nothing of attraction [Anmutlichkeiten] in it. (See possibility, attractive [anmutliche] and open [offene].)

{PP (HUA9,), 43:17-25 (m in E)} Open possibility and attractive possibility designate totally different types of modalization because the modalizing consciousness is fundamentally different in origin in the two cases. Both are modalizations of certainty. But open possibility consists in that an indefinitely universal intention, which itself is of the modus certainty, bears implicitly in itself a weakening [Abschwächung; Logische Untersuchungen has Abschichtung] of its certainty with respect to all conceivable specifications <is open to specification in all of them equally>.

{LU#6 (HUA19/2) § 32, 638 mB₂108} For example, a spotted color is demanded with certainty. Fulfillment is thus bound insofar as what fulfills must be "some" color with "some" spots, but there is here no conflict between possibilities; every specification of this type will fulfill the demand in like manner.

{ibid. and HUA11, 44;3-11} Out of a primal modus of simply naive certainty, a closed and exactly delimited [umgrenzte] group of modalities can be distinguished by virtue of their being modalizations which occur through conflict of a demand that was originally simply certain with counter-demands. In this sphere belongs problematic consciousness with its problematic (attractive) possibilities. Thus, the modalities arising out of conflict are fundamentally different in essence from the modalities of open specification.

<Primarily automatic apperceiving, on the occasion of some originary givenness (adequate) always involves, noetically speaking, some reference that is empty and, as noematic correlate, a sense character. Husserl refers to both these as indefiinite universality.
(1) Concerning this rule, in what sense can changes in the situation be said to put it into effect? Properly speaking, not at all: for such an effectuation or application can be understood only in teleological terms, i.e., as a striving. This striving occurs whether the ego engages in it or not; we could say that it is consciousness that strives for unity, but the unity of consciousness is the ego-pole . The striving is a doing that is no "I-do" but is still of the ego;  every "I-do" presupposes a tendency of the ego toward devoting-herself-to (see possibility, attractive [anmutliche] and open [offene]).
(2) The question whether such a striving can occur where no ego is engaged in doing anything at all remains open.
 

(a) In what sense is this reference empty?  The reference is non-empty in that it makes a requirement upon what it refers to; it specifies that it refers to something of a kind, but any species of this genus will satisfy the requirement. Insofar, the reference is "universal" and "indefinite".
(b) In what sense is the noematic correlate indefinite in its universality? The apperceived unity is that of an individual object x. The requirement involves a requirement that, in order for the object to maintain the unity it is apperceived to be, the non-originally intended determinations turn out in originary givenness to be of the kind they are anticipated to be. If the rule for converting non-originary to originary givenness be put into effect, either by the ego or simply by unwilled changes in the situation , then the individual determinations of the object must turn out to embody a species of the required genus if the unity of the object is to be preserved. The ego's intending one unitary object (objectivation) is. thus, presupposed as motivation for all apperceiving and all fulfilling. It is only in cases where the object-determination appresented is already familiar that the anticipation is determinately individual.
c) In what sense are the possibilities which can fulfill the implicit reference open? What is anticipated will always be that the not adequately perceived determinations of the perceived 'something' will embody some species of some familiar genus. The class "species of the genus in question" is open; it is not limited to just the species thereof which are familiar. A totally unfamiliar color may crop up at any time; this may be surprising, but it does not cancel or frustrate the anticipation of color. Predelineation is motivated by positional consciousness and occurs within a context of positional consciousness (memory-perception-anticipation) but still involves a consciousness of universality and indeed indefinite universality and open possibility. {HUA11 42:6-7}

(1) Only through some theoretical construction, e.g., mind of god, can indefinite universals be conceived definite.
(2) What is the connotation of 'all' in "the class of all species of x"? 'All species of x' has no extension. 'Species of x' has an extension, but it is indefinite, open.          

The ego has no decision to make with respect to open possibilities; there are no counter possibilities (attractions and counter-attractions) involved. Hence, the thesis is executed automatically; no becoming-convinced [Überzeugung] is involved. What specification will fulfill them is simply left open, to be decided by the course of events.>

pre-"objective" unities. See contents of mental processes; "contents" of conscious processes, objects of conscious processes.

{HUA11, 327:14-19} Prior to all recollection and to any active cognition at all there is constituted, purely passively, in perception itself and in it alone, a unity [Eine] that is as yet no "object". Any "object" is the correlate of some sort of cognition of a sort that occurs through synthetic identification of a kind which does presuppose recollection <The use of scare quotes on 'object' is important here. It indicates several distinct senses for the word. Within scare quotes it refers to an actional, exegent consciousness of a preconstituted unity as a unity — in Heidegger terms this would be a unity singled out and thereby explicated as a unity. This is a narrow sense for the word 'object', whose reference is otherwise the widest most inclusive possible, the unity that includes everything about which something might be said truly. Consciousness of an object in the narrow sense of the word can occur, it is said, only in a stream of consciousness in which recollection occurs or has occurred.>

presuppositions, absolute freedom from. See being, absolute.

FTL (HUA17) 279 (m240)} The relationship between formal ontology  and the ontology of realities  can be clarified and theories about it grounded through the path that leads through reduction to transcendental subjectivity toward the original grounding of all sciences (and of the formal ontologies of both sorts which exert a normative function for them all) as branches of a constituted production via the one transcendental subjectivity. In other words there is only one philosophy, one actual and genuine science; and particular genuine sciences are only non-selfsufficient members of it. The all-embracing science of transcendental subjectivity, in which all conceivable sciences, in respect of their actuality and their possibility, are essentially predelineated as actualizable by free action gives the only conceivable legitimate sense to the ideal of grounding cognition with an absolute freedom from presuppositions and prejudices

{FTL (HUA17) 279; (m241)} Every entity (that can ever have or have had meaning for us) stands, as intentionally constituted, in a hierarchy of intentional functions and of entities already constituted intentionally, which, for their par are involved in intentional functions for a new constituting of being. Every entity (contrary to the false ideal of an absolute existent and of the absolute trueness of an absolute existent) is ultimately relative; not only everything that is relative in any usual sense, but every existent is relative to transcendental subjectivity.

{FTL (HUA17) 280 f. (m241 f.)} The whole of phenomenology is nothing more than scientific self-examination [Selbstbesinnung] on the part of transcendental subjectivity, an examination that at first proceeds straightforwardly and therefore with a certain naïveté of its own, but later becomes critically intent on its own logos; it is a self-examination that goes on from the fact to the essential necessities, the primal logos from which everything else that is "logical" originates. All prejudices necessarily fall away here <eventually>, because they themselves are intentional formations, which become uncovered in the nexus of the systematically progressing self-examination. All criticism of logical cognition, not only the cognition that produces logic but also the cognition already mediated by logic — the criticism of cognition in sciences of every sort — is, as a phenomenological performance, a self-explication on the part of subjectivity, as it investigates the sense of its own transcendental functions. All Objective being has in transcendental subjectivity the grounds for its being; all truth has in transcendental subjectivity the grounds for the cognition of it, and if a truth concerns transcendental subjectivity itself, it has those grounds precisely in transcendental subjectivity. Stated in greater detail: if this subjectivity carries out self-examination systematically and universally — and therefore as transcendental phenomenology — then, as is clear from our earlier exposition, she finds, as constituted within herself, all "Objective" being and all "Objective", all truth legitimated in the world. Something Objective is nothing other than the synthetic unity of actual and potential intentionality, a unity belonging to the proper essence of transcendental subjectivity. Because of the manner in which the open plurality of other egos is constituted in my apodictically existing ego, this synthetic unity is relative to the universal community of the transcendental egos communicating with me and with one another, the transcendental egos existing "for one another"; that is to say, it is a synthetic unity of the intentionalities belonging to this community as part of its own essence. On the other hand, all truth concerned with this transcendental intersubjectivity as its theme is, so to speak, all the more relative to this intersubjectivity, correspondingly to this intersubjectivity's mode of being, which is being for herself, "absolute" being.

Thus, the ultimate grounding of all truth is a branch of the universal self-examination that, when carried through radically, is absolute. In other words it is a self-examination which I begin with the transcendental reduction, and which leads me to the grasping of my absolute self, my transcendental ego. As this absolute ego, considering myself henceforth as my exclusive fundamental field, I carry on all my further sense-investigations, those that are specifically philosophic — that is, purely phenomenological.

primordial world <in the terminology of The Crisis…, contrasted with that of CM>. See NLPW.

{The Crisis… 259 (HUA6, 262) and CM (HUA1) §§ 47-49} In CM, the "primordial world" refers to a stratum of mental life that is abstract compared to the reflectively perceived adult mental life. The primordial sphere as conceived there can become a theme for phenomenological investigations only through a further abstractive (privative) reduction of the phenomenological residuum. The abstractive reduction involved is there called "the ownness [eigenheiliche] reduction." <There is, however, a terminological as well as a conceptual difference in the German. In CM the sphere of ownness is called "primordinal world" as being the intrinsically first transcendency or world while in The Crisis… the sphere spoken of is called a sphere of primordiality as being my original sphere. But Husserl himself uses Primordialität in his 1930 reflections on the problem of intersubjectivity {HUA15 73, 76}> The ownness reduction is effected "by disregarding all constitutional effects relating in any way to other subjectivity."

In contrast to what CM calls the primordial world, the sphere of primordiality is more inclusive since it embraces the transcendentally reduced community of subjects even though it is still referred to as "my original sphere" within which the essential structures of an original life are to be attained through intentional modification <=fictive variation?>. Here the reduction to primordiality is said to be achieved as an aspect of transcendental phenomenological epoche. Since transcendental epoche requires that the phenomenologist not co-perform any of the positings that occur in the mental processes being investigated, there must also be a refraining from co-positing other subjects. All thetic qualities which are accepted by the investigator are taken simply as they show themselves to be, i.e., as qualities belonging to the experiences being investigated. The same applies to all empathic validities; they are not to be co-performed. Of herself, transcendental reduction, when carried out consequentially, is reduction to my original sphere: there is here, in the discussion of primordiality in The Crisis…, no mention of a further and abstractive reduction being needed in order to uncover my original sphere, the primordial sphere. <Empathic validities belong to the transcendentally reduced primordial sphere as this sphere is sketched in The Crisis… In the transcendentally reduced primordial life, the essential structures uncovered are structures of absolute, transcendental historicity. The same structures belong essentially to what, from the natural standpoint appears as family, people, community of peoples. If we take the statements in The Crisis… as representing Husserl's considered opinion at the time they were written then it appears that he had shifted away from the position presented in the CM of February, 1929. On this assumption, Husserl's statement (October/November, 1929), "The solipsistically reduced world is not to be confused with the primordial [primordinalen] world, or the solipsistic reduction confused with the primordial reduction," {HUA15, 51} would appear to be a correction of the conception of the primordial sphere in CM, where primordiality is uncovered through a reduction to ownness that is a solipsistic reduction, for when all constitutional effects relating to other subjectivity are disregarded then the resulting abstractive reduction can only be solipsistic.>

The consciousness of other subjectivity belongs to my very ownness. The ways of being conscious of other psycho-physical entities include more and less originary consciousnesses of the other — as depicted in a photograph or a painting or as the subject of gossip or of a news story. There is a most originary way of being conscious of an other, and this is consciousness of something sensuously given as a lived body other than one's own. On the other hand, other subjectivity is never given adequately. Hence, genetic analysis is needed in order to uncover mental processes of the sort which motivate the thesis, lived body of another. This analysis requires that, starting out from a concrete adult human life, the investigator imagine a variation of such a life that would be, however, purely solipsistic. <It is, however, an error to think that such a mental life is a persisting stratum within the reflectively perceived adult human mental life, as if it were somehow a stratum within the investigator's primordial sphere.>

This indicates that the terms used in the fifth CM to characterize the empathic apperception of other subjects need revision. They need a revision which does not shrink from using the term "solipsistic" — provided the stratum, world, sphere, life, etc. which are designated as solipsistic are understood to be abstract in comparison to <but not abstract parts of> monads of others sorts, including the lives of all transcendental egos of the sort called human. Whether there might be non-human monads who achieve no higher form of life than the solipsistic may remain for the time being an open question. Since the term "primordial" will then have been broadened to include the consciousness of other subjectivity and of the world as Objective, the term "solipsistic" should then be read in place of "primordial" in such passages as the following from the fifth meditation {op. cit. 139 ff. (m in E); the translations are Cairns'}.

1. The perception proper that functions as the basis [for the apperceptive awareness of others] is offered us by our perception of the <primordially> reduced world…
2. A certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the substratum, "<primordial> world", (which in any case is the incessantly underlying basis) and making present to consciousness a "there too", which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an "itself-there".
3. Let us assume that another man enters our perceptual sphere. <Primordially> reduced that signifies: In the perceptual sphere pertaining to my <primordial> Nature a body is presented which, as <primordial> is of course only a determining part of myself: an "immanent transcendency."
4. Ultimately we always get back to the radical differentiation of apperceptions into those that, according to their genesis, belong purely to the <primordial> sphere and those that present themselves with the sense "alter ego" and upon this sense, have built a new one — thanks to a genesis at a higher level.

probability. See possibilities, attractive.

psychologism, transcendental.

{ID3 (HUA5) 148, Collected Works 3 415} Attending to the nuance that conducts one from a pure inner psychology to transcendental phenomenology actually is what decides between the being or non-being of a philosophy which, in a radically scientific spirit, knows what is required by its distinctive sense, which is to be grounded in ultimate self-responsibility, and so knows the required foundation and required method. Only on the basis of such self-understanding can the deepest and genuinely radical sense of psychologism, i.e., its sense as transcendental psychologism, as the aberration that has corrupted the pure sense of philosophy by seeking to ground philosophy on anthropology or psychology, i.e., on the positive science of man or, respectively, on that of human psychic life. This aberration is not mitigated even if, following our procedure, a pure inner psychology is worked out as an a priori science. Even then, it remains positive science and can be a foundation only for a "positive", "dogmatic" science—but for philosophy, never.

psychology.

Psychology is concerned as a positive science with the mental only as something actually or possibly occurring within the world; the way it delimits its field of investigation makes impossible that it consider anything mental except as a constituent of the world. As a psychologist, therefore, one cannot even consider the possibility that the self-same psyches one takes an interest in also exist transcendentally. This does not mean either that the psyche is "real" or that it is somehow more real than the transcendental. You seem again to be confounding phenomenology with Kantian or with some other nativist transcendental philosophy.

psychology, pure (phenomenological).

When the actuality of psychologically reduced mental phenomena is disregarded (eidetic psychological epoche), it is indeed no longer taken as part of the actual world. Yet, it is still understood only "naturally" as occurring in [Heidegger, "within"] "the" world although that world would also be taken just as a possibility, i.e., as a possible world, and the mental life reflectively perceived is still only understood to be in [Heidegger, "within"] that world. Moreover, when what is reflectively perceived is imaginatively varied then the mental phenomena will be imagined as if they were reflectively perceived. They will no longer be intended as actual occurrences at all (and so not as actually reflectively perceived); they will no longer be intended as occurring in the actual world. But still they will be intended as occurrences such that they can only occur within some possible world. Being-in-the-world is still not understood as an achievement of the ego; the ego is still not understood to make herself be in the world, and it is still not understood that the world is given in and through the ego's experience.

{Crisis (HUA6) § 72} It seems at first as if a pure psychology does not exist in fact as a positive science. Such a science would investigate the universe of human beings living in the world as real facts, would investigate that field as other positive sciences (natural as well as moral [Geistes-]) investigate theirs. But there is no such science; instead, there seems to be only a transcendental psychology that is identical with transcendental philosophy. We must now consider in what sense this impression need be corrected. It were wrong to say that there can be no psychology as a science based on the pregiven world, i.e., as a science dealing straightforwardly with humans (and also with brute animals) in the world. It is certain, however, that no such psychology is possible without inquiry into what is purely and peculiarly essential to psychic being. It is just as certain that the latter is not to be had gratis as something one need only have a look at, being as how it be already there but not noticed. Whatever is in this way already there belongs to the world as something apperceived by those who see it that way and falls within the domain of that which is to be reduced. But if the all-inclusive epoche is needed, the epoche that encompasses all consciousness of the world the psychology loses for the duration of this epoche the Objective world as basis. Thus, pure psychology is in itself identical with transcendental philosophy as science of transcendental subjectivity. This is unassailable.

We can return from the shifted attitude into the natural attitude; pure psychology has, we said before, its vocational time like every other vocation in life. For the time during which I am transcendental or pure phenomenologist, I exist exclusively through transcendental self-consciousness, and I am my own topic, exclusively as transcendental ego with whatever is implied thereby. Here, there is no mere [schlechthin] Objectivity at all. Here there is Objectivity (including things, world, and all world-science — including all positive sciences and philosophies) only as my phenomena, the transcendental ego's phenomena.

Pure descriptive psychology places in suspension all prejudices regarding real relations between psychological phenomena and other occurrences. But it continues to accept the thesis of the natural attitude that human beings or other mental beings belong to the Objective world. Properly speaking, psychology has no further concern with questions as to whether such a world exists; such questions do not fall within the field of inquiry for positive sciences.

The pure psychologist must deal with beliefs about the world and about things in the world, beliefs which include precisely those beliefs she herself holds about it, and in dealing with them she may not assign them a privileged status, may not believe them as she otherwise does. And these beliefs include beliefs about her own organism and its relations to the only mental life which she reflectively perceives, viz., her own. These include as well whatever she may believe about other persons. None of these beliefs may she assume to be true as she otherwise does.^[8]

It will be a true disaster for positive science when it needs to establish the reality of its subject matter in order to exist as a science. You might as well maintain that there could be no theology unless the reality of gods were established.

There is a further reductive step for psychological phenomenology whereby one abstracts from the factuality of what can be observed in this field of worldly facts in order to consider this or that sort of fact just as an essentially possible example for a certain kind of psychological fact, whatever the particular kind of fact that is currently under investigation.

The priority of eidetic phenomenological psychology (eidetic descriptive psychology) over a physiological psychology has at least two grounds.

(1) It is simply a matter of its making more general assertions than particular empirical inquiries. Eidetic psychology establishes laws for what is essentially possible, necessary, or impossible within the region of the mental. What is involved here is the basis of psychological inquiry. But this does not get at the genuine relationship. All psychological theory must square with, be compatible with eidetic psychology. But what this means is simply that results, whether empirically or eidetically achieved must be mutually consistent. The principal differences between the two sorts of inquiry have to do with differences in the nature of verification or, more precisely, falsification: empirical claims, so long as they fall within the range of eidetically possible psychological phenomena, can be falsified only by observation and measurement of actual cases; eidetic claims can be falsified by any clearly imagined cases whose description would be incompatible with the relevant eidetic claim(s). So that if the concept of certainty were relevant at all here then we should presumably be less certain or our eidetic claims than or our empirical ones. On the other hand, if there is reason to think of eidetic claims as being more secure than empirical ones then that might have to do with Husserl's conception of eidetic psychology as standing to empirical in a relation analogous to that of geometry to empirical physical science. In that case, we might expect eidetic claims to be more secure than empirical ones simply because there is, as Mill might say, a wider range of ways to falsify them so that if an eidetic claim were false then it is more likely it would have been found false already. Still, such claims must square with all known facts, whether of empirical psychology or of any other science. So, in its generality, eidetic psychology must square with whatever we know about psychological or other phenomena regardless of whether the phenomena concern human or other animal behavior.

(2) Physiological psychology would presumably need to differentiate its field of investigation from the rest of physiology. How would it be feasible to do this in the absence of a scientific description of the psychological phenomena to which physiological phenomena must be related in some definitely specified way if they are to be relevant to physiological psychology? Given the state of psychology as a science, I think it absurd to suppose that psychologists are somehow born with adequate concepts of mental phenomena. It seems even sillier to suggest that psychology should let these be dictated by ordinary usage. It is a fiction, devised by materialists and their various sympathizers, that if there were any minds then every mind would have perfect self-knowledge.

real [real]. See perception [Wahrnehmung]; categorial acts; infima species.

{LU#6 (HUA19/2) § 47, 679:29 ff.} The concept of the sensuous or the real can now be defined thus: whatever is real is possible object of some simple perception. The possible objects of sensuous perception, be it actual or imagined, are objects of sensuous intuition in general. The parallel between the actual and the imagined assures that real objects can be understood to include those of imagined simple perception as well as those of actual simple perception. <Note that it would not follow that something which is imagined as if it were simply perceived could be identical with something actually perceived; the point here is rather that imagined real objects can be quite like real objects.>

"The concept real part — more particularly, the concepts real piece, real moment (real characteristic), real form — is determined by the concept "real object [des realen Gegenstandes]. Each part of any real object is a real part." Through being simply perceived, the whole object is said to be "explicitly" given, each of its parts (in the widest sense of the word) is given "implicitly." The totality of those objects which can be given through simple perception whether explicitly or implicitly is the sphere of sensuous objects in the widest sense of the word.

Sensuous intuition of any abstract moment of a sensuous object is non-self-sufficient. Even in the case of mere representation through analogy, the representing content can be experienced only through a more inclusive concretum. Yet this does not imply that the intuition of the sensuous moment must be a founded act. It would have to be if the grasping of any abstract moment had necessarily to be preceded by grasping the concrete whole or, more precisely, grasping the complementary moments, where grasping is understood to be an act of intuitive advertance. But I <Husserl> do not consider this to be obviously so. On the other hand, grasping any moment, and in general any part at all as part of a given whole — and so grasping any sensuous characteristic as characteristic, any sensuous form as form does necessarily indicate many founded acts, among them many acts of referring. This would leave the sphere of "sensuousness" and enter that of the "understanding."

{ibid. 681:9} Any sensuous object can be grasped in a variety of ways. To begin with, naturally enough, simply. Being grasped simply is to be understood, like all the possibilities to be discussed in this connection, entirely as an ideal possibility which characterizes an object as sensuous. Grasped simply the sensuous object stands before us unifoldly [einfaltig; cf. Heidegger] : the parts which constitute it are indeed in it but they do not become explicit objects for us in the simple act. We can, however, also grasp the selfsame object in explicating fashion: we "raise" the parts into "relief" through articulating acts; we posit what is emphasized in relations, whether to one another or to the whole, through referring acts. And only through these novel ways of being grasped do members that have been connected and related acquire the character of "parts" or of "wholes." The articulating acts and the retrospective relating of the simple act are not merely lived through in series; on the contrary, there are in each case transcending unities of acts involved through which the part relationships are constituted as novel Objects. {ibid. 681:21} See categorial acts.

When individual intuition is intuition of anything real or of anything belonging to the category of the Material then it is necessarily inadequate. Real things are transcendent in both of the senses which Husserl distinguishes {see also IP (HUA2) 35 f. (m in E)}: they are not real components of the reflectively perceived mental life and they can never be given adequately. This remains true even though we can have adequate knowledge that it is an eidetic necessity that real things are not adequately knowable. This necessity is established through eidetic description of the most originary possible givenness for real or material things, viz., sensuous perceiving, not through sensory observation of any real Object.

Real things are phenomena insofar as they are intended objects of mental processes, and these are adequately given and can be described eidetically. This, however, is true of the object of any consciousness whatsoever. Just because eidetic description shows the meaning of real objects to be such that they if they do exist then they are not adequately intuitable, any real intended object can be adequately known only as it is intended or meant — not as actually existing.

Something quite similar would be true for other minds which are, like purely real objects, transcendent in both senses even though it is true of them that if they do exist then they are adequately given to the other mind.

{FTL (HUA17) §64, 177 (m150-151)} Much vehement opposition <to the concept of irreal objects> arises from a misunderstanding of the sense in which we put ideal <here, eidetic> objects as well as the categorial transformations of real objects (such as predicatively formed affair-complexes) on a par with [Gleichstellung] these real objects themselves. For us this is merely a matter of the legitimacy of the broadest sense, "any object whatever" or "anything whatever", and, correlatively, of the most universal sense of evidence, evidence as the giving of something itself. Otherwise than with respect to the legitimate subsumption of ideas under the concept of object, and consequently under the concept of substrate of possible predications, there is no parity at all between real and ideal objects, as can be understood precisely on the basis of our tenets. In respect of its being, reality has precedence to every irreality whatsoever, since all irrealities relate back essentially to an actual or possible reality.

{from comments on a student's preliminary work for a thesis} Real' in Husserl normally does refer to objects that are understood to be spatio-temporal in contrast to objects that are understood to be temporal but not necessarily spatial; he usually reserves the term 'actual' for the latter while extending it to include everything temporal whether spatial or not. The actual is contrasted with the ideal for which he prefers to use his term 'eidetic.'

So, the non-real is by no means limited to the actual, and there can be and historically have been sciences (pure mathematics, formal logic, phoronomy (pure kinematics), etc.) dealing with objects which are neither real nor actual. Such objects do not lack legitimate ontological status.

When you speak of "necessary features of any object of psychological investigation," for example, your locution would imply that there are laws regarding features which anything psychological or mental must have. No clear reasons have been given for believing that laws are real things. So it were better not to prejudice the matter of the status of laws or other ideal (eidetic) objects.

To the best of my knowledge 'real' in Husserl never connotes "substance" in any traditional meaning of that word. Brentano held a reist metaphysics similar in many ways to Aristotle's and to Descartes', but Husserl did not. When he uses the word 'substance,' it carries primarily a logical rather than an ontological meaning. An eidetic (ideal) object is just a much a 'this' (object of possible judgment) and so just as much an individual as a material thing is. And a "material thing" (the scare quotes are important here) is <intended as> concrete or "absolute" (here, too) or self-sufficient only in comparison to its qualities, states, relations, etc. But it is not concrete in any ultimate sense. There may be some such object as an ultimate, all inclusive unity, but what to call it and how to conceive it is not spelled out, and the aim of the method is to avoid prejudging this question. <8 December 2001. The ultimately inclusive class or unity appears to be the class of all objects [Gegenstände]. In any event the assertion that something does not belong to the class of objects is self-defeating in that it could not be true unless it were untrue.  3 May 2007: The all inclusive unity, the unity of all objects, would necessarily be a member of itself; I do not find that this gives state of affairs generates any paradoxes; should it do so then that is an indication that proper logic requires a value that might best be termed "neutral" for propositions that, being paradoxical, are not true and are not false.>

Husserl really is concerned here to establish the meaning of terms in a supposedly descriptive vocabulary. He is not supposing that any of the things he refers to as real exist. Instead, he attempts to describe the experience of objects intended as existing in space, regardless of whether or not anything does so exist. The point would be that "spatial thing" is one of the most extensive types, categories, or regions among the things believed to exist. He makes and reports a terminological decision to reserve the term 'real' for objects so intended that if they exist then they have a locus in space. (Being intended as having spatial locus is a necessary, not a sufficient condition for being intended as real; standing in if-then relations of functional dependency is another necessary condition for being intended as real. He finds that every personal psyche intends herself to have a spatial locus and so as real in the terms he is using. He also holds that actionally to intend herself as a reality is an acquired trait of each soul who has it so that there can and indeed must be souls who do not have this trait. <Note that having it or not having it has no clear relation to whether the soul who has it does or does not exist in space. That is a quite separate question, and when he does consider it, Husserl is inclined to agree with Locke that it does.> If it is true that all persons are aware of themselves as being in space, still nothing would follow from this concerning Objectively Real relations between sensations and physiological occurrences. Moreover, that memory is intentional does not at all rule out the possibility that it has Objectively Real physiological conditions.

reduction, transcendental and psychological. See originary [originär]; life-world [Lebenswelt].

<Properly speaking, the "transcendental reduction" was misnamed. When Husserl introduced the term, he had not yet distinguished as sharply as he would later between the new phenomenological philosophy as it had evolved since the Logical Investigations and the earlier eidetic psychology. What the phrase refers to is a methodological step involving a decision to include the underlying thesis of the natural attitude within the field of investigation for phenomenology; the effort to investigate it requires that the phenomenologist adopt toward it an attitude of neutrality. Far from having a more restricted subject matter than phenomenological psychology, transcendental phenomenology is the more inclusive discipline. Its attitude toward its subject matter is less abstract, more concrete. [In much the same sense in which George Berkeley argued that investigating objects of any sort at all is only truly concrete when it takes into consideration how consciousness of them would occur.] Indeed, it is the ultimately concrete science since its field of investigation includes anything at all of which there can be any consciousness at all. This is the legitimate sense in which transcendental subjectivity is absolute, all inclusive. Not that all objects are in it as constituents but rather that it enables us to conceive and to investigate the all-inclusive subject field. As investigator, one does not assume that the thesis under investigation is true or is false; that is one of the things one is presumably trying to disclose, the truth about the thesis that what is mental is part of the world. Properly speaking, the executing of the thesis doesn't cease, if it did then it would be all the more difficult to observe and to describe it. Supposedly, one ceases as investigator to co-perform it.

The psychological, non-philosophical steps in the method can legitimately be thought of as reductions or abstractions. The psychological reduction abstracts from anything and everything which the investigator believes or even knows about things other than the mind that can be observed reflectively. Here, too, the belief in other things is not eliminated or terminated; it is included within the field of investigation not as a truth but as something accepted, something believed in some quite particular manner.

So the principal difference between this reduction and the transcendental one is that psychological investigation conceives its field of investigation to be one part or aspect of the world, one aspect, e.g., of a psycho-physical being.>

referring [beziehende] acts. See nominal forming [nominale Formung].

{LU#6 (HUA19/2) 654:19} Are acts <mental processes> of correspondence or non-correspondence, predicative acts. Strict adequation can place non-referring as well as referring intentions at one with their perfect fulfillment.

reflection, phenomenological and non-phenomenological.

{ID1 (HUA3) m95} Anyone can certainly carry out reflection and can consciously grasp such reflecting, but doing so is not phenomenological reflection and the consciousness thus grasped is not pure consciousness…Radical deliberations are needed to achieve the recognition that there is or even might be a field of pure consciousness which is no component part of Nature. …pure consciousness is so far from being a piece with Nature that Nature is possible only as an intentional unity motivated in consciousness by immanent interconnections. Such radical deliberations are also needed to recognize that a unity such as Nature is given and is to be researched theoretically through an attitude wholly different from the one in which the consciousness which "constitutes" this unity — and so every absolute whatsoever — is to be researched. …they are needed if it is at long last to become clear that transcendental research into consciousness cannot mean research into Nature and cannot presuppose such research as its ground [Prämisse] since Nature is, through its transcendental attitude, bracketed…

residuum, <transcendental> phenomenological. See natural attitude; consciousness; consciousness, transcendental; being, absolute; psychology; psychology, pure (phenomenological).

{ID1 (HUA3) m58-59} In the natural attitude we take these <reflectively perceived> mental processes just as occurrences in the lives of animate beings. This attitude is so natural that even when seeking a new <non-natural> Object-province we overlook that the new province emerges from these very spheres of mental processes. The first thing that will occur to the reader, since we are concerned with a new eidetics, is that what has been excluded is the world as matter of fact and that what remains as the phenomenological residuum is the world as eidos. Thus, philosophy turned away from the mental as such and sought the new objects in the spheres of arithmetic, geometry, and the like. Yet we do not follow the tradition down this path. We want to exhibit as residuum what we designate "pure mental processes," "pure consciousness" with its pure "correlates of consciousness" on the one hand and its "pure ego" on the other.

We shall start <psychologically> with the Ego, the consciousness, and the mental processes which are given to us in the natural attitude <Copy D: and can be derived from it with purity>. We absolutely need universal insight into the essence of any consciousness whatsoever and, quite particularly, into the essence of consciousness insofar as it is, in itself, by its essence consciousness of "natural" actuality. The insight which these investigations are to lead to is that consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion. It therefore remains as the "phenomenological residuum," as a region of being which is of essential necessity quite unique and which can indeed become the field of a science of a novel kind: phenomenology. <The field of investigation is "the same" in an important sense for both "pure" descriptive psychology and what is here called "phenomenology" rather than "transcendental phenomenology." The latter sort of investigation emerges from the same field through inquiry having a novel attitude or orientation. The field of investigation for "phenomenology" is "implicit in" the field of investigation for "pure" psychology.

{ibid. 143} However, eidetic psychological assertions are by no means themselves <transcendentally> phenomenological assertions.>

Sartre, Jean-Paul.

As I understand Husserl's view, 'pure ego' refers to the polar unity, the continuous synthetic unity of the flux of consciousness so that there is no consciousness at all, whether brutal or personal or just vegetal whose unity is not a pure ego. This would be the case even if there are monads wherein no ego ever actively engages in any of the mental processes occurring in the monad's stream of consciousness so that the ego's life is in such a case entirely passive. One way to put the Sartrean objection might be that it is a sort of category error to try to conceive this unity (which Sartre certainly does not deny) in personal terms through the use of a word like 'I' or 'ego'. Sartreans will then have to show how an ego can originate where there was none before. That may be doable; it would require showing how activity can occur without any ego if the ego is to arise only through reflection and if reflection is active. An entirely passive ego (or for the Sartrean an entirely passive consciousness) would presumably not be free if freedom be conceived to require active choice. {See PP (HUA9) 99.}

sciences, specialized, and philosophy. See phenomenology, transcendental.

{HUA28, 178} Facts can as a matter of principle not be derived from essential laws; the latter merely prescribe possibilities for the former in the manner of ideal norms. All specialized science, each specialized natural science, for example, are subordinate, as science in the rigorous sense, to the ideal of absolute cognition and are thereby to be called philosophical. Each factual existent integrates into the total existent, and to know the latter perfectly is a philosophical ideal. At any time, science in its current state is rigorous science only to the extent that it corresponds to the ideal of science at large and, more particularly to the idea of the pure science which has that universal form which is prescribed by that regional category to which the respective factual existence is subordinate.

sensations, affective. See affective sensations (impressions).

sensuous object. See real [real].

state of affairs [Sachverhalt]. See categorial objects and sensuous objects.

{HUA19/2, 684:31 f.} In the terminology of the Logical Investigations, the set states of affairs includes only "objects of a higher order".

{HUA19/2, 651:22-24} Husserl sometimes differentiates objects in the narrower sense from states of affairs. When so used, "state of affairs" refers to the correlate of any identifying and differentiating synthesis.

subjective, (the) culturally [das Kultur-Subjektive]. See subjectiveness [Subjektivität];  categorial form contrasted with subjectively relative traits.

{PP (HUA9) 407–09 (excluded from E)}
I. Culturally subjective characters of Objects are different from merely subjective overall characters such as acquaintedness [Bekanntheit].

A. Acquaintedness is an associative character and is a sort of overall coloring without articulation and with no specific relation to specific properties of the Object. <It includes no alteration of the material properties of the Object. This is, however, compatible with the Object's acquiring new subjectively relative properties>.
B. In contrast, the aim or purpose of a practical action impresses specific forms (sometimes quite various ones) upon the Object, shapes its specific properties, sensuous as well as non-sensuous, shapes the make up and the parts of various kinds and qualities. Examples given are: any tool, agricultural implements, musical instruments. <This seems to differentiate the class too broadly since a found Object may serve as a tool without being altered in any way. It is important to note that the found Object need not be in any way transformed in order to serve as tool; using it simply explicates (uncovers, reveals — see Heidegger (QCT, 9-17}: the basic trait of techne is that it is a way of revealing not merely that it is a way of changing something) its meaning without altering the Object. There is an important difference between a thing's being unintentionally shaped by use and its being shaped for use, despite the fact that use does make some implements more effective so that such implements, for someone who is acquainted with a certain implement before and after it has undergone such changes, the goal of making similar things more useful is likely to be "constituted.">

1. {ibid. 408:29-409:1 (omitted from e)} Shaping the Object in this way impresses upon it, Husserl says, an enduring teleological character. <Husserl does not seem to notice that utility for the purpose is discovered.>

a. {ibid. 407:31-38} This enduring teleological character of the Object formed for a purpose seems to be the genuinely distinguishing characteristic, for Husserl, of what he calls "purposeful activities and formations carried out with consciousness of universality and creating serviceability for continuously recurrent cases" as opposed to what he calls "individual purposeful activities," i.e., those that are related to one individual case and that lend the Object a passing end-form for the here and now only. In connection with these latter Objects, Husserl speaks of "most primitive cases" with utterly occasional end-determinations. As examples he gives an handy cudgel used on the spur of the moment as being found suitable for driving home a peg and also marks for oneself and Others found useful momentarily.
b. ibid. 407:31-408:1 and fn.} What we call a hammer, on the other hand has a purposeful formation and serviceability for a class of possible cases that recur occasionally. And in fact the tool has a universal community character, i.e., a serviceability not just for its possessor but for everyone who might use the tool. So, too, he says, marks might eventually be volitionally formed and used in universality.
c. Husserl also says it is easy to see that the development progresses from individual end-objects to universally serviceable ones. <However, it would seem that the genuine difference here is between "tools" that do and that do not have the sense "having been made by or shaped by someone for a purpose". The difference, however, is not that between individual and general [here: communal?]. The "individual hammer" is just as universally serviceable as "what we call a hammer" is. The genuine difference between the former and the latter is:

(1) much more a difference in ease with which the latter is recognized by a certain set of persons (regardless of how extensive the community of persons is whether single person, a family, a clan, etc.)
(2) most often a difference in efficacy for the purpose with a tendency to specialize the tool for specific purposes.

The difference also involves a development , but not from individual to (actual or possible) community usefulness. In contrast to the "natural" hammer, the "hammer proper" involves a history through which it has not merely been found useful for a purpose but has been formed for the purpose; its teleological character has been formed into a work in which this character has been impressed upon the Object, i.e., the Object's material properties have been altered to suit the purpose so that there has been a material alteration that makes the thing an artifact, an alteration through which the Object itself has become expressive not only of "natural" but of human (personal) history. This is not so of found, merely discovered tools. These might show signs of use but not of manufacture. Both natural and "proper" tools delineate by their material (sensuous) properties what they are good for, i.e., the range of their use. But these material properties, in the case of the tools proper, indicate also (to anyone who is in a position to apperceive them so) the process by which they were altered for use by someone. Like natural Objects will perhaps be collected and kept thus removing the need to search and an element of chance. Once the tool is made rather than just being found, the possibility arises of improving it not merely by use but purposefully. Along with this comes the development of a new skill and the prospect of skilled, specialized workers.

Husserl placed in brackets in the MS the passages underlined above, indicating his own dissatisfaction with the distinction in question. The passage "<the objective cultural world is> therefore communal as such, is for 'everyone'" {PP (HUA9,) 409:41-42 (omitted from e)} is an improvement later substituted for an earlier passage that had read "individual end-formations, we might say formations of individual culture, become generally understandable and also experiencable Objects, Objects existing for everyone, as Objects of a communal culture." {PP (HUA9) 633 (omitted from e)} The improvement shows that Husserl became aware of the serious error in the way he conceived 'individual' tools.

(1) Natural tools are just as universal as are tools proper; and there is no warrant for the suggestion that utility is a sense supervened artificially upon an in itself valueless material.
(2) Moreover, natural tools are not less universal than artificial ones.
(3) An "individual" culture that would exclude social meaning does not occur. Communization of the surrounding world is implied by any Object whatsoever. That using a found "natural" Object for a purpose constitutes that Object as a tool for the ego using it does not mean that the Object becomes useful by being used. By using it, the ego reveals its serviceability, its usefulness for a purpose, and makes possible

(a) that the ego intend it as being useful through certain of its material properties
(b) that the ego intend as similarly useful any Object which would be like it in the relevant way: the ego may, e.g., collect similarly sharp edged stones and begin to do so habitually.

However, the Object's serviceability is not expressed by any voluntary alteration of the Object itself, any effort intentionally to change its material properties to make it more suitable for the purpose. Still, it probably remains true that the sense of the thing as tool comes to be constituted for anyone at all only through the comportment of some individual ego and necessarily so, no matter what sorts of groups of egos the constituting ego may wittingly or unwittingly belong to.
(4) But this individual origin would not distinguish the natural tool from "proper" ones, even in the case of an original primal instituting of the utensil sense. Even a social group in which there were no artificial tools might nevertheless have a tradition of using natural tools. Thus, non-artificial tools could belong to a socio-historic tradition and need not be limited to an individual-historical tradition.

In any case, the primal instituting  of utility senses such as these — and perhaps of any sense whatever — will necessarily co-institute for any but a solipsistically existing ego not only an "I can" but a "we can" and indeed an "anyone can" (with the condition that whoever can must have suitable organs). To what extent these senses will stimulate the ego and which if any of them will be adverted to and how they will be adverted to will depend upon the situation  in internal time.

Husserl also struck out from the text {PP (HUA9,), Beilage X, 407:17, 633 (omitted from e)} the following passage:

And this <subjective and teleological> character stays with the Object to begin with for the one who has brought it about, e.g., the arrow as her arrow in the enduring end-character. These characters thus acquire 'objectivity' through the interaction of persons [Menschen] with each other as persons who are conscious subjects, sensuously experiencing subjects, sentiently valuing subjects, and acting subjects

His doing so indicates that Husserl subsequently became dissatisfied with the view it propounds, viz., that tools or utility senses originated historically and perhaps also genetically as private to the individual who first constituted them and even as that ego's private property. However, the fact that anyone who fashions an arrowhead must be in some sense an individual is entirely consistent with this individual's belonging for herself or for others to a group and with many different ways of understanding the useful thing's ownership. The fact would seem indeed to be compatible with complete absence of any sense of ownership at all. Allegations concerning axiotic necessity of one or another form of ownership seem to have no necessary connection at all with this ontic fact. Heidegger is probably quite right to emphasize that "they" dominates the ego's life and attitudes; accordingly "they" also decides which attitudes if any the ego will have to begin with toward ownership as well as toward her relationship to the group(s) to whom she belongs.

{PP (HUA9,), 409:41-42, 633 (omitted from e)} Similarly, Husserl deleted,

out of individual purposive formations [Zweckgebilde], we might also say formations of individual culture, arise universally understandable and experienceable Objects of community culture.

in favor of:

The Objective world is an ever developing Objective cultural world. Therefore, as such is communal surrounding world for 'everyone.'

The deleted passage had clearly implied that:

(1) genetically speaking, teleological characters relative to that individual subject for whom they are constituted and to her alone come first and then become elements of something referred to as an "individual culture" and
(2) Objects which are universally experiencable and so are accessible to and have a status [in Geltung] for a community develop out of individually relative teleological characters and
(3) along with this development, the teleological character becomes for the individual subject an element of community culture.

But what is the meaning of the phrase 'individual culture' in these contexts? Seemingly, Husserl means the historicality of the individual ego's memory, that is, her internal historicality {see the entry "historicality"} of the sort involved in the temporality of any mental life {see FTL (HUA17) 316 (m278)}. Then it would seem that all intended unities would pertain to individual culture, including the unities intended by a solipsistically existing ego, such unities as would be left over after abstracting from all senses that would entail or refer to a plurality of subjects. Such solipsistically intended unities would certainly have been primally instituted through actional subjectivity, and they would include whatever special teleological characters might be generated. All such characters intended by an ego would, if they are not themselves initial primal institutings, have the subjectively relative characteristic "familiarity" and would point back to an original primal instituting through an initial and necessarily intuitive consciousness of some character of the relevant kind.

However, individual culture undergoes a decisive transformation through the constitution for the ego of the possibility of mental processes that do not occur within the ego's own internal time. But the individual would have achieved a form of existence that is being in a world that is social and communal. This achievement means that there has come to be constituted for the ego her status as social and communal and Object. What she has thus achieved will not be transformation of a previously isolated individual existence into a social one but will have instead the sense of explicating or revealing a previously unfamiliar aspect of her being in the world. The ego's existence doesn't thereby cease to be individual any more than it thereby begins to be Objective. But it does cease to be solipsistic. At least part of the trouble with the passages above which Husserl either deleted or marked as being unsatisfactory is their inclusion of the suggestion that this achievement entails the introduction into the ego's life and surroundings of a previously absent set of traits rather than the explication of traits genuinely belonging to her individual essence. The newly explicated traits enter into associative synthesis with the ego's retended past in such a way that she will acquire the habitual belief that she lived her "solipsistic" life in the presence of others on whom she unwittingly depended.

Sometime after November, 1926, Husserl reviewed these manuscripts, marking and annotating them as noted above and adding a marginal note: "cf. nun Heidegger: Bewandmis-Zusammenhang!" Heidegger's BT appeared early in 1927 in the eighth volume of JPPF. Husserl had not read it prior to publication. He was busy working on the Paris lectures and his own FTL until the last page proofs for FTL were sent in on July 3, 1929; the book appeared at the end of July, 1929. Then he spent much of the next two months (July and August, 1929) studying BT:

Right after my last book <FTL> was printed, I turned for two months to the study of Being and Time as well as the more recent writings in order to reach a sober-final position toward Heidegger's philosophy. {HUADoc I 349}

These markings and annotations probably originated during or shortly after that study. Husserl's dissatisfaction with his own position on the culturally subjective is likely to stem from this study. It seems likely that he quite approved of Heidegger's views of the matter.

It is far from clear that R.B. Perry was right in his conclusion that Husserl had Heidegger in mind when expressing disappointment "that his best pupils (Heidegger, e.g.) have gone off in speculative directions." {HUADoc I, 364} Perry is reporting on things Husserl said at a tea in his home to which a number of persons (Heidegger, Schestow, Pos, Becker, Kaufmann, Szilasi, et al.) had been invited. It isn't likely that Husserl would have aimed such remarks pointedly at Heidegger on that sort of occasion. The observer is likely to have made more of the matter had Husserl done so.>

2. Note that Husserl does not say in any of the above contexts that the culturally subjective is co-extensive with the sphere of exigent comportments which produce enduring teleological characters or with the sphere of exigent comportments generally (with their intentional products or achievements).

II. That Objects acquire in this way an enduring teleological character means:

A. In the first place one has oneself personally formed <altered?> such Objects wholly originally. 1. As a result one has oneself actually understood originally these originally formed Objects. <This understanding does not, however, mean that one has grasped or explicated the Objects as having been so formed; indeed, the original constituting of x cannot be a grasping or objectivating of x, no matter what x may be.> The teleological character of such Objects is subsequently understood of itself [selbstverständlich].
B. {PP (HUA9,), 409:1-8 (omitted from e)} Objects that are like these [dergleichen Objekte], when they come into one's view as finished products and affect one from the background, are in being integrated construed at once retrospectively [nachträchlich] in a corresponding way with respect to their end-sense so that one recognizes them at once as having been shaped to such and such an end.
C. All this holds not just for the subject who has shaped the Object for a purpose and thus made a serviceable object, bringing the object into a purposive context, but also for fellow humans [Nebenmenschen]. It holds, more precisely, for all Others, living in common with us <meaning, presumably, in one harmonious world> and in the same practical situations [Lagen], who themselves have shaped like or similar end-Objects and who therefore apperceive the Object in its end-type at once, even if they have not observed the forming of it, just as they construe things they have never before individually seen <and are at the moment conscious of as something being spoken of, for example> to be tea-roses, figs, etc. {PP (HUA9,), 409:19-27 (omitted from e). See the entry "Object".}

<Husserl appears to have considered the above points (I and II) to be a "detailed analysis of cultural objectivity." See PP (HUA9,) 628, editor's remark to appendix VI (omitted from e).>

subjectiveness [Subjectivität]. See act [v. handeln]; acting, action, activity [n. Akt, Handeln, Handlung, Aktivität, Tätigkeit; active, exigent [adj., adv. aktiv, handelnd]; Object [Objekt];  historic, the historic [historisch, Historisches]; historicality [Geschichtlichleit]; history [Geschichte], occurring of.

{PP (HUA9,), 406 (excluded from E)} Subjective characters belonging to the sense of Objects of any kind whatever are 'subjective' in that they are essentially relative to a history, in particular, through the How of their manners of givenness, their subjective modes of 'appearing'. Such characters may be relative to:

1. Passive comportments of the ego requiring not even the least degree of activity (the least order of activity is the receptivity in the sense of some actively executed experiencing), in which the subject whose consciousness of the Object varies does not actively [handelnd] generate the character in question by executing some species of ego activity. These may be characters or affective characters or associative characters.
2. Active comportments having their source in the active subjectivity as such, i.e., in the specific conscious processes Husserl calls ego acts {see act}. Including:

a. Acts carried out completely privately by an individual, i.e., not carried out in community with others. In these cases, the formed object has its teleological or purposive character, however, for all Others who, living in common with us and in the same practical situation, themselves have formed like or similar purposive Objects and so apperceive of Object in its purposive type. The teleological character, therefore, is one that the Object acquires in principle for "everyone;" its origin is subjective, but it becomes objective again and again.
b. Acts carried out in community with Others, e.g., formation of an objective work by several or many socially related individuals. Such communities, acting as personal communities in special senses (city and state communities) can also generate communal works and can do so for ends of the community itself. {PP (HUA9,), 409:42-410:3 (omitted from e)}

3. There are also historio-traditional subjective characters (senses) with their subjective manners of givenness which are relative to active comportments (ego-acts). <Husserl doesn't say in this passage whether there are characters of this kind that are relative to passive comportments.> Acting and effecting on the part of individuals, and even on the part of communities doesn't remain isolated insofar as they enter into mutual personal influencings. Ultimately everything in the way of individual cultural forming that is effected within the unity of the human life stands within the unity of an historic context (see <the> culturally subjective).
4. The teleological characters of cultural Objects whether formed wholly by the single agent or by several agents in socialized production cannot be merely subjective in spite of their relativity to the subject or subjects who produce them. They are produced as Objective determinations of things, and apperception of cultural determinations is not limited to those who produce them or to those who use them. The universe of those subjects for whom these determinations are understandable is not closed but is open — open in principle to any, though with the qualification that they live in common with us and in the same practical situations and have previously themselves formed practical objects like or similar to those they understand. {PP (HUA9,), 409 (omitted from e); see entry "Object"}
5. The question remains: Is there anything to be found which is relative to the single subject alone in the sense that it is in principle not experienceable by someone else?

a. Sense data in the sense of Ideas I would seem to be such. On the other hand, to the extent that these function <are intended> as components or constituents of Objects , they are certainly intended as experienceable by Others and so as being independent of alterations in my kinesthesia. This seems to leave only my after-images, spots before my eyes, etc. as possibly idiosyncratic sensuous matter.
b. What of mental processes themselves? The child seems to learn that these are not experienced by Others. On the one hand, she learns to give signs of hunger, etc. but learns to do so because of correlations between her behavior and gratification which leaves open the possibility that her wants are directly apprehended and that her giving signs only calls attention to her wants. Much later, she may learn that without a sign no one will notice and that her thoughts can be "concealed". This would seem to include their not being experienced by others. However, there is still the open possibility that "someone" sees, with many possibilities for interpreting the "someone". To what extent could such a "someone" be intended as like the child herself; must the "someone" be intended to have special powers of intuition? Gods? Angels? Demons?
c. Could "delusions" be regarded as cases of misplaced Objectivity? If it is possible to establish that certain things are necessarily idiosyncratically subjectively relative then we could say that to intend them as Objective is delusory.

6. What is socio-culturally relative (not experienceable by outsiders)? The experience of primary socialization, of being socialized and enculturated initially within a given family, clan, tribe, social class, sub-culture, society, nation, etc. and of undergoing the process in the given geo-political locus (loci) where this applies and at the specific time in the history of these groups. (Also experiences generally insofar as they are conditioned by that experience?)

taking-position, position-taking[Stellungnahme]. See thesis [Thesis]; act [v. handeln]; acting, action, activity [n. Akt, Handeln, Handlung, Aktivität, Tätigkeit; active, exigent [adj., adv. aktiv, handelnd]; taking position, attractive possibilities and.

{ID1 (HUA3) m181} A performed thesis (an actual or, more precisely, an actualized thesis in the earlier terminology) is what characterizes taking position <generally> or, more particularly, acts through which a position is taken. Accordingly, every performed and non-neutralized perceiving, judging, valuing, etc. is a position-taking act. {ibid. ) 256:19-22 (m214)} When the expressions 'thetic' acts or being-'positing' are used to refer to an act that is also an actus, i.e., to a taking-position in some specific sense, then precisely this taking of position should be left out of consideration. <Is this so because, in such cases, being-p or x-existing (in contrast to not-being-p or x-nonexistent) is that toward which position may be taken either affirmatively, negatively, or in some modalized way?>

{ibid. m236 f.} The active intentional mental process is an "I think" that is "performed", "committed". However, the same mental process can also go over into a "non-performed" one. The mental process of a performed perception, judgment, feeling, willing does not disappear when the attention is turned exclusively to something new; what is involved here is that the ego "lives" exclusively in a new cogito. The earlier cogito "diminishes", sinks into "obscurity", yet it still exists as a mental process howbeit a modified one. In the same way cogitationes push their way up in the field of mental processes, sometimes in memory, sometimes neutrally modified, sometimes even unmodified. For example, a belief, an actual one "rises"; we already believe "before we know it" — similarly approving or disapproving positings, desirings, even decisions come alive before we "live" "in" them, before we perform the cogito proper, before the ego becomes active judgingly, approvingly, desirously, willingly.

{ibid.} The cogito, as that term was introduced from the beginning, designates the genuine act of perceiving, judging, liking, phantasying, etc. On the other hand, the entire structure of the mental process with all of its theses and noematic characters is the same in cases such as these when this activity of the cogito is lacking. In this sense we speak with justification of acts or intentional mental processes and differentiate between performed and non-performed acts; the latter may be acts that have ceased to be performed or may be act-stirrings. The latter term can quite well be used universally for any act whatsoever that is not executed. Such act-stirrings are experienced with all their intentionalities, but the ego does not live in them as "performing subject" Thus, the act-concept is broadened in a definite and quite indispensable sense. This way of talking about performing is exceptionally suited to the thesis, the moment of positing which is essential to the act or, more precisely, to the transformation that accrues to this moment through the transition to the form cogito. Performed thesis (active or actualized in the earlier terminology) defines — when restricted to the case of potentiality — a broadest sense of the talk about taking-position or acts of taking position. Every act that is performed and not neutralized is an act of taking position. <The material presented in this paragraph indicates that Husserl has as yet devoted no serious thought to the possibility of monads in whose mental processes no ego ever has engaged. In such a mental life no feature would be constituted as one that the ego might potentially busy herself. Such egos do not seem to be essentially impossible, and the conception of position-taking developed here would not seem to apply to them.>

On the other hand taking-position when understood in the narrow sense points back to certain founded acts (of the kind we shall later discuss) such as taking-positions of hate, more precisely, of the hating toward what is hated and which of its part has already been constituted as existing person or thing, taking affirmative or negative position toward ontic claims and toward other claims would be of this sort.

{ibid.} Acts in this wider sense, any mental processes whatsoever, carry distinctions of neutrality and positionality, just as do those which are specifically cogitationes. Even before being transformed into cogitationes, they are noematically and thetically effective [leistende], but we get to see their effects [Leistungen] only through acts in the narrow sense, cogitationes. The positings — more precisely, the positings in the modus "as if" — are already actually present in them <i.e., "as if" actually performed?> along with the full noeses to which these positings belong — assuming the ideal case in which the positings are not augmented intentionally or otherwise changed along with the transformation.

{ibid. 237 f.} Any thetic act-character whatever — i.e., any act "intention" such as a liking (positive valuing) or a striving intention having a specific character of positing approvingly or of positing strivingly respectively) — conceals in itself and by its nature a character of the genus doxic thesis and one which in a certain way "coincides" with it.

{ID1 (HUA3) Beilage XXI, 407 f.}

{ID1 (HUA3) Beilage XXII, 409 f.}

taking position, modes of.

{PP (HUA9,), 426. Omitted from E.} Modes of taking-position <which are sides, dimensions, strata, moments of intentional mental processes> are given, through reflection upon the ego, as emanating from the ego, so to speak, as belonging to the ego-dimension [Ichseite] of the mental process: in contrast, e.g., to modes of givenness which arise attached to the intentional object and which are what brings intentional objectivity to consciousness. The mode in which the ego takes position may vary while the already objectivated something, with its objective sense, remains continuously unchanged: as when the same thing first pleases then displeases me. <Is this genuinely possible; would it be consistent with the ego's tendency toward self-consistency in its takings of position; must not some change, if only further explication of the objects sense take place in order to motivate such a change in the mode of taking position?> However, the position taken may also be modalized through some new and different taking of position that does not ensue immediately upon the former taking of position that differs from it and that does not (?) belong to the unity of one context of consciousness.

Corresponding to transitional syntheses from one mode of givenness to another, there are transitional forms on the side of the ego that are productive of unity of synthesis, e.g., in the transition from deliberation to decision, questioning to answering.

taking position and attractive possibilities. See taking position, position-taking [Stellungnahme]; possibilities, attractive and problematic.

{ID1 (HUA3) m243} Just as with doxic mental processes, every nondoxic mental process [Gemütserlebnis], every valuing, wishing, willing is in itself either characterized as certain or as attracted <toward positing with certainty> or as conjectural, dubitative valuing wishing, striving.

{PP (HUA9,) 45. E m45} Counter-attractions, counter-possibilities that arise in a given situation  exert, each of them, a stronger or a weaker pull [Zug], but they do not determine the ego. The ego is determined in her believing only by the one of these possibilities for one of which she has decided, whether by going through and resolving a process of doubting or not. This involves a process of becoming convinced [Überzeugung]. Weighing the testimony for the one or the other, I decide for the one. It can happen that the testimony for the other then becomes null: it loses all weight, has in truth no longer any weight. But even so, it must be that the testimony for the other does indeed preserve a weight, yet the testimony for the one is so "overwhelming" that I decide for the one and disallow the validity of the counter-testimony, do not "accept" it and discard it in this sense <i.e., "subjectively">. I take position for, take the side of [Partei], the one set of testimony and against the other. However, I can take note of the different magnitude in weight of the attractive possibilities  without deciding for one of them. I leave them all hanging. Perhaps I decide to await the "objectively decisive" experience, refraining from taking a position, waiting for an experience which will establish one of the possibilities as "undoubtedly" actual, i.e., as one which negatively cancels every one of the counter-"possibilities", and this robs them of their weight.  Even if the ego be "conscious" of only one possibility — only one stands out — this will still be "attractive" if the ego is not "sure" of its fulfillment. The other possibilities or perhaps quite indefinite possibilities are "unconscious" — not awakened — but the inhibition is there nevertheless. The "something" in question attracts and does so to a variable degree.

With respect to attractive possibilities, the ego has a variety of options.

a) The ego is conscious, through the attraction, of the possibility, but nothing more; she "doesn't let herself be determined by it".
b) The ego is inclined to decide for the possibility. Insofar as attraction as such is an affection of the ego which corresponds to a being-drawn-toward on the part of the ego, attraction itself implies "inclination". Nevertheless, it is something new — phenomenologically speaking — that the ego lets herself be drawn "strivingly", that she is engaged in following the attraction. Her doing so can, however, be inhibited either by the counter-inclinations or by the inclination's "not working out at all" [überhaupt nicht sich "auswirken"].
c) {ibid. 46 (m in E)} "Working out" would mean that the ego gives in, complies, simpliciter — and perhaps uninhibitedly — with the inclination, setting herself upon its ground [Boden], deciding once and for all [endgültig] for this possibility; she is "subjectively certain". However assertive, this certainty is troubled, problematic, impure.  It is not simply that the testimony for the one is preferred, the attraction is stronger: in her subjective certainty, the ego imparts validity co-believingly to its testimony, and this inner "Yes" signifies then a "No" for the testimonies for the counter-attractions.

taking position [Stellungnahme] and motivation.

{ID2 (HUA4) 278 f. In E, m278 f.} The adverting of attention is also behavior [Verhalten] but is no taking of position; instead, it is the presupposition for the taking of position. <This would mean that there must be advertance to x if any sort of position is to be taken toward x. However taking position can occur in entirely passive ways. This would imply that x must be intended actionally if any position is to be taken toward x. This makes it difficult to comprehend how advertance can be motivated in what would seem to be the normal sorts of cases. To me this seems a serious error; Husserl seems to reverse the proper order. To be attracted to or repelled by x is to take position emotionally, and adverting to x would normally be motivated by some such emotional taking of position toward x. What should have been said is that advertance is not taking of position but and that some sort of position-taking is presupposed by any advertance; advertance entails caring about the conflict among x and its alternative attractive possibilities. Taking position can and very frequently does occur passively. The text seems to confound being receptive or passive with being inert. This error would be in agreement with Husserl's tendency to treat 'spontaneous' (the opposite of 'inert') as equivalent to 'actional' (the opposite of 'passive').>

{ibid. 220. In E m220} Taking position is <typically> motivated by the taking of other positions. However, in all cases, certain "absolute" motivations are presupposed: something pleases me "for its own sake", etc. regardless of whether or not reason governs the motivations. But even here reason isn't excluded in as much as these cases are the paradigms of rational motivation, viz., motivations involving evidence which, when pure, constitute higher level conscious unities whose correlate is "true being" in the broadest of senses. Thus, we need to distinguish:

1. motivation of active doings by active doings;
2. {ibid. 221} other sorts of motivations.

There can be rational motives in a double sense. It can mean mere relationships and context of requirements between "acts" properly so called. In these instances, the subject is what is active in a certain sense, even in the purely logical sense "active". Reason can mean pure reason — when and insofar as it is evident and motivated by evidence. But it need not mean this. Fallacies also come under the title 'rational motivation'. Here reason is "relative" — whoever lets herself be attracted through drives, inclinations, that are blind (because they don't proceed from the sense of the matters functioning as stimulus, don't have their source in the matters themselves — such a person is driven irrationally. Still, if I hold something to be true, hold a demand to be ethical (i.e., hold it to spring from the relevant values), and if I freely follow the supposed truth, the supposed moral good, then I act reasonably — but relatively so since I might err.

{ibid. 222 (m222 in E)} I project a theory in a relatively rational way when I carry out the intentions pre-delineated by my prejudices. But I may be following a blind bias. Here we come ultimately to the basic questions of ethics in the broadest sense: the object of ethics in this sense is the rational behavior of the subject.

{ibid.} The theory of affects in Hobbes and Spinoza treats, on the whole, immanent motives.

taking position, freedom, and the subject as psyche. See act [v. handeln]; acting, action, activity [n. Akt, Handeln, Handlung, Aktivität, Tätigkeit; active, exigent [adj., adv. aktiv, handelnd]; thesis [Thesis].

{ID2 (HUA4) 388:12, 31-45, m388 in E} The subject who takes position is dependent upon that substratum which belongs, as "psyche" to the person insofar as, in order to experience motivations in my position-taking , I must have the motivating mental processes. The latter stand in associative interconnection and under rules of associative dispositions. Indeed, position-taking stands under such rules; with every taking position there arise "tendencies" toward taking the same position under similar circumstances. Taking position itself has its natural aspect in that every taking-position goes over into disposition {ibid. :29-30}. Here arise the problems of the freedom and the distinctive character [Eigenheit] of the subject of free position-taking in contrast to the psychological, associative subject. The free subject stands in contrast to the subject of the drives, the enduring tendencies, the enduring natural psyche.

{ID2 (HUA4) 299:35, m299 in E} Position-taking is a trait that is characteristic of what Husserl calls spirit [Geist}. Spirit lives mentally, takes positions, is motivated. Every spirit has her style of being motivated, has — unlike the Thing — her motivation in herself. She is not individual only by being at some definite locus in the world. Even the pure ego of each cogitation is absolutely individual, has absolute individuation. The <spiritual?> ego, however, is not the empty pole but is rather the bearer of her habits, and her individual history is implicit in this trait.

temporal form, individual [suggest 'structure' instead of 'form']. See being, immanent; consciousness, absolute; individuality of the mental; time, as the universal form of all egological genesis.

{PIT (HUA10) m296 and in E}. If the temporal structure of consciousness is distinguishable at all from its content then it is surely distinguishable only abstractly. Unlike formal eide, inherently temporal individual structure is not and cannot be indifferent to its content. All individual content has its individual formal traits. The temporal structure of any mental process is unique to it and is not anything eidetic or ideal. The original experience of any constituent of the stream of consciousness can occur only when that constituent is occurring, and necessarily does occur whenever the constituent either will be or is or was occurring. The individual time-form of the constituent and of immanent time as a totality individuates the constituent even in the absence of changes in the internal horizon of meaning belonging to what the ego is aware of through the constituent. Individual temporal form cannot be given even obscurely for consciousness, i.e., cannot be "constituted", except through identifying and distinguishing and associative syntheses that occur in primary passivity. These are syntheses whereby the given has for consciousness meanings such as might be expressed "given now as it was anticipated" or "given in some ways as anticipated but louder" or "to be retended in a continuum of retendings already occurring". Phases are not discrete, despite being sharply distinguishable from one another.

When a perceiving ceases, it has no impressional now-phases but only retended now-phases, only phases that were now-phases. However, whatever is impressional is also retended though it is not the case that every retended phase is now impressional even though Husserl does not make this point clearly. Properly understood, the "precedence" of the impressional over the retended is "logical" rather than temporal: it is no mere artifact of Husserl's time-diagram that every point on the horizontal line representing impressional consciousness is also a point on a vertical descending line representing retentive consciousness. It is not the case that a sensuous impression must already be given in order that very slightly later the sensing of it can first begin to be sensed internally; nor is it true that impressional consciousness must occur without temporal form in order then very slightly later to acquire temporal form. That it occur is a necessary condition for its being retained and for the retention through it of its correlate, the impression sensed. There is no need, however, that the impression already be over: there is no need, that is to say, that it have occurred in some pure perception unsullied by memory.

When now protended future constituents of protended future immanent time come to be given, they integrate as continuously with the retended past phases as formerly present phases have done. Must there not be such a thing as the future and must there not be perfectly determinate truth about it, just as necessitarians, the vast majority of thinkers in the philosophical tradition, have held? Phenomenology can answer, "Emphatically not!" even without resorting to the vitalistic notion that genuine flux is fundamentally unstructured, unformed. On the other hand, phenomenology does need to address Bergson's central question: What difference does time make?

Despite the thorough continuity of once future and now retended nows, the sharp distinction between the has-been and the not yet is no mere abstraction introduced by conceptual thinking. It is utterly contingent that anything at all be given, that synthesis of retended to what is now given impressionally, can occur at all. Transcendental syntheses as here understood are not independent of what is given in time even though they are not themselves temporal. Heidegger is quite right in emphasizing the finitude of the entity who makes herself be in the world through such syntheses. The being of the self in its transcendental status is no less contingent than that of the self in the world.

Though the ideal of perfect fulfillment, of a mental life that is purely intuitive, be unactualizable, the ideal of the Absurd (Heidegger's "ownmost possibility") is not to be excluded. The Absurd would be the complete frustration and cancellation of all anticipations, making it impossible that any further projecting occur at all, and further synthetic unification of a flux of immanent time would cease to be possible. This would be an abrupt and sharp termination of the monad or of Dasein, and it could occur and could have occurred at any time. {See pages 201-205 in my EGO (or the same pagination in the German version, ICH} Any phase that has run its course could at any time have been terminated without running off as it did.

Moreover, Husserl differentiates between possibilities that are projected and possibilities that are anticipated with what he terms "simple certainty." Insofar as the ego takes for granted the fulfillment of possibilities, their fulfillment is, Husserl maintains, simply certain for the ego. Possibilities anticipated in this way he refers to as open possibilities. On the other hand, whenever there is some question as to whether what is anticipated will occur the anticipated possibilities are called attractive or problematic. Husserl considered this differentiation of attractive from open possibilities important enough that he discusses it at length in each of his major publications starting with Logical Investigations. (Quite elaborate discussions of the same distinction occur in virtually all of Alfred Schutz's major publications.)

temporal phases, differentiation of. See form, individual temporal; temporality.

{PIZ (HUA10) 316} When a perceiving ceases, it has no impressional now-phases but only retended now-phases, only phases that were now-phases. However, whatever is impressional is also retended though it is not the case that every retended phase is now impressional even though Husserl does not make this point clearly. Properly understood, the "precedence" of the impressional over the retended is "logical" rather than temporal: it is no mere artifact of Husserl's time-diagram that every point on the horizontal line representing impressional consciousness is also a point on a vertical descending line representing retentive consciousness.

The perceived and the remembered are continuous throughout an ongoing perception; without a continuous identifying synthesis, the continuity of the remembered with the currently perceived and remembered would not be constituted for consciousness. Moreover, nothing about a tone as initially given excludes the sense "having already been in progress", except in cases where the circumstances of its beginning are themselves given, as when I speak or attack string with bow, etc.

So, retention does not require that a sensuous impression already have been given in a merely perceived present instant in order that very slightly later the sensing of it can first begin to be sensed internally; nor is it true that impressional consciousness must occur without temporal form in order then very slightly later to acquire temporal form. That it occur is a necessary condition for its being retained and for the retention through it of its correlate, the impression sensed. There is no need, however, that the impression already be over: there is no need, that is to say, that it have occurred in some pure perception unsullied by memory.

temporality. See temporality of an individual ego.

The form (temporality) of internal time excludes the possibility that the earlier-later relation be reversible. Temporality entails the impossibility that the self-same event occur more than once. temporality allows that events in inner time be similar in a great many <limitless?> ways; thus, events in inner time cannot embody the self-same infima species if doing so be understood to require that other perfectly like embodiments of that species be possible; yet a set of several events in inner time can exemplify a very large set of subgenera such that each member of the set of events exemplifies every member of the set of subgenera; it excludes, however, the possibility that events in inner time be perfectly alike. Time can also be conceived.

temporality of an individual ego. See temporal form, individual; temporality.

{ID1 (HUA3) m163–165} The term 'intentionality' expresses a property that is essential for any mental process whatsoever, but what it designates is not merely something belonging universally to every mental process. The property through which each is an example of this universal is a form whereby mental processes combine necessarily with mental processes. Necessarily each mental process lasts, and in lasting it combines with other mental processes in the individual whereby it has its ordered locus in an endless continuum of duration. Necessarily each has an infinite temporal horizon within which the mental processes that combine with it are all of them fulfilled, all of them given rather than emptily intended. <That this catches the meaning of the passage seems clear from the remainder of §81 and the first paragraph of §82, which says that every lived, emergent now, even the initial phase of any newly emergent lived experience has necessarily its before-horizon [Horizont des Vorhin] and that this cannot be an empty before-now, some empty form without content, which would be nonsense. The form is necessarily that of a past now, a form that includes some now past mental process that was not then past. This assertion is quite clearly directed against Hume's account of memory in terms of a copy or picture theory as well as against any alleged description of memory in terms of presently existing signs for prior lived experiences. When Husserl goes on to say with emphasis "No mental process can cease without consciousness of ceasing and having ceased", he is rejecting Hume's assertion that what he calls "perceptions" succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity. He should, however have formulated this view more cautiously so as to say that no consciousness can be retended as haveing ceased without there being a consciousness of ceasing and having ceased. This formulation allows for the possibility that the monad cease to be.> This means that it belongs to one endless flux of mental processes. Each of the mental processes that it includes can end as well as begin so that its duration is limited, but the flux of mental processes can neither begin nor end. As temporal each mental process belongs to its pure ego. This includes that the ego's regard can be directed to each and can grasp it as actually existing, i.e., as lasting in phenomenological time.

{CM (HUA1) 108; m in E} In any unitarily possible ego <later: in any unitarily possible ego that is a possibility-variant of my de facto ego> not all singly [einzelnen] possible types are compossible, and not all compossible ones are compossible in just any order; this is true at no matter what the loci in that ego's temporality. <Types of mental traits which can be exemplified in some mental life of some specifiable kind cannot occur in just any kind of monad.>

… When I reduce any de facto mental process of mine to its eidetic type, I have varied myself too (regardless of whether I am aware of it) — not in a wholly optional manner but within the frame of the corresponding essential type… {ibid.}

Whatever occurs in my ego — in the way of intentional processes, constituted unities, Ego habits — has its temporality and in this respect participates in the system of forms that belongs to the all-inclusive temporality with which every imaginable ego <inserted later: every possibility-variant of my ego> constitutes herself for herself .

%%theology and teleology, philosophical, pure. See nature; theoretical disciplines and non-theoretical disciplines; fact-value distinction; .

{HUA28, 180:10-22} Absolute theory of being includes cognition (regulated philosophically by epistemological principles) not only of factual psychophysical actuality but also consideration of nature in the broader as well as the narrower sense under the purview of value (hence regulated philosophically by theory of axiotic-practical principles and ultimately by the inclusive teleological or, as we could also say, theological ideals). This can also be expressed as follows: even if solved from the absolute standpoint of theoretical philosophy, the problems of the science of nature are the ultimate problems neither of actuality nor of natural philosophy, where by the latter is meant theoretical natural philosophy. Natural philosophy in the highest and ultimate sense is not merely theorttical <is not merely cognitive>.

theoretical acts. See determinism.

…it belongs to the peculiar character of the theoretical attitude and its theoretical acts (the performance of which makes the subject the theoretical subject) that, in them, objects which for the first time will become theoretical are already, in a certain manner, laid out there in advance. Thus objects are already constituted pre-theoretically; it is only that they are not appropriated theoretically and are not Objects intended in the pre-eminent sense, and much less are they Objects of theoretically determining acts.

theoretical disciplines and non-theoretical disciplines. See affective mental processes [Gemütserlebnisse].

{HUA28, 368-370} There are different concepts of "theoretical" to be distinguished.

1. In the broadest sense of 'theoretical reason', it is correlated with pure and even purely formal theory of science: formal logic, formal mathematics, theory of forms and of validity for significations (correlatively: formal laws of objectivity, formal ontology). We can say that this formal science defines theoretical reason in the broadest sense of the term, a sense in which all objects and all predicates belong to the sphere of "theory" insofar as they are accessible to scientific investigation.
2. A different meaning of "theoretical" is operative where a distinction is made between theoretical and non-theoretical sciences (the latter being identified as axiological and practical) with a corresponding distinction between objects and predicates. Here, theoretical sciences are sciences of theoretical objects or of objects considered with respect to their theoretical predicates while non-theoretical sciences are sciences of non-theoretical objects, objects insofar as they are determined by axiotic and practical predicates
3. {HUA28, 369} In a still different sense, "theoretical sciences are distinguished from technical and normative disciplines. Here the division is a matter of the point of view from which the cognitions are ordered and on which they are based, depends, that is, upon the goal that cognition poses [sich stellt]. <It seems a mistake to say that cognition poses the goal; rather cognitions are posed in view of the goal, for whatever purpose.>

a. In theoretical science, judgments are arranged and grounded systematically in order

1) {HUA28, 369} to establish what objects of a unitary realm are, what belongs to them lawfully and unitarily or
2) to establish conditions which objects must fulfill in order to accord with pregiven norms and purposes.

b. {HUA28 370} Insofar as disciplines in sense 3.a.2) are based on hypotheses that are non-theoretical in sense 2., they, too, are non-theoretical in that sense as well. The differentiation of theoretical from non-theoretical under 2. is defined by the objects themselves and their predicates so that the objects themselves are said to be theoretical or non-theoretical, depending respectively upon whether they be considered merely in respect of their theoretical predicates or, on the other hand, have value. Disciplines that are non-theoretical in the second sense can be theoretical in this third sense, but all disciplines that are non-theoretical in the third sense are also non-theoretical in the second.

thesis [Thesis]. See taking position, position-taking [Stellungnahme]; affective mental processes [Gemütserlebnisse]; affective mental processes, positionality of.

{PP (HUA9,), 479-480; omitted from E} The thesis is the style of orientation-toward… [Richtungsstil]; the content, the sense, is the theme. Where theses are founded theses <and in this context it would appear that all theses are founded>, the founded thesis is the end-thesis with respect to which the founding thesis is mediating, and — wherever the founding theme lies in the unitary direction of the end theme — the mediating theme enters into the end theme: the relevant founding theme takes on new "interpretations" which are new theses. The new theses are not empty orientations-toward…. They have a sense. The orientation and the toward-which of the orientation are not tied to one another externally, not even in the case of affection.

{ID1 (HUA3) Beilage XXII, 409:9-11, 276:31-32; m in E} Normally, the term 'thesis' designates actional (exigent) positing as in the performance of a believing, valuing, etc. Any thesis is a position-taking  in a broad sense. 'Thesis' is an equivalent term to 'positing'. However, exigent theses are the only ones that are theses actional actually rather than just potentially. <Husserl seems here to have quite a long way yet before he will straighten out the distinction between exigent mental processes and passive or automatic ones. The formulation here easily makes it seem as if the automatic ones do not actually occur at all. By calling them potential, Husserl meant merely that they are characterized by "attentional non-actionality [attentionalen Inactualität]; he certainly did not mean to suggest that they are non-occurrent. It is clear, for example, that the retrotendings involved in primary memory both are bound to occur and are bound to posit what is retended to have occurred.>

{ibid. 290-291} Every act, more precisely, every act's correlate carries in itself something "logical" whether explicitly or implicitly. Each is either actionally or potentially (passively) thetic, where 'thesis' is used in a generalized sense to include specifically non-doxic as well as doxic theses.

Active Objectivation is performed by the doxic cogito alone. Every non-doxically performed thesis is potentially an objectivating. <NB: This is true even if one abstracts from the non-doxic process' being founded upon a doxic one. But Husserl here leaves genetic analysis out of account and does not mention that this being "potentially an objectivating" is characteristic only of non-doxic theseses occurring in a mental life that has included objectivating mental processes. This sort of omission is quite common in his writings.> The non-doxic acts are archontic {HUA3, 288} with respect to objects which they "constitute" originally: even the affective and conative acts. They are necessarily sources for different regions of being and for the corresponding ontologies. For example, valuing consciousness constitutes axiotic objectivities which are novel in contrast to the mere material world; it thus constitutes "beings" of a new region in as much as ideally possible doxic theses are predelineated through the valuing consciousness. <This presents another example for the sort of omission mentioned in the immediately preceding comment.> The predelineated doxic theses are such as would bring out (objectivate) objectivities new in content, viz., values, as what was "meant" through the valuing coniousness. These are meant affectively in the affective act and come to be meant doxically (and moreover in an explicitly logical manner) to the extent that the predelineated doxic theses come to be performed actionally, become exigent. This is the most profound source for elucidating the universality of the logical, the universality of predicative judgment ultimately. This leads to comprehension of the ultimate grounds for the dominion of logic itself. Consequently, it is possible to conceive formal and material or, more exactly, noematic and ontological disciplines concerning affective and conative intentionality.

thing. See individuality of the corporeal.

time. See individuality of the corporeal; time, as the universal form of all egological genesis

{HUA24,[9] 293 f.} Time, space, thing are forms that are intimately interconnected. These are forms that occur even at the level beneath that of logical form (with which Husserl contrasts them): the level of the primal material and its blind primal forms refer to their full unities and generate intuition or simple objectivation [schlichte Vorstellung] of a spatio-temporal world of appearances. We could call them the original ontological forms. Husserl writes in this connection:

In the Logical Investigations, I spoke on the whole only of the logical forms and called them categorial forms. If categories are understood to be the basic forms of objectivity in abstraction from their varying material then we must differentiate the logical categories and the metaphysical categories (the categories of thinghood) from one another. There remains still the open question whether categories of pre-empirical being (that which people often have in mind when speaking of "consciousness") are to be placed alongside these <categories of thinghood>.

<The context seems to indicate a further distinction between what are here called "ontological forms" and what are called "sensuous forms" earlier in the same section and are contrasted with "thought-forms [Denkformen]". Sensuous forms would seem to include whatever Husserl has in mind as pre-empirical forms that would pertain to pre-empirical being. Pre-empirical objects might be a sort of quasi-being such as might be intended by a "solipsistically intentive" monad without an awareness of them as appearances of more concrete unities. 'Metaphysical categories' might then be the categories appropriate to fully concrete objects, and the phrase might in that case refer to an ideal of concreteness.> In the same section {HUA24 §46}, Husserl differentiates between objects produced by thinking [Denkgegenstände] and sensuous objects. The former as well as the mental processes that produce them [ihre Objektivationen] are said to be founded objects. They are founded on the latter, the lower level objects, which are identified as "a certain primal stuff of lived experiences called sensuous" {ibid. 290:10-14}. The time-flux belongs to the primal material of consciousness {ibid. 291:33}. Through it sensuous contents and all further contents that are interwoven with them become in an original way one and formed. Time-flux is not Objective time, not time in the authentic sense; the latter grows through apprehension [explication, Aufassung], by making sense of [Sinngebung], by identification. The sort of form that sensuous contents have just by belonging to the time-flux is still blind form in the same sense in which mere sensuous contents as they are impressionally "there" are blind {ibid. 291-292}. They are experienced [erlebt], but they have no <logically, categorially formed> sense: mean nothing in as much as they are not explicated, identified, objectified [vergegenstandlicht]. Yet they do have form that is more basic than categorial or logical form, form that belongs to them as they occur in the time-flux. These pre-categorial forms are forms that sensuous contents have as sensations occurring in a unitary sensuous field, a visual field, a tone field, etc. The connexion or fusion of sensations in a sensuous field can and does occur regardless of any categorial formation through apprehension or explication; it is grounded not in thinking (in the narrower sense of active doxic intending) but in the sensations, more particularly in how they show themselves to belong together generically, in their material likeness. In contrast, categorial forms are entirely indifferent to material considerations. The fusion and fusion-forms of impressional content in the several sensuous fields belong to the contents as "moments", inseparable constituents.of these contents, and they are fundamental to Objectivating space-apprehension. Husserl writes with emphasis,

{HUA24, 292:28-36} Thought-forms do not belong inseparably to sensuous contents as if such forms were already spontaneously there eo ipso along with sensuous content! Sensuous form is necessarily there and inherently there with the sensuous contents that are unified by it. Categorial form, on the other hand, accrues as an addition to that which is formed categorially; categorial form can be there or not be there. And the same thing carries over mutatis mutandis to empirically appearing objects and their objective forms.

Like categorial form, the spatial and the temporal forms of the Objects may be but need not be there for consciousness when there is a sensing of the sorts of impressions which will — provided that suitable sorts of apprehendings occur — be intended as appearances of a more concrete Object . Against the sort of phenomenalism that is traceable in modern times to George Berkeley, Husserl here maintains that impressions occurring in sensuous fields have their own, inherent spatiality or temporality, have a sort of extension in space or in time that can be given regardless of whether or not the impressions are apprehended as appearances of Objective space or Objective time or any Objective thing. {compare the entry "individuality of the corporeal".}

time, as the Universal form [the all-inclusive form, Universalform] of all egological genesis. See temporality.

{HUA1, § 37, p.109} The Universe of those subjective processes which make up the really inherent being-content [den reellen Seinsgehalt] of the transcendental ego is something compossible only in that Universal form of unity of the flux into which all particulars are ordered as themselves flowing within it.

Several critically important points need to be made in connection with Husserl's use of the words 'Universe [Universum]' and 'Universal [universal]' as applied to the transcendental ego and its "really inherent being-content."

1. The transcendental ego and all of its really inherent constituents (all of which are abstract parts) are individual objects. None of them is something universal [Allegmeines] and none of them is something eidetic. Nothing individual can have constituents, really inherent parts, that would be other than individual. Moreover individual being and eidetic being — or eidetic objectivity — are mutually exclusive. Thus, some objects that are Universal [Universal] are objects that cannot be universal [allgemein].

{CM (HUA1) 100, 102} Moreover, the class of such Universal objects includes the "form of unity of the flux" of subjective processes. This is the very unity which Husserl otherwise identifies as the pure ego and as the polar unity of those subjective processes belonging to that stream of consciousness which belongs to the make up the ego taken in full concreteness (to the monad).

{CM (HUA1) 155} In order to be conceived to persist unchanged for retentive consciousness and recalled with evidence, a subjective process need not be mistaken for something ideal. Once it has occurred, the subjective process is gone, is no longer presently occurring. Still, it can be presentiated, recalled and even repeatedly recalled with the evidence that "I can <probably> do so again." The several recallings themselves occur in sequence in my temporality. Each is a different subjective process from the others as well as from the subjective process recalled. Nevertheless, an identifying synthesis can connect the several subjective processes through the evident consciousness of "the Same [dasselbe, not the like]." That this can happen entails that what is recalled each time is the one, individual past subjective process with the "same, never repeated temporal form, filled with the same content." That the recalled subjective process is the same means that it is an "identical intentional object of separate conscious processes." Veridical memory entails retention of the unique temporally situated subjective process with its temporally situated and, therefore, individual unique and never recurring context of retendings and protendings.

a. {ID1 (HUA3) m167}. It is eidetically valid and evident that no concrete mental process can be completely self-sufficient; each needs supplementation by a nexus that is restricted [nicht beliebigen], that is bound as to its form and character. To any mental process whatsoever—such as the sensuously perceiving a house—there belongs, as a necessary constituent, its complementary experiential surroundings [Erlebnisumgebung]. But it is a very uniquely peculiar necessary constituent indeed, one that is nonetheless "extraordinary" ["auβerwesentliches", other than general, other than common] namely one whose alteration alters nothing at all of the mental process's own <individually> essential content <Wesensgehalt, its own being>. Thus, the house-perceiving itself is altered when those experiential surroundings alter while the lowest difference in the perceiving's genus is the perceiving's own inner peculiarity <Heidegger: ownness> and can be conceived to be identical. <This seems to imply that, where mental processes are concerned, these least differences that can be identical are eidetic objects that can as a matter of eidetic necessity have only one instance. Is not this the sort of object that Husserl refers to as an "eidetic singularity"? While the pure ego instantiates a vast plurality of such singular and quite definite eide, it is no eidos; it changes or alters continuously with all alteration occurring in the flux.>

2. Here Husserl is being careful to distance his position from the "cinematographic" conception of the mental in phenomenalism from Hume on, including Bergson. But he is also dissenting from the entire tradition back at least to Aristotle, who held — on the basis of the fact that mental constituents can be "repeated" in memory — that a mind includes forms as constituents and that all forms are eide.

{CM (HUA1) 109} Thus, even the most universal form for all particular forms of concrete subjective processes and for the structures which are flowingly constituted through the flowing of these processes, is a form for the motivation which connects all and is a form governing every single process in all its particulars. <It is an eidetic law that every subjective process must have an individual form through which it is related to that pure ego (polar unity) which is the unity of an individual stream of consciousness; thus, it is an essential necessity that every subjective process be related to every other subjective process which either does occur, did occur, could have occurred, or can occur in that self-same individual stream of consciousness, ego, and monad. Moreover, what is thus unified through the monad's temporality (individual temporal form) is governed throughout (Universally) by a motivation (causality) that is necessarily unique to this individual monad while nevertheless occurring according to formal laws.> We could also call it a formal regularity belonging to a Universal genesis, a genesis such that, in accordance with its form, past, present, and future are constituted over and over again in one unity through a certain noetic-noematic form-structure of flowing manners of givenness. {CM (HUA1) 109:7-19} Within this form, however, life goes on as a motivated course of particular constitutive performances [Leistungen] with manifold particular motivations and motivational systems which, according to universal laws of genesis, produce a unity of the Universal genesis of the ego. The ego constitutes herself for herself through the unity of history, so to speak. <Being unified by the ego's unique and lawful motivation(s), this "history" is a generative unity. Her temporality is necessarily also a genesis and a performance, a striving, something achieved, for which of her projected systems of compossibles occurs in the flux depends on how she has been and is motivated and how she strives in accordance with her motivations. The monad's history is not a closed system though it is definite in that it can only occur in certain ways. For example, whichever of her potentialities do eventuate, the past she has now will be an integral part of the past she will then retend.> We have said that the constitutings of all the objectivities that there are for it, whether immanent or transcendent, ideal or real, are included in the constitution of the ego herself; and it should now be added that the constitutive systems through which such and such objects and categories of objects are there for the ego <changed to: are accepted unities> are themselves possible only in the framework of a certain genesis in conformity with laws. In this, they are at the same time bound by that Universal genetic form which makes the concrete ego (the monad) possible as unity, as compossible through its particular being-content [Seinsgehalt].

{CM (HUA1) 110} That there is a nature or a cultural world (a human world with its social forms, etc.) there for, accepted by me means that experiences of the corresponding sort are possible for me — as possibilities that can at any time come into play for me and continue in a certain synthetic style — whether or not I actually do experience just those objects.

time, Kant's view of compared to Husserl's.

In opposition to Kant's view, formal temporal universals are, as Husserl understands them, not themselves intuitings. Whatever is genuinely or properly temporal is individual. Although there are formal temporal universals that are intuited objects, these are nevertheless not themselves genuinely temporal; they are like all eidetic objects in being atemporal. They are temporal in that whatever might embody them must be genuinely temporal and must embody them through its individual temporal form.^[10] A formal temporal universal cannot be intuited unless the intuition is founded on intuition of a genuinely temporal individual. If a "pure" temporal form would be one that could be intuited even in the absence of given genuinely temporal "content" such a form would be not only empty but impossible, could not occur at all. Temporal forms cannot be both empty and extant.

Inasmuch as consciousness must exist temporally and is always adequately given, consciousness is always an intuiting of individual temporal form and always intuits, however obscurely, universal temporal forms that are embodied by those individual forms.

Transcendencies whose manner of being is eidetic are, like mental phenomena, given adequately whenever they are given. However, all eidetic objects are transcendent, and many of them, perhaps even most of them, need not be given at all. <This is a point which Husserl sometimes makes with great clarity. Still, given the persistence of the traditional link between universals, cognition a priori, and nativism, it needed much more frequent reiteration than Husserl gave it if he was to minimize misinterpretation. The title of HUA3 §44 is misleading in this respect. The title given it in the 1982 translation (fn 193) is less misleading. On this point see Idea of Phenomenology {IP (HUA2) 35; 27 in E}, where eidetic objects would be transcendent in the first sense mentioned yet would be immanent in the second. {See also §45 of the 1905 Time Lectures (PIZ (HUA10) PITC)}.>

{HUA24, 273 f.} When Husserl insists that time is not a form of consciousness even though he seems consistently to speak of immanent time as if it were a time-form), the point being made is that time is not a form of sensibility in Kant's sense, as if sensuous contents were Objects on their own, i.e., as if an Objective time-location belonged to them like yet another moment of content such as quality or intensity and as if all sensuous contents had their time-order through such a time-moment.

There are a number of critically important issues looming here in Husserl's early work on the constitution of time. They threaten to trap him within a position he would seemingly prefer to avoid, an intellectualism having unwanted affinities to those of Plato, Descartes, and Kant. So even though Husserl follows Kant's language in referring consistently to time as a form, the passages reported on in the preceding paragraph seek to distance his conception of the relations between time, the mind, and the objects of experience from Kant's. When he insists that time is not a separate Object from the contents that are to be temporally apprehended, he is rejecting the Kantian assertions (1) that time is an intuition and therefore strictly something immanent that cannot be justifiably applied to anything transcendent and (2) that time is most fundamentally a pure universal form of mathematical thinking and therefore altogether alien to the most primitive content of intuitions, sensuous impressions.

time-consciousness [Zeitbewuβtsein]. See temporality; time-constitution [Zeitkonstitution]; time, Kant's view of compared to Husserl's.

{ID1 (HUA3) 273:21-34, m229} The original time-consciousness itself functions as a consciousness of perception and has its analogue in a corresponding fantasy-consciousness. This all-embracing time consciousness is however evidently not a continuous immanent perception in the pregnant sense, i.e., in the sense of an actionally positing perceiving [which would be yet another mental process [Erlebnis] in our sense of the term]. In other words, it is evidently not a continuous inner reflecting in which the mental processes would become objective as posited in the specific sense, actionally grasped as being.

We have the following modi of time-consciousness.

1. "sensation"  as presentation [Gegenwärtigung, Präsentation] and the retrotentiveness and protention that are essentially bound up therewith but which also come to independence; this is the originary sphere in the broader sense. We regard sensing to be the original time-consciousness. {PIZ (HUA10) 107:14} See repetition.

2. positional presentiation [Vergegenwärtigung] (memory), co-presentiation and iterative presentiation [Widervergegenwärtigung] (expectation).

3. fantasy-presentiation as pure fantasy, in which all of these same modi appear in fantasy-consciousness. {PIZ (HUA10) 107:31}

time-constitution [Zeitkonstitution]. See time, Kant's view of compared to Husserl's; time-consciousness [Zeitbewuβtsein]; mental processes, lived experiences [Erlebnise].

{PIZ (HUA10) 423 fn.} Time constitution and internal perception are, if not one and the same, apparently necessary correlates that in some way mutually imply one another.

{HUA24, 273:7-} Time is constituted only through synthesis; without synthesis there would be no actual but only possible Objectivating <doxic> time-consciousness. Currently occurring lived experiences (the contents per se) do have their Objective time-positions, -order, -extension, etc. These can be authentically predicated of them, viz., through the ideal possibility of a consciousness that would Objectivate the contents as contents and would thereby effect the needed identification. Time is the form of possible <individual?> Objectivity, not a form of consciousness.

However, even contents can be constituted as Objects in perception or other Objectivating acts, and only insofar do they have their time. What is true of identity, difference, multiplicity, and unity, viz., that even they can be given <distinctly>only through categorially formative acts of identifying, differentiating, collecting, and positing unity they are nonetheless not accidental but are Objectively, genuinely predicable, so much so that without them there could be no talk of Objectivity — precisely the same is true of time, which is after all the essential form of individual Objectivity. <Here, Husserl has not yet established clearly enough the distinction that he will later draw between on the one hand, active or exigent doxa that constitute categorial form for the ego and that objectivate and, on the other hand, those doxa that do not do so. The distinction is sorely missed in this passage, especially at the point where I have interpolated the word "distinctly".> In these 1906-07 lectures Husserl has not yet >

Where there is no positing now, primary memory, anticipation, identification, etc. there content remains blind so to speak, content will there signify no Objective being, no objective duration, no Objective alteration, no succession, etc. Whatever is has essential relation to some possible consciousness: even to say that it is being refers to possible adequation and to some Objective time-locus in which it is and through which it necessarily requires a Before and After. And that this or that is predicable of what is refers to the sphere of judgment and to the possibility of this or that categorial intuition.

{HUA24, 273 f.} The relevant point here is, however, that time is not a form of sensibility in Kant's sense, as if sensuous contents were Objects on their own, i.e., as if an Objective time-location belonged to them like yet another moment of content such as quality or intensity and as if all sensuous contents had their time-order through such a time-moment. <As noted two paragraphs above, Husserl needs the distinction that he has not yet drawn emphatically enough between obscure givenness and distinct givenness; the categorial acts explicate the content; through them the "content" acquires for the ego significance that it could not otherwise have for the ego; through the act the "content" comes without being otherwise changed to be there for the ego in a way in which it would not otherwise be there for the ego: for example, it comes to have been singled out through the ego's attention, a new sense accruing to it through the act. However, it also acquires for consciousness senses which need not otherwise be new at all.>

Time-order is actively realized only through time-positing acts; where no such acts occur time does not figure in the act, does not come into play [ist nichts Aktuelles]. <In the terminology Husserl begins to employ at least as early as Ideas I 'aktuell' would usually be best rendered by 'active' or 'actional' where what these terms refer to is contrasted with the passive or automatic, the involuntary. However, this passage is from lectures in the winter semester of 1906/1907 when no explicit concept of passive in contrast to active mental processes has been developed. Instead, what will later be identified as the doxic sphere of mental processes and subdivided into active and passive mental processes is referred to globally as Objektivierungen with no explicit distinction between those which do and those which do not "constitute" or "give" their intended object categorial form. The most primitive of categorial forms and the necessary condition for all other categorial formation is simply 'this'. But here it is as if all belief-phenomena, including perceiving, retending, and protending - all Objektivierungen conferred categorial or logical form. The mss on time constitution that were published in the 1928 volume of Husserl's Jahrbuch were very naive in respect of these crucial distinctions. There publication without any significant updating was a grave disservice to his work and to phenomenology. The publication served Heidegger's own interests, showing his own work on temporality to be far more sophisticated than what he published of Husserl's.> The passage goes on to say that what is intended is in such cases Objective only in the same sense as number is when no numeration occurs since neither time nor number is something besides what is Objectively intended, neither is an additional Object which accompanies the Objectively intended: neither is something other than and accompanying that of which temporal determinations on the one hand or number on the other is predicable even though not predicated. What can be numbered refers to the ideal possibility of a numeration, and in the case of time there would be no underlying Objectivity at all without at least the beginnings of some sort of time-positing. "Time," Husserl writes, "is the necessary form of individual Objectivity and has nothing at all to do with accidental subjectivity."

On the other hand, Husserl's conceptual framework and its terminology at this phase in the development of his thought require that any time-positing at all would have to occur as an Objectivating act, and such acts are understood either to be or to presuppose acts of logical thinking. Since he also holds that all consciousness that is non-Objectivating, such as emotion and striving, must either be actually based on or presuppose Objectivating acts, his phenomenology would be driven to a position much like that of Descartes so far as those animals are concerned who do not exhibit logical thought.

time-form [Zeitform]. See my TFA, 40, 55; consciousness, as lived experience [Erlebnis] contrasted with consciousness as intentional; individuality of the mental; time-constitution [Zeitkonstitution]; time, Kant's view of compared to Husserl's; temporality; time-consciousness; mental process.; commonalities [Gemeinsamkeiten], formal and material; Objectivating. <The passages paraphrased here stem from the period when Husserl was most strongly drawn toward the voluntaristic and vitalistic variations of the Kantian differentiation between being phenomenal and being in itself. That was the phase in his thought reflected in the time lectures of 1905 that were published with little or no editing or comment by Heidegger in 1928, creating the utterly false impression that Husserl's thinking about time consciousness had not changed radically since 1905. This was a piece of wickedness on Heidegger's part that was probably much more sincere than was whatever support he may have lent to National Socialist anti-Semitism. It generated the impression that his own conception of temporality in BT (1927) was then more novel, original, and "creative"[11] than it in fact was. Heidegger knew of and mentions in the 1928 publication extensive work by Husserl on time consciousness that was far sounder and less naive than that of 1905. If Husserl was shortly to turn against Heidegger then this self-serving Judas stroke on the latter's part would have been a quite reasonable ground for doing so. That Husserl would seriously have aimed — as a long standing interpretative tradition alleges he did — at Heidegger a clearly false charge of "anthropologism"is prima facie implausible. But then what all is not alleged with great conviction rooted in long standing traditions?

Husserl is here still very close to espousing something quite like William James's notion of "pure experience". He has yet to introduce the crucial distinction among the belief-phenomena (the phenomena of the understanding) between those that are and those that are not actively engaged in. This distinction is equivalent to that between those belief-phenomena through which categorial form is there (i.e., is "constituted") for the ego and those of which this is not at all the case. For the time being, Husserl has no way to distinguish consciousness of forms that are categorial and consciousness of forms forms that are not. So he here treats even "the time-form of consciousness" as if it were a categorial form, and tends to think of it in the pragmatist/vitalist/lingualist manner as something that the understanding constructs or that Language generates through the understanding. This conceit went together with another that there is a "sphere of phenomena in the absolute sense (in the sense of phansiological manifolds, in the sense of lived experiences prior to Objectivation)". Such experiences, so the conceit runs, would not be intentional. {See the entry "consciousness as lived experience [Erlebnis], contrasted with consciousness as intentional" in these notes; and the entry "persons and personalism, Heidegger's misrepresentation of Husserl's position" in Heidegger Notes.}>

{PIZ (HUA10) 19:15-17, 295-297} Lived experiences are the constituents of consciousness itself. The sphere of phenomena in the absolute sense is a sphere of phansiological multiplicities, of lived experiences prior to all Objectivation. In this sphere ther are only changes, an eternal flux. The order of consciousness is an order belonging to the essence of any consciousness whatsoever, namely to the essence of all lived experiences and to every nexus of lived experiences. It is to be differentiated from the time-order that pertains to them <only> Objectively.The time-form is neither itself time-content nor is it a complex of new contents attaching themselves somehow to the time-content. The time-form is not an absolute form but a categorial one and a form only of the "appearances", that is, only a form of individual Objects. Time is not the form of the lived experiences which make up consciousness itself and are the "contents" that are formed through being apprehended. Time-consciousness is therefore an Objectivating consciousness. It is, we must say, no absolute form but is rather only a categorial form.

The consciousness of time is an Objectivating consciousness: without identification and differentiation, without positing now, positing past, positing future, etc. there is no <consciousness of?> enduring, rest, change, successive being. This means: without all this, the absolute "content" remains blind, does not signify Objective being, does not signify enduring. And here, too, belongs The difference between presentation and re-presentation (to re-present is to mean mean something but to do so confusedly). Something is in Objective time. "Something!" _That depends on Objective apprehension.

{PP (HUA9) §§ 33-34, pp 169 ff. (e130 ff.), 314 (omitted in E)} In a lecture course of 1925 Husserl seems to have adopted a different position regarding the flux of lived experiences. He now differentiates Objective temporality from flux temporality [Stromzeitlichkeit]. The former is restricted to the sphere of the sensuously perceived entities, i.e., to the space-field of what is thus perceived. From that temporality, the temporality of the "merely subjective appearances" is sharply to be separated. This latter temporality is that of the flow of the modes of appearing. Therefore, the differentiation of Objective from flux temporality extends as well the temporality of what can be sensed insofar as it can be remembered or anticipated valued, striven for, thought of, etc.

In the following lecture, Husserl differentiates {ibid. 171 fn1} the "transcendence" of the objective sense, of the irreal intentional object as such (i.e., of the perceived as such) on the one hand from the transcendence of the purely and simply perceived [Wahrgenommen schlechthin]. The latter is that of the purely and simply believed in and so is the transcendence of what cannot be fully determined, cannot be all-inclusively given no matter how far the perceptual synthesis goes. <Husserl understands what is given through a sensuous perceiving to be given as well when the sensuous perceiving is itself something perceived reflectively. In either case, what is perceived sensuously is transcendent in that its objective sense includes that it is not really inherent in the perceiving mind or monad. Insofar as this transcendent object is perceived without reflecting its (purely and simply) sensuous givenness is also transcendent in the sense that it is not and cannot be adequately given. It is however immanent in the sense of being adequately given insofar as this fact about the sensuously perceived thing is included in its objective sense as this selfsame object is given reflectively. Inclusion of this fact about the thing in its meaning does not alter its manner of being, does not convert the real thing into an idea, for example.>

{PP (HUA9,), 172 ff. (e132 ff.), 314:28-36 (omitted from e)} In the transition of phases into ever new phases in immanent time no really immanent part can be identical with another whereas the appearing object appears evidently as identically the same through differing phases despite variations in its meaning.

timeless (being).

Ortega {WIP?, Chapter 1} rightly emphasizes that to exist timelessly means to exist in a way that has nothing whatever to do with time so that if it be true that x exists timelessly then the statement, whenever anything at all exists (existed), x exists (existed), is not true but is materially absurd. Still, this needs qualification to allow that if x be at all then x has ways of being given and refers necessarily to possible occurrences in time.

tradition [Tradition], internal. See historicality [Geschichtlichleit]; my HPHS.

{HUA 11 10:36-11:2} The pre-delineation involved in apperception is an acquisition from internal tradition. {See HPHS 248-259.}

transcendent and transcendental. See being, absolute; transcendental epoche and reduction.

{ID1 (HUA3) m141-142} Transcendental consciousness  is the primal region of being in which all other regions of being are rooted. It is now a matter of insight that, in this sense of the word, being can be attained to in its purity <as absolute, all inclusive, NOT as independent, NOT as substantial> only through the method of phenomenological reduction. The essential relation between transcendental and transcendent being is the ground for the relation between phenomenology and all other sciences. These relationships mean that the domain of phenomenology extends in a certain peculiar manner over all the other sciences, which phenomenology nevertheless excludes.

{ID1 (HUA3) m187} Once reduction is effected , positing anything transcendent at all is restricted to the field of investigation alone and is excluded from whatever positings we effect while engaged in pure reflecting. <This would seem to hold regardless of our having effected or not effected eidetic reduction. If we have not done so then we would be entitled to posit as actual the subject being investigated, but as actual and immanent rather than actual and transcendent; that might perhaps even be required of us, given the principle of all principles, . Isn't this exactly why Husserl here uses 'transcendent' rather than 'actual'?> Implicit in this method is that we allow perceivings, judgings, valuings, etc. to be considered and described only as the essentialities which they are in themselves.We allow ourselves only what is evidently given with or through them. <The meaning of 'essentialities' is highly ambiguous here; the essentialities evidently given would include:

1. the eide exemplified by the noeses as such;
2. the eide exemplified by the noemata as such;
3. in case eidetic reduction has not been effected,

4. in case eidetic reduction has been effected but no imaginative variation has occurred, the self-same traits referred to in 3 but now in their status as possible but not as actual;
5. in case variation has been effected, a set of traits that are either similar to or quite like traits referred to in 4;
6. a set of eide that is a subset of the union of the sets of eide referred to in 1 and 2, some (all?) members of this subset being exemplified by traits referred to in 3 as well as in 4 and 5.>

transcendental. See phenomenology, transcendental; transcendental epoche and reduction; transcendent and transcendental; natural attitude.

transcendental epoche and reduction. See being, absolute.

 <This entry is derived from comments on a paper presented by Marina P. Banchetti of Florida Atlantic University to a meeting of The Husserl Circle held at Del Ray Beach, Florida under the sponsorship of Lester Embree as president of CARP.>

Transcendental epoche is an operation whereby the investigating consciousness dissociates from that mind that is reflectively perceived as it is perceived. This dissociation must occur without changing, without modalizing, and without suspending any of the beliefs which occur in the mind as it is reflectively perceived, including

1. its belief in the reflectively perceived mind itself;

2. the consciousness which the reflectively perceived mind has of a givenness of the world in which that mind believes itself to be;

3. the consciousness which the reflectively perceived mind as reflectively perceived has of other members of the selfsame world to which it takes itself to belong.

4. < Among the beliefs that are common habits of (and perhaps even indigenous to) the self as reflectively perceived is the belief that there are in the world many things to whose being their being perceived is not essential. So transcendental phenomenology had better not construe the meaning of being in the manner of George Berkeley.>

If any of these features of the reflectively perceived mind were altered by transcendental epoche and reduction then the procedure would be a failure. For then transcendental phenomenology would not take its departure from what is given to reflective perceiving. Instead, the procedure of imaginative variation would already have begun unnoticed. My supposedly descriptive phenomenology would then have no point of contact with actual things, not even with the actual world, much less an actual mind. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology would then be wide open to the often raised objection which says that it ignores reality, existence, the real world, etc.

The mind that I start out from must be the one who I am even though I, in my capacity as phenomenological philosopher, no longer take for granted that any of these beliefs belonging to my field of investigation is veridical. Whatever difficulties may be involved in putting such restraint into effect, none of them would seem to rule success out. There is no reason to believe that what Husserl proposes we do as philosophers is impossible. A phenomenology which would describe one's own self as it exists in the world is entirely possible and could be carried out along the lines Husserl has proposed.

The method of transcendental epoche and reduction would not, when properly understood, exclude anything at all from the field of investigation. The term 'reduction' that Husserl chose for the effect of transcendental epoche had a disastrous impact upon the way others understood his work. The effect of transcendental epoche is the very opposite of reducing or limiting the potential field of investigation for phenomenology as philosophy. Instead, its effect is to facilitate revealing consciousness in its full concreteness as transcendental subjectivity. The procedure actually employed by Husserl is the very opposite of privative. The effect of epoche is indeed to disclose something about consciousness, something which tends otherwise to be disguised from interpretation; the reflectively perceived mind is understood more rather than less concretely through transcendental epoche and reduction.

Moreover, the "absoluteness" of transcendental subjectivity is properly understood only by reference to its concreteness, its being an all-embracing field of objects.

Transcendental reduction, therefore, entails no denial and no negation of the world. Suspending the thesis of the natural attitude does not deny or reject any fact about the relation of consciousness to other objects. It is true that his phenomenology led Husserl to reject traditional conceptions according to which whatever is must be either a substance or else dependent upon a substance. The rejected tradition held that to be a substance is to be independent, self-sufficient. For this traditional ontology of substance, "to be" included "to be a substance or to be dependent upon some substance or to be a relation among substance-dependent entities". This was true of atomistic ontologies (whether materialistic or logical or psychological) as well as holistic ones (whether the one substance is thought of as God, nature, absolute spirit, will to live, will to power, life, élan vitale, duration, pure experience, or what have you). Genuine being, substantiality, is then thought to lie either with the mental or with something else. From the point of view of substance-ontology, transcendental reduction is seen to be incompatible with the thesis that real being belongs to something other than what is reflectively perceived. But the thesis that "genuine being" or "the really real" must be absolute in the sense of being independent turns out from the point of view of transcendental phenomenology (phenomenological philosophy) to have been a basic error.

Transcendental reduction suspends the thesis of the natural attitude. In doing so it sets aside prejudices whose effect is to exclude the possibility of investigating those transcendental functions whereby objects, including the world, are there for consciousness. These transcendental functions include the ones without which the respective objects would not be given to consciousness. Transcendental reduction clears the way to investigate those synthetic functions through which consciousness of a world is possible. Transcendental reduction reveals that the field of investigation for phenomenology is universal in the sense that it is all-inclusive; it is not universal in any sense that would entail its being eidetic. This field of investigation is what Husserl sometimes and very misleadingly refers to as the "residuum" of the phenomenology reduction. But this "residuum" is absolute not as being independent but just as being all-inclusive, excluding no object, no subject of possible judgment whatsoever. To interpret the field of investigation for phenomenology instead as some absolutely existing entity is to reintroduce the Objectivistic attitude into the phenomenologist's procedure. The field that has now been objectivated would then be taken as if it were an entity having material [sachliche] traits of its own rather than as just being the polar unity of that whose unity it is; it would thus be taken as a material rather than a formal object. The transcendental field has no material content of its own apart from the material content of the objects belonging to the field. Inasmuch as this is true of it, it does belong to itself, does belong to the field of investigation for transcendental phenomenology, and is an object in our sense of that word. Other than being the unity of this domain it has no traits.

Little beyond obfuscation is to be gained by saying that it is temporal on account of the inclusion of actually and possibly changing objects in the domain. That would amount to insisting that it is temporal or historical on account of being disclosed and to some extent explicated. And just as little is to be gained by alleging it to be atemporal on account of the inclusion of atemporal objects in the domain. The risk of and the temptation to category error is extreme here.

This field is the domain of lived experiences considered as pure essences {see the entry "essence [Wesen]}. <Here, to be taken "purely" means to be taken as merely possible [as openly, in contrast to being problematically, possible] and so as "reduced" from the status — which reflexively perceived lived experiences have — as "actual"> Husserl quite rightly foresaw that his characterization of it would be misinterpreted. He writes {ID1 (HUA3) m95}, "It is closed fast within itself. And yet," he cautiously adds, "it has no limits that would separate it from other regions simply because there is no comparable field or unity." And he elaborates, "…It is by its essence independent with respect to all worldly, all Natural being", for it includes all possible being whether worldly or Natural. "[I]ts existence requires neither worldly nor Natural being. Existence of the domain of possible consciousness can not require existence of any certain Nature since every Nature turns out to be correlate of consciousness; each is only as it constitutes itself through orderly nexu*s of consciousness <whether actual or possible>"

These statements neither assert nor imply that the field of investigation for transcendental phenomenology is some entity much less some substance. However, this point is easily overlooked by readers not already quite familiar with Husserl's thought. It is even more easily overlooked by readers of ID1's English translations: much more readily by readers of the earlier than by readers of the later one.

Yet even readers of the more recent translation are liable to form the conviction that Husserl holds a quite wildly implausible variety of idealism. Earlier in the very same paragraph {Husserl, ID1 (Kersten trnslation) M95)}, the translation reads as if Husserl believed that Nature, and so any Natural object whatsoever (past, present, or future), were dependent for its existence upon the existence of "the field of <transcendentally> pure consciousness" and that this field is itself not a part of nature and that Nature is possible only as an intentional unity motivated in transcendentally pure consciousness by immanental connections {ibid. 115, m96}.

The translation thus supports an idiotic idealism that would make every actual natural entity dependent for its actuality upon there being some actual consciousness of it. This was not, however, what the passage said (in German that is admittedly reprehensible); what Husserl wrote read more like:

that Nature as an intentional unity, one that is motivated by connections immanent to transcendentally pure consciousness itself, is only possible through the field of pure consciousness.

The field in question is that of openly possible conscious processes as well as whatever conscious processes may be actual, if any. Every Natural determination would be the correlate of a system of possible mental processes that would be intentive to it. So, no member of Nature is adequately conceivable without reference to conscious processes through which it would be intended; no member of Nature satisfies the criterion for being a substance. However, there is no implication, much less allegation, that some member of the relevant system must be actually occurring if Nature or some Natural object is to exist. Something Natural that would exist in itself without any reference to possible conscious processes would be entirely unimaginable, inconceivable, and a material absurdity.

transcendental subjectivity. See being, absolute.

truth and Being [Sein]. See Absurd, the; Nothingness [Nichtsein]; state of affairs [Sachverhalt].

I. {LU#6 (HUA19/2) §§ 36 ff, pp. 645 ff. Cf. Heidegger SZ, p. 218.} Truth or the true is the Objective correlate of evidence in the strict sense of the word. This relation holds regardless of the distinction between states of affairs  and other objects on the one hand or between referential [beziehende] acts — acts of agreement or non-agreement, predicative acts — and non-referential acts: strict adequation can posit as one referential as well as non-referential intendings.

II. {LU#6 HUA19/2 mB₂125} At least to begin with, the nature of the matters in question requires that the concepts of truth and falsity be extended so as to include the entire sphere of Objectivating acts <in Husserl's later terminology the entire sphere of doxic mental processes, whether active or passive>.

A. As correlate of an identifying act, truth is state of affairs {see the entry "state of affairs [Sachverhalt]"} and — as correlate of a coinciding  identifying — is an identity: the utter agreement between the meant and the given as such. In evidence, this agreement is lived in as much as evidence is the actual execution of adequate identifying. However, that evidence is a lived experiencing of truth may not without further ado be taken to mean that evidence is perceiving (in a broad sense) and is, in the case of strict evidence, adequate perceiving of truth.

1. {ibid. m122-123} Executing the identifying synthesis of coincidence is not yet an exigent perceiving of the objective agreement. The lived experiencing of the agreement becomes exigent perceiving of the objective agreement only through a further act of Objectivating comprehension, through a distinct looking-at [Hinblicken] the truth that is present-at-hand [vorhandene]. And the truth is indeed present-at-hand. A priori there is here the possibility to turn one's regard at any time to the agreement and to bring it to intentional consciousness in a adequate perceiving.
2. This Being [Sein] (the correlate) should not be confused with the being of the copula of "affirmative" categorial statement. The latter Being corresponds as a rule, though not always, to partial identifyings (determining judgings [Beschaffenheitsurteil]) while evidence, whose correlate is truth, is a matter of total coinciding. But the two beings do not coincide even where total identification is indeed predicated. In the case of evidence of judgment (judgment=predicative statement), the Being in the sense of the truth of judgment is vividly experienced but is not expressed and, therefore, never coincides with the Being that is both vividly experienced and is meant by the "is" of the statement. The latter is the synthetic moment of what is in the sense of the true and cannot express the being true of what is true. In such a case multiple agreements are brought to synthesis.

a. The predicative, (usually) partial agreement is assertively meant and adequately perceived (itself given). This is the agreement between subject and predicate.
b. {ibid. m124} The agreement of which the synthetic form of the act of evidence consists, viz.,., the total coinciding between the signifying intention of the stating and the perceiving of the state of affairs itself, a coinciding which is of course carried out step by step. This agreement is obviously not stated; it is not objective as the other (the agreement belonging to the judged state of affairs) is though it always may be stated and stated with evidence. If stated with evidence, it then becomes the state of affairs that makes a new evidence true, the correlate of a new evidence for which the same distinctions are repeated, etc. But at every step one will have to distinguish between the (non-objectivated) state of affairs that constitutes (is) the evidence itself and the (objectivated) state of affairs that makes the evidence true.

B. As the ideal [Idee] of the absolute adequation as such, truth is involved in the ideal relationship — obtaining in unity of that coincidence which is defined as evidence — between the epistemic essences of the coinciding acts. This ideal belongs to the act-form and is the epistemic essence, grasped as ideal, of the empirically accidental act of evidence.
C. In evidence we also experience vividly — on the side of the act through which fullness <what fulfills?> is given — the given object itself in the mode of what is meant. This is the fullness itself and may also be designated as the Being, the truth, the true, insofar as it <the given object> is experienced vividly not as the mere adequate perceiving but rather as ideal of fullness for any intending, i.e., as object that makes true or as ideal of fullness for the specific, epistemic essence of the intending.
D. {ibid. m123} From the standpoint of the intending, the apprehension of the evidence-relationship yields truth as correctness of the intending (e.g., correctness of judging), as adequateness of the intending to the true object or, more particularly, as correctness of the epistemic essence of the intending in specie. An example for the more particular sense of correctness here would be correctness of judgment in the logical sense of the asserted proposition: the proposition "orients" itself by the subject matter in question, says it is thus and it is exactly thus. Correctness in this sense expresses the ideal, and therefore universal, possibility that a proposition about like material can be fulfilled in the sense of strictest adequation.

III. If the signification of the word 'truth' be restricted to senses B and D under II above while A and C are reserved as possible significations of "Being (see truth and Being) then:

A. If judgment be defined so as to include any positing act whatsoever then, subjectively speaking, the sphere of judging in the widest sense coincides with the combined spheres of truth and falsity. {See the entry "determinism".}
B. {ibid. m126} If judgment be defined so as to include only statement and its possible fulfillings so that judgment includes only the sphere of referential positings then the same coincidences still stand except that only the narrower concepts of truth and falsity are taken as the basis.

IV. {ibid. § 39, mB₂125} The most fitting differentiation of the concepts of truth and being would seem to be that which places the concepts of truth on the side of the acts themselves and their ideally graspable moments, while placing the concepts of being (being-true) on the side of the corresponding objective correlates.

A. Accordingly, truth  in senses II.B and II.D  would have to be defined as ideal of adequation or on the other hand as correctness of the objectivating positing and signifying.
B. Being in the sense of truth would then be defined in accordance with II.A and II.C as identity of the object that in adequation is both meant and given or on the other hand (closer to the natural sense of the word) as the adequately perceivable at large in unspecified relation to some adequately fulfillable intending that what is so perceivable would make true.

V. {ibid. B₂126} To take into account the distinction between referential and non-referential acts (predicatings and absolute positings) one could then delineate narrower concepts of truth and Being.

A. Truth would then be limited to the ideal adequation of a referential act to the pertinent adequate perceiving of the state of affairs.
B. The narrower concept of Being would then apply to the Being of absolute objects and would separate such Being from the "persisting [Bestehen]" of states of affairs.

VI. {ibid. mB₂126} Falsity  and Nothingness [Nichtsein] , as the correlates involved in absurdity [the counterpart of evidence], are the precise counterparts of truth and Being  respectively.

truth conceived as identity. See nominal forming [nominale Formung].

unconscious. See interest [Interesse].

universals: purely material, <conceptually> formed, and purely formal. See commonalities, formal and material; value [Wert]; individual; individuality of the mental; temporal form, individual; time, Kant's view of compared to Husserl's.

{EU §85, 407 f.} Two fundamentally different types of universality can be differentiated depending upon the class of objects that are compared for the purposes of grasping what is universal.

1. Synthesis of coincidence of what is alike obviously can link objects of simple experience [Erfahrung] that have undergone no syntactical formation. Through this synthesis of coincidence and the abstraction it entails, they attain to primitive syntactical form. This is how concrete concepts having purely material content arise. These do not even have names, for concepts that are verbally coined such as tree, house, etc. harbor within them a multiplicity of predicates — accrued through judging activity — that go beyond purely material content. However, it is important to place at the beginning the primitive limiting case, for these are concrete concepts prior to all explication and syntactical unification of predicates. <While Heidegger agrees that there is an understanding of likenesses which is independent of all categorial formation, he treats circumspection as a pre-predicative, pre-categorial way of explicating and one that generates syntactically structured behavior.>

2. {ibid.} Two new likenesses emerge when we compare syntactical formations.

a) In connection with likenesses that belong to contents differentiated out of passive experience through explication and that rest therefore on material community <alone> universal concepts having material content emerge.

b) Certain likenesses that pertain to syntactical forms that are generated spontaneously arising from spontaneous generation are related to merely formal commonality. In the assertion, "Red is different from blue," for example, pure forms are expressed — by the reference to difference and by the entire form of the proposition (subject form, predicate form), Object form — along with the concepts having material content (red and blue). When everything contentual [alles Sachhaltige] in the sentences is left variable then such concepts as likeness, difference, unity, multiplicity, set [Menge], whole, part, object, property are pure form concepts, i.e., they are formal universalities. Such are all so-called purely logical concepts and all concepts that must be expressed by means of that multiplicity of forms in which predicational affair-complexes [Sachverhaltsformen] occur. Verbally, such, too, are all statement-forms [Aussageformen].

The set of formal universals and that of material universals are mutually exclusive: no formal universal is either a genus or a species. Whatever exemplifies a given genus also exemplifies some species of that genus and so exemplifies a material universal of less generality than the genus. Husserl seems to have held that this would entail exemplifying an infima species and to have held as well that infima species are universals all of whose instances are perfectly alike in respect of some set of traits, a set whereby the instances also exemplify the genus. To instantiate a material universal would thereby be conceived to entail belonging to a plurality of possible objects all of which would be perfectly alike in some way. There may well be serious objections to this aspect of Husserl's doctrine regarding material universals {see, for example UAJWP and UKBDP, 286-289}. In contrast, to embody or to instantiate a formal universal would not entail being in any way perfectly like another member of an ideal extension.

In contrast to Kant's view, formal temporal universals are not themselves intuitings. Whatever is genuinely or properly temporal is individual. Although there are formal temporal universals that are intuited objects, these are nevertheless not themselves genuinely temporal; they are atemporal in being, as are all eidetic objects although they refer essentially to ways of being given through possible mental processes each of which would be temporal. <That is, they have ways of being intuited or of being otherwise intended, and these refer to events such that they must occur in time if they are to occur at all. Ortega y Gasset provides an important account of this aspect of universals; it leads him to adopt a phenomenological perspectivism {see What is Philosophy?}.> Moreover, temporal universals also refer to temporal events in that they must have possible embodiments and whatever might embody them must be genuinely temporal and must embody them through its individual temporal form. A formal temporal universal cannot be intuited unless the intuition is founded on intuition of some set of genuinely temporal individuals. If a "pure" temporal form would be one that could be intuited even when there is no consciousness of genuinely temporal "content" such a form would be not only empty but impossible, could not occur at all. Intuition of temporal forms cannot be both empty and extant; it would not exist at all, could not occur.

Inasmuch as consciousness must exist temporally and is always adequately given, consciousness is always an intuiting of individual temporal form and always intuits, however obscurely, universal temporal forms that those individual forms embody. The intuiting of such universal forms is really immanent to consciousness and to the mind or monad. The universal forms, however, are not at all immanent; they are transcendent with respect to the mind, transcendent with respect to any and all minds whether these be considered transcendentally or otherwise. In contrast to Kant's view, "time" when considered as a formal universal, a "pure" form, is not an intuition even though it be true that time is intuited if anything at all is intuited.

Transcendencies whose manner of being is eidetic are, like mental phenomena, given adequately whenever they are given. Many of these, perhaps even most of them, need not be given at however. <This is a point which Husserl sometimes makes with great clarity. Still, given the persistence of the traditional link between universals, cognition a priori, and nativism, it needed much more frequent reiteration than Husserl gave it if he was to avoid misinterpretation. The title of HUA3 §44 is misleading in this respect. The title given it in the 1982 translation (fn 193) is less misleading. {See IP (HUA2) 35 f.; e27 f., where eidetic objects would be transcendent in the first sense mentioned yet would be immanent in the second. See also §45 of PIZ (HUA10) and PITC.}>

{ELE (HUA24) 273 ff.} Husserl consistently speaks of immanent time as if it were a time-form. When he also insists that time is not a form of sensibility, he is denying that it is a form in Kant's sense, that is, he is denying that sensuous contents are Objects on their own, denying that an Objective time-location belongs to them as it would if they were themselves moments of content such as quality or intensity and as if all sensuous contents had their time-order through such a time-moment .

There are a number of critically important issues looming here in Husserl's early work on the constitution of time. They threaten to trap him within a position he would seemingly prefer to avoid, an intellectualism having unwanted affinities to those of Plato, Descartes, and Kant. So even though, Husserl follows Kant's language in referring consistently to time as a form, the passages reported on above in this entry seek to distance his conception of the relations between time, the mind, and the objects of experience from Kant's. When he insists that time is not a separate Object from the contents that are to be temporally apprehended, he is rejecting the Kantian assertions (1) that time is an intuition and therefore strictly something immanent that cannot be justifiably applied to anything transcendent and (2) that time is most fundamentally a pure universal form of mathematical thinking and therefore altogether alien to the most primitive content of intuitions, sensuous impressions.

value [Wert]. See value predicates [Wertprädikate] and  value properties [Werteigneschaften]; Object_[Objekt]; Absurd, the; universals: purely material, <conceptually> formed, and purely formal; commonalities [Gemeinsamkeiten], formal and material; valuing.

{HUA 28, 255}. Values are values in themselves, whether they happen to be valued or not, and they are not moments or components in valuings since they would in that case arise and vanish together with the valuings. So, we have here a problem analogous to the epistemological one: How can an emotional act become conscious of a value in itself?

{HUA28, 249:34-250:4} Values are founded objects. We speak of values insofar as there are objects that have value. Values are present only through value predicates , and their subjects, the objects, are called values on account of their having these predicates. However, "the objects have value predicates" is ambiguous. We must distinguish value predicates in the proper sense, like "beautiful," "good," etc., from value predicates in the sense of those predicates which ground this "good" or this "beauty".

{HUA28, 255:19-26} What Husserl terms value is the sense or content of a feeling; value is the sense of an affective consciousness of the object which is valued. Value can be given originally only through feeling. However, such a feeling cannot, he insists, occur except as directed toward something (the valued) which is there for consciousness or the ego through mental processes [Erlebnisse] which are non-affective, doxic, and intentive (whether actively or automatically) to the valued entity as having characteristics whose manner of original givenness is not affective and whose being or non-being might be truly affirmed or denied or might be questioned, doubted, etc.

Thus, every valued object is a synthetic unity intended in at least two ways: doxically and affectively. Husserl insists that mental processes of both sorts are here intentive to the self-same noematic object but also insists that they are intentive to entirely distinct features of the object. What each discloses about the object is different from what the other discloses yet the object is synthetically identified, is a polar unity to which both sets of features belong. <It is not formally or analytically true that what possesses the doxically intended characteristics possesses the affectively intended characteristics.>

Each member of the doxic set is a mental process belonging to one or more species of doxa: visual perceiving, anticipating, remembering, judging, imagining, etc. It may be intuitive or non-intuitive, and if it be intuitive then it is evidence with respect to the existential status (being, actual being, likely being, possible being, non-being, impossibility, etc.) of the noematic object. <As it is used here 'intuitive' may designate mental processes that are automatic as well as mental processes that are actional.> Such mental processes bear upon the being of their objects, upon whether the object is or is not or could be or could not possibly be. <The affective mental process (or processes) affords (afford), in contrast, evidence bearing upon whether the object ought to be ("is" good, is worthy of approval) or ought not to be ("is" bad, is worthy of disapproval).>

If it be non-intuitive then there is co-intended some possible intuitive consciousness of the self-same object or of objects quite like it as intuitable through mental processes quite like those which would be intuitive of this object. Husserl insists that other mental processes of the self-same doxic species as this one could occur without grounding mental processes of the same affective species as the one which this set of doxic mental processes has made possible. The founding doxic mental processes are only necessary, not sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the affective mental process or processes which are conditioned by them.

{HUA28, 268:3-5; emphasis added} Stated in this way, Husserl's thesis of noetic-noematic foundedness seems entirely defensible. However, if this be the thesis then Husserl is quite mistaken or else disastrously vague when he writes as if such passages as the following explicate the thesis: "...objects must first have their being and their being be analyzable by predicates before they can also be of value."

{cf. UKBDP "Unnatural Kinds..." 293 f.} Properly understood, however, the thesis does not in the least imply that any objects could occur which would have doxically intuitable features of the same species as those which found the goodness of this object and yet lack the sort of goodness which this object is valued for. As I am presenting it and as, I think, Husserl meant it, the theory of noetic-noematic foundedness is entirely compatible with the objectivity of value, so far as I can tell. Indeed, it would seem to be an eidetic law that if anything be correctly loved for having doxically intuitable traits of a certain sort then everything having characteristics of the same sort can be correctly loved and is good in the same way.

In the case of any quite novel feeling, only actual experience of an affective mental process of the unfamiliar kind predelineates for the ego a range of evidently possible non-experienced affects similar to the primally instituting [urstiftende] one.

An ego who had experienced no positive feelings could not clearly project positive feelings as possibilities. An ego who had never experienced a correct feeling could not clearly project possible feelings as correct at all and so could have no evidence of their possibility. (And an ego who had experienced no emotions at all would be unable to project any feelings as possible.) Such an ego would not be able to know that positive feelings are possible. Such an ego would be unable clearly to conceive that there might be entities of a certain description such that correct emotions intentive to them under that description could only be positive. An ego who has never loved an entity under a certain description could not know that entities of that description are to be loved. Husserl concludes with Brentano that no such ego could know any entity of that description to be good: apart from emotions, no intellect can know good and evil.

This is the defensible — and perhaps even true — core of Husserl's conception of the relationship between entities and values on the one side and between valuings, doxa, and objectivating [vorstellende] acts on the other. This — and not the Weberian differentiation between fact and value — is what is properly meant by saying that theory has nothing to say about values as such. It can say nothing about value proper so long as it disregards the possibility that there are affects which function as ways of appearing for something which is no less factual, no less objective than what is given through sensuous appearances. A science which altogether excludes any such possibility and so excludes genuine values from its subject matter altogether is an abstract, not a concrete science. Yet such sciences can and do exist. <Husserl's attitude toward Galilean natural science at the time of the HUA28, manuscripts was naive compared to the stance taken in The Crisis of European Sciences. There is, however, no evidence to support the suggestion sometimes made that Husserl noticed only late in his life that values are no less intuited and objective than are shapes or colors. {See ID2 (HUA4) 9, m9 in E}>

Affective consciousness is the form in which the impression of value occurs. Receptivity to value occurs only through emotions, and the intellect could never achieve knowledge of good or evil in the absence of such receptivity. Through feelings, consciousness is open to what is called "value". The impressional consciousness of value occurs only as feeling, affective intending. Value complexes [Wertverhalte] are no less factual than are other states of affairs such as simultaneity or succession. Perhaps all of that can be established; perhaps nothing in the world would be worthy of love or worth caring about if any of this were untrue. Then there would be nothing genuinely dreadful in the possibility that there be not anything at all.

Even if all that be so, we still have no answer to the question, "What is it that is given through positive affects to the extent that the ego is receptive through them to values as such? The fact that an entity is good must be given in order to be known. There is in Husserl nothing like the fact-value dichotomy as that developed out of certain naive and/or biased interpretations of Hume. Instead, Husserl acknowledges facts about what there ought (ought not) to be as well as facts about what there is or what there is not or what there might be or what there cannot be. On the contrary, to the best of my knowledge, Husserl would grant — unlike Schopenhauer, for example — that much of what there is also ought to be. Yet he would indeed insist that 'there are national armed forces' and 'there ought to be national armed forces' refer to quite different facts that cannot be given in the same manner.

Still, having said all this, nothing has been said about what it is that is given insofar as something is correctly loved, what it is that is evident insofar as it is evident that something ought to be. Husserl appears, in HUA28, to accept Brentano's analysis of 'is good': 'x is good' means that anyone who has toward x an emotional attitude that is other than positive has toward x and incorrect emotional attitude. Yet it is almost certain the he does not accept Brentano's further claim that the analysis is not only correct but exhaustive (so that Brentano's definition is "naturalistic" in Moore's sense). Husserl also seems to agree with Brentano that acquaintance with good and ill is acquaintance with formal states of affairs rather than with qualities while rejecting Brentano's insistence that such acquaintance is entirely analytic. Laws about value, axiotic laws, would be formal rather than material universals. What satisfies laws regarding what ought to be need have no quality or other trait in common (need be alike in no way) other than that each ought to be. The quest of ethical theory for a highest genus of goods has been a category error.

What is disclosed to the ego through correct affects are facts concerning values (concerning what ought to be) that are involved in what is disclosed through the founding objectivating (that is, doxic) mental processes. What is thus disclosed is the fact that whatever exemplifies a certain set of ontic and material universals satisfies a certain law about objects that ought to be.

value accumulation [Wertsteigerung]. See best of what is attainable.

{HUA28, 90.f.} There can be accumulative relations among values, and the comparisons involved can be of three and only three types: "equal" or "greater" or "lesser". But there are conditions that must be fulfilled for values to stand within accumulative relations: the values must be of a single value-region or value-category; to compare a wished-value [Wunschwert] with a pleasing-value [Gefallenswert] and an existential with an non-existential value (a goods-value with an allure-value) would be senseless, as if one were to say that the one is of greater wish-value than the other is of pleasing-value. Within the limits of a single category, relations of cumulation hold, and in these cases those axioms apply which apply to the formal essence of all cumulation relations such as: if (a=b) then (b=a); and there are "greater than" and "less than" relations, so that 'if (a> or <b) and (b> or <c ) then (a> or <c)'. Also, if equals are added to equals then the results are equal, but only within the relations of summation (the summatory whole). In this context, 'equal' cannot be genuinely regarded as a likeness but means just "neither greater than nor less than".

<Husserl's way of describing the summation of value strongly suggests the notion that the further axiotic characters considered, regardless of their quality, are supervenient to the other moments of the object's sense, that the thing comes to be invested with another value, altering thereby its axiotic quality, that the object's content thereby acquires a new moment of form: as when Husserl states the law, "where the existence of one good has another good as a consequence, the good-value of the first good undergoes increase." {HUA28, p. 132:15 f.} As in other cases in which the sense that an object has for the ego acquires a further sense for the ego, such as the object's membership in a certain set of things, the state of affairs being referred to here needs to be described differently. The law that Husserl has in mind would be better formulated, "Where the existence of a good of any species is conducive to to another good, the goodness of the first is greater than the allure which members of the same value-species otherwise have".

Stated this way, the law does not imply or suggest that correct valuing of the first good for its alluring consequence generates rather than explicates the further value it discloses. If the difference between these ways of formulating the genuine law does indicate a fault in Husserl's conception of it then it is a fault which seems to run throughout his otherwise very well worked out and insightful discussions of valuing and practice. It may indicate an error in his comprehension, or it may indicate a danger inherent in his developing the theory as an improvement and elaboration on the work of Brentano. His well founded admiration for Brentano may have lead him to formulate in the vocabulary and style of traditional consequentialism views requiring quite different locutions.

Husserl should, after all, have understood that the state of the valued [Wertverhalt], disclosed by a right affect, is not numerically different from the thing valued any more than a state of affairs formed syntactically through a true judging is numerically different from the state of affairs as it is and is given in case the judgment is also evidently true. Evidently correct (apt) valuing discloses that what is valued ought to be rather than increasing the worth of the valued as such. When the state of the valued is then objectivated as it might be in judging it to be good then the belief that what has been valued is good is a further acquisition beyond the already acquired habitual valuing of the thing.

Should it occur to me that a friend's trustworthiness which I may have prized for years is, like trustworthiness in most of its instances, the realization of a necessary condition for the existence of communities based on justified mutual trust then it may become alluring to me in this respect as well. Neither the friend nor her trustworthiness has derived new allure from the enabling relation between them and the still higher order goodness of communities based on justified mutual trust. Even if I have only now come to value them in this relation, the valuing, if well founded, acknowledges and discloses a way in which they had already been of value.>

value-fact. See value accumulation [Wertsteigerung].

value, intuition of [Wertvernehmen, Wertanschauung]. See valuing, apt [konvenientes Werten]; valuing, insightful [einsichtiges Werten].

{HUA28, 370:10-23 and 288} In a science of the theoretical, the grounding of judgments that are about theoretical objects and their predicates must occur through intuition that "gives" us the objects and allows us to extract [entnehmen] their predicates as those that are given while demonstrating <showing, revealing> what was posited in the judgment. In the case of such non-values and non-axiotic predicates it is clear that intuition means perception and the like <remembered perception, clearly imagined perception>. But how is it with axiotic predicates? They too must be grounded by something such as perception. But here the principle must be respected: No givenness of value without valuing.

{HUA28, App.13, analysis in 1909 of §§2-12 of the 1908-09 lectures, 370 f.} How does valuing function in the givenness of value? The act through which values are given (or through which value judgments are demonstrated <are made evident>) necessarily includes a valuing, an act of a different genus from thinking, from predicative (i.e., cognitive) judging. Does this indicate that there is for value judgments no giving act? Or should we perhaps say: We must differentiate between thinking <actionally doxic mental processes> and the underlying <mental processes>which can function in making it evident and grounding it (the <mental processes> from which thinking takes its grounds. The specific thinking is the theoretical act in the specific sense, but the <mental processes>underlying thinking are various, in the one case sensuous perceiving in the other valuing, which is a receptivity to value [Wertnehmen]. But in that case must we not give up the view (as Natorp apparently does since he even regards willing as a cognizing) that while perceiving and judging belong together, valuing is something fundamentally different both of them. <Note that Husserl is here analyzing, revising, and correcting what he had presented in the lecture course of 1908/09. The material that needed revision is that paraphrased in the next following paragraph below. Here, he decided in favor of the view that the original intuition whereby value is itself given is affective and nondoxic. Here the valuing, the affective consciousness, itself is acknowledged to be receptive to value {see also ID1 (HUA3) m198 and ID2 (HUA4) 9 (m9 in E)}. What is being corrected in what was presented in the course is the notion that the disclosed value would be given in an originary way only to subsequent insight into affectively correct consciousness of value. There, he had treated this sort of actional and doxic insight as the relevant analog of perception in the sphere of things.

The correction makes clear that the affective consciousness whereby value is originally given is never a distinct insight of the sort that would be needed to ground an evidently correct predicative value judgment. Often enough it does not occur clearly, much less distinctly. To discern the ontic traits for whose sake something is correctly valued is a complex hermeneutical task. {See VT 726 f..} Highly refined value sentiment often occurs in persons who are quite incapable of explicating in a veridical manner what is felt. They may even, as in the case of B. Russell, for example, deny that their sentiments have other than a subjective ground. Even obscure and confused sentiments effect an abstraction simply by, for example, loving a thing or person for some traits rather than others.

Moreover, Husserl insists rightly here (and against Brentano's view) that the consciousness through which value is given must itself be directed toward the valued rather than toward the valuing.  His way of formulating and conceiving the foundedness of affective mental processes upon doxic (cognitive) ones improved vastly between the 1908/1909 lecture course and the 1913 publication of ID1. I find the later formulations to be defensible and accurate. The earlier ones were neither.>

{HUA28, 281} When a subsequent thinking speaks of valuing and values and establishes classes of values belonging to the novel correctness or validity of valuing acts then there must be both an insight into these acts through novel ways of being conscious and an Objectivating that is carried out on the ground of these acts through this insight and through judging cognition, an Objectivating through which values and disvalues are recognized as belonging to these ways of being conscious. What is this insight into valuing acts which brings values to givenness for us? It must be something like a perceiving, an analog of perceiving since the values are simultaneously intuited, viewingly given, and it must be the necessary basis for the establishing of values through judging, quite as perceiving functions for judging about things. And it must be an intuiting since the abstraction which brings universal value-concepts to givenness for us can have its foundation only in it or in a corresponding fantasy-intuiting. {HUA28, 280f.} Is valuing a value-intuiting all by itself or does that not require a special viewing? But, on the one hand, this would be a special insight that would take in something from a valuing that would be itself inherently blind. On the other hand, is not intuiting an intellective act belong to the specifically rational sphere and so to be contrasted with the class of valuing acts? Unworkable alternatives on either hand. As an intellective act, and so a perceiving, an insight could not receive from the valuing act anything other than the act itself as it is, its aspects, components, moments; and these would include no values.

value, moral. See best of what is attainable.

There appears to be no recognition in HUA28, of moral value as a unique species of value. In the second appendix (1914) to the "1914 Lectures on Basic Questions of Ethics and Value Theory," Husserl writes:

Valuing anything good is itself good; willing to will only what is good is a good. The present willing through which I will for the future the best future, however, does not belong to the coming good but is a present good, a good which is recognized by a subsequent retrospective reflection as something which was good. It is thus a practically possible good that one be resolved always as new horizons open in the future to seek to attain insight as to what the best is and to will the best to the best of one's powers. {HUA28, 158:24ff.}

But what role, Husserl asks, does the resolve to be so resolved in the future play?

{ibid.} If I do will with insight the best of what is achievable for any ego whatsoever, still I must consider what this best of what is achievable is. What am I able to do; what all is achievable? <These are the issues that Fichte excluded from consideration, calling it blasphemy to consider them and insisting that they are matters of faith, where faith is the certainty of the internal perception which is entailed in all deeds. In the manner of Kant's postulates of practical reason this conception of what was just then coming to be called lived experiencing [erleben] was vested with Divine authority, becoming faith in The Moral Order of the Universe. In Husserl's later (1920 and 1924) course of lectures, "Introduction to Ethics" he would call this sort of move "flight into theology and into an illusory grounding for theory about the validity of moral obligation as well as about the validity of knowledge" {Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924, 253}. To achieve just such a flight, Descartes denied the reliability of internal perception (self-understanding and disclosing in Heidegger) so as to make its validity depend upon a proof of his having been created by the super authority.>

Yet while I weigh all this, time passes. Perhaps something of special value escapes me in the meantime. Yet, by acting without insight, I could choose evil as well as choose something of value. So rather delay the choice and consider. But for how long should the consideration last? A minute, an hour, a whole future? {HUA28, 158:38ff.}

The ideal would be an ego who has a surveyable future horizon, and one wherein achievables are to be found, perhaps limitlessly many as yet unfamiliar <to me>. I see only some of these and simply know nothing of others. [Husserl probably should have added here that I am aware that the possibilities surveyed are a selection within an open, indefinite horizon of other possibilities not noticed.] Among those I do notice, I see that G is the best achievable one that falls within the time interval that I survey.

Yet that interval may hold much that I do not see, good and bad; perhaps some other occurrence of value still gets omitted through the choice of G. <ibid.>

Husserl seems to consider only "goods value" in his discussion {HUA28, 134:17 ff.} of choosing the lesser evil. He says that every decision or willing that is directed toward something of disvalue is incorrect when considered in itself: if the alternatives are all bad then the correct decision is to reject them all without raising the question of greater or lesser evil.

When he adds in a footnote that there are laws of correct preference even here, that deciding for the lesser evil is itself less evil than deciding for a greater one. <HUA28, 134 fn. 1.> Husserl is again close to noticing the need to differentiate between the allure of the act founded as it is on a correct preference among its intended alternatives and, on the other hand, the repulsiveness of the chosen results, considered apart from the positive value of the nonoccurrence of the still more repulsive alternatives. The former is a feature of the act's positive moral value; the latter repulsiveness is that of the primary disvalue to be exemplified by the results in case the act succeeds. That evil, for so it will then be, will be the source for the factual disutility, which will detract from the act's utility as a means of preventing still greater ills.

1. In terms of its moral quality, the decision is a good and may even be of high moral quality.
2. In terms of its intended results, it is also a good since the result sought was not simply an ill but was a way of avoiding more serious ill.
3. In terms of its actual effects, the action is therefore also, on the whole, good but is certainly no pure good. The effects remain partly evil and repugnant. The evil they involve does not disappear by their having been brought about through a correct preference and a correct choice.

a. There is something repugnant and perverse in the approval of situations in which people must make such choices.
b. A correct disapproval of such situations may be what distracted Husserl into disapproving wrongly of any choices at all when the alternatives are all of them ills.

Considerations of this sort show clearly a need of the distinction Scheler later draws between moral quality and goods-quality. Without this distinction, Husserl falls into a paradox when treating cases where the choice favors the lesser of alternative goods. Having wrongly concluded that choosing the lesser evil has negative quality, like the evil chosen, he concludes rightly that choosing the worse of alternative goods has axiotic quality opposite to that of the chosen good. {HUA28, 134:17 ff.} <Here Husserl is at the verge of distinguishing moral value quality from utility.> For a choice to be correct, he continues, it is not enough that it be of positive value; it must not disfavor something of greater positive value.

Husserl calls what would be involved in such a case an effect of summation of value quality . Willing something good is of positive value in and of itself <=as objectivated?>, but if the same good be pursued so as to disfavor a higher good and to exclude its realization then the choice and the action are ills. For to the positive value of the lesser good there is added a surpassing disvalue of disfavoring the superior good. {UA28, 131:12} Under all conditions, he reasons, the subordination of something better, a greater to a lesser good is, in sum, not positive but negative instead {ibid. :21}

value predicates [Wertprädikate] and value properties [Werteigenschaften]. See values, ideal "self-existence" of.

{HUA28, 255:20 ff.} Values are present only through value predicates and their bearers; the bearers are called "values" on account of their having these predicates. However, "they have value predicates" is ambiguous. We must distinguish value predicates in the proper sense, like "beautiful," "good," etc., from value predicates in the sense of those predicates which ground this "good"or this "beauty". Value predicates in the genuine sense belong either to objects in the narrow sense , i.e., to what are not <predicatively formed> states-of-affairs [Nicht-Sachverhalten], or else to <predicatively formed> states of affairs. {HUA28, 255:27 ff.} These predicates belong to the object Objectively, belong to it abstraction from issues of value or disvalue, under abstraction from whether it is valued or can be valued as beauteous or hideous, as beneficial or harmful, as sublime or as common, etc.; and they must be differentiated from the specifically axiotic predicates that are attributed — and seem rightly attributed Objectively — to it when not prescinding axiotic issues in the, so to say, attitude of value judgment. Value predicates are a distinct genuine "category" of predicates. {HUA28, 254, n.1 and 256}

<Correlative to the essential foundedness of emotive processes on doxic processes is an essential foundedness of the axiotic properties on ontic properties. Accordingly, that something has a value quality entails that it has ontic properties of a definite sort. That x has a value quality of a specific sort is equivalent to, not synonymous with, its having ontic properties of a specific sort. If we must say nevertheless that the ontic kind and the axiotic kind are two kinds rather than one then this is because the thing with the relevant ontic property can be doxically intended correctly without any correct emotive process being directed toward it. The differentiation between being good and having the relevant sort of ontic property does not imply that what is correctly liked is not correctly liked for its having that ontic property. Since Husserl's way of conceiving values is likely to be much less familiar to readers than Scheler's conception of material values, it should be emphasized that the "ought-to-be" of value traits is a mode of being and so is a formal rather than a material trait. Notice that 'good' refers therefore to a formal universal rather than to a genus making the  long history of efforts to find the way in which everything that ought to be is like everything else that ought to be (value monism: hedonism, Kantianism, utilitarianism, etc.) a category error and quite irrelevant. Husserl's formalism has little to do with Kant's. His position is much closer to Brentano's ideal consequentialism. Whether his variety of axiological pluralism shares the consequentialists' weird view that moral goodness cannot  be included among the indefinitely many sorts of primary goodness is not quite clear however. >

{HUA28, 77:34ff} If a property is of value then every Object possessing it is of value for the sake of the property. As a consequence of this law there follows as corollary: value characteristics belonging to some whole impart derived value to the whole itself.

values, ideal "self-existence" of. See value predicates [Wertprädikate] and value properties [Werteigenschaften].

<Axiotic qualities have the sense of being ideally self existent by virtue of their independence of actual events. Axiotic qualities of a given type may be actual or merely possible. An axiotic universal (a kind of axiotic quality) must have possible instances if it is to be at all. Still, it can very well be without having actual instances. A law having not even a possible application, having no possible cases to which it would apply, is an absurdity, but a law having no actual cases to which it would apply is not absurd at all. [This seems to be my own view written around 1973. It seems correct on the whole, but what is here called "axiotic quality" needs much elaboration {see the entry "value predicates [Wertprädikate] and value properties [Werteigenschaften]"}. To reflect my current thinking, what is called "axiotic quality" or "axiotic property" is not properly a quality at all bit is the formal state of affairs that something having a certain set of ontic properties ought to be. 'Good', 'evil', 'indifferent' and the like are not names for genera (which would be material universals) but for formal universals; there are no gounds for believing that there is some way in which all objects that ought to be are homogeneous, quite as there are no grounds for believing that there is some way in which all beings are homogeneous. ]>

values, vital. See body, organism [Leib].

{Roth, EHEU, 114} The bearer of vital values is the body as founding stratum for the animal subject. These include such values as health, feeling well, enjoyment. The feeling of these values is purely sensuous. The value character which the body has through such values is passing. The pleasantly warm feeling after consuming brandy passes; its mark is left in memory. However, the awareness that the experience is repeatable gives the body an enduring value-quality in as much as it is a field and a necessary condition for such experiences.

valuing [Werten]. See affective mental processes [Gemütserlebnisse]; value, intuition of; Objectivating.

{1924/25 at earliest; ID2 (HUA4) 9} The most original consciousness of value occurs through feelings insofar as they are the (in a broad sense) pre-theoretical delighting abandon on the part of the feeling Ego-subject for which I used, in my lectures of several decades back, the term "value-reception". The term is meant to indicate an analog in the sphere of feelings to per-ception which signifies, for the doxic sphere, the ego's being currently engaged with the object in an original manner (i.e., grasping the object itself). It thus refers in the sphere of affects just to those feelings through which the ego lives in the consciousness of being feelingly engaged with the very object itself, and that is precisely what is meant in speaking of it as enjoying.

{HUA28, 72:20 ff} Even in valuing and even in abstraction from the doxic positionality implicit in it, something is posited. {HUA3, 278:20-33} Basic to every valuing act there necessarily are intellective acts, "Objectivating" acts (acts which objectivate in fantasy or judging acts or acts which deem something likely), in which the valued objects are objectivated and perhaps stand there in certainty or probability as existing or non-existing. And this is no mere psychological foundedness. Rather, the valuing act is essentially founded, precisely insofar as it constitutes the appearance of value, in and through the intellective act. This involvement of the cognitive or intellective can mislead by suggesting the error that the valuing acts are intentional only in the sense that they refer to what has been objectivated. However, as will be shown, Objectivating acts alone refer to objects in the proper sense, to beings or to non-beings, whereas valuing acts refer to values and, more exactly, to positive and negative values <N.B.: Does this sentence not indicate the need to differentiate between values and value qualities? Affectively neutral mental processes have their noematic correlates as well, viz., the fact that the object is neither of positive nor of negative value.> Through the acts, the two types of reference are materially fused to be sure; values have their object side and their specific value side at the same time: the former founds the latter; and, when values themselves become objects for judging cognition, the value side itself is Objectivated. <The passage reported on here from HUA28 seems both correct and quite compatible with the one from ID2 that is reported on above in this entry. He has however not yet distinguished well between consciousness that is intuitive and consciousness that is both intuitive and evident. the former need not be actional (exigent) whereas the latter must be so.>

{HUA28, 72} H. adds: As always in these rather difficult relationships, there is a connection to rational motivation which links the intellective with the axiotic; for example, whoever is certain that A exists cannot rationally will A and whoever is convinced that A does not exist cannot rationally will that A not exist. <In his example, it is likely that H. errs. If A both exists and ought to exist then I cannot rationally will that A come into existence, but I may very well will (depending on the circumstances) rationally will that A continue to exist; and if A both does not exist and ought not to exist then I may (depending again upon the circumstances) quite rationally will A's continued non-existence. Husserl may very well have succumbed here to a widely held and thoroughly perverse view that probably stems in other psychologies from identifying valuing with desiring and striving for, disvaluing with aversion and striving for. >

{HUA28, 266:20-35} Should a cognizing be directed toward valuing then that valuing is its Object; the cognizing, not the valuing, does the Objectivating. Analogously, valuing can by its nature be "directed" toward Objects without being on that account a cognizing. Valuing is also "consciousness" and so is intentional; intentionality is not limited just to objectivating consciousness such as , perceiving, judging, or other cognizing mental process. Since valuing is other than cognizing or perceiving consciousness, it should be constitutive, of something for Objectivity, it is however constitutive of something that pertains essentially to the valuing. Valuing has, in its various forms (as liking, wishing, willing) its own differentiated way of referring to Objects, just as do perceiving, cognizing, guessing, etc.

valuing, apt [konveniente Werten]. See valuing [Werten]; valuing, insightful [einsichtiges Werten].

{HUA28, 239} Any valuing that is directed toward something that is of positive value is apt so long as it is itself a positive affect; if the affect is negative then it is apt if and only if what it is directed toward has negative value; affective indifference is apt insofar and only insofar as what it is directed toward is neither good nor ill. Valuing is apt when its valence corresponds to that of the valued.

If an object is something to be approved then the approval directed to it is itself worthy of approval, is something alluring in the widest sense: every apt valuing is as such of positive value, having a value grounded purely in the aptness as such and not in transference of the value character from the valued value to the valuing of it. The valuing-as-good of something good is not good because the valued good is good and reflects its value back onto the apt valuing; it is good just because it is apt. The disapproval of an evil — of something repulsive, of something deserving disapproval — is of positive value as an apt valuing whereas it would have to be bad were its value derived from that of the ill which it aptly disapproves. <This accords with Husserl's view that all affects are receptive to values and so are in this sense intuitive. They can be and frequently are unknowingly, non-cognitively, i.e., non-doxically, receptive. An emotion can be incorrect only in so far as it is founded on false doxic consciousness. I very well may mistakenly prize a colleague for trustworthiness who does not deserve to be trusted. Approving trustworthiness is apt nonetheless.
Does Husserl here confuse aptness of valuing with the goods value of the act whose end would be the result being valued?>

valuing, insightful [einsichtiges Werten]. See valuing, apt [konveniente Werten].

{HUA28, 240:35-241:10} An insightful valuing is of higher value than a merely correct valuing. The term 'insightful' is carried over from the doxic thetic sphere where an insightful judgment is not a mere opinion but an opinion which is fulfilled exactly to the extent required by the opinion in all of its opinion-components. Similarly, some valuing in the broadest sense, i.e., some affective intention, can be completely fulfilled. In such cases, the valuing is not only correct but completely grounded, and this is not grounding through thinking but is affective grounding. Every such affective fulfillment admits a priori the possibility that there be an insight <doxic> into it and the further possibility that there be, founded on this insight, discursive judgmental cognition which grasps the value-showing in its adequateness and so makes cognitively evident the relation between meaning something to be of value and its grounding fulfillment. This in turn makes possible the theoretical insight into the objective validity of such valuing. It is then also evident that insightful valuing is higher in value than merely correct valuing. It will then turn out that correct valuing is properly of value only for the sake of its being groundable, that its being of value is merely derivative by way of its utility in relation to insightful valuing. <Husserl overstates the point here. The genuine point seems to be that the mere correctness in valuing has no intrinsic value, but it still may have consequential value, and its consequential value (utility) will be to some extent quite similar to the consequential value of corresponding insightful valuings. Moreover, it is not clear that any but possible derivative value quality accrues to the merely correct valuing simply by reference to possible insightful valuings. Utility (consequential value) is value of the sort that Husserl differentiates from allure (beauty, charm, etc.), and he rightly says that it modalizes temporally when its bearer is a temporal entity.

That different value qualities are intuited to belong to the same object entails that the valuings are different and that what is being valued differs correlatively . In case they are valuing the same object x then they are valuing it for different ontic properties. The properties for which x is correctly valued are properties of x and are properties by virtue of which x is both a) worthy of a an affective consciousness which is like the correct one in quality and b) good, bad, or indifferent in correlation with the quality of the appropriate affective consciousness.>

{ID1 (HUA3)  m198} As the perceived as such stands over against the perceiving in a sense that excludes the question as to truthfulness, so the valuing stands over against the valued as such so that the being of the value (of the valued thing and its truly being of value) remains beyond question. All concurrent actional positing is to be excluded in grasping the noema. To the full "sense" of the valuing there belongs the What of the valuing with the entire content through which the corresponding valuing is conscious of it. The value-objectivity in scare quotes is not without further ado the full noema.

valuing, positionality of, and doxic positionality. See valuing [Werten]; affective mental processes [Gemütserlebnisse].

{HUA28, 252:37-253:28 in "C. ZWEITER TEIL DER VORLESUNGEN ÜBER GRUNDPROBLEME DER ETHIK 1908/09"} In the emotional sphere (sphere of practical reason), we cannot abstract at all from the understanding, which is the Objectivating faculty. And can we at all abstract from the dimension in which the constitution of value-Objectivity lies? There might be some sense in talking of a pure understanding that excludes any cooperation of emotional acts. But even if we could talk analogously of a pure sentiment, the values ought to be nonetheless objective, the value-predicables nonetheless predicables. The value-characteristics are accordingly something Objective, and understanding alone can give an account of them. A mere feeling, a liking or a disliking, any emotional act whatsoever does not Objectivate anything at all. Any such act may refer to Objects given antecedanously to it through the faculty for objectivation, yet the value it values to [zuwertet] the Objects must be something which there is a consciousness of — in the form of an act of the understanding — as something these Objects deserve or at least seem to deserve. So, in the end it is the understanding, here as everywhere, which posits or without mediation intuitively grasps Objects, here the values and so in a certain synergy with the sentiments, and which then makes about them whatever assertions are made — among which assertions are to be found whatever value judgments may arise with a claim to validity along with principles of value judgment and the norms of valuing itself. <The emphasized passages seem to make impossible a satisfactory answer to what the next paragraph calls the most difficult of problems. Intuition of values seems to be confounded here with clear (insightful) intuition of values so that it seems impossible to conceive the initial intuition of values (the authentic impression of values) as an emotion whose noematic correlate can then be grasped by a secondary, apophantic and perhaps (but very rarely it would seem) evident understanding of the value that has been given antecedaneously through the emotional mental process. This error is absent from the brief account of the constitution of valuing  in ID2 {p. 9  and the much fuller accounts in ID1, see especially § 95}.>

All of this is beyond doubt and it certainly justifies integration of theory of ethical cognition and of all axiotic cognition in a certain way into the general theory of cognition. On the other hand, however, there emerge exactly at this point the most difficult of problems: How do the sentiments function in the value Objectivation effected by the understanding, and what does the understanding genuinely do in Objectivating value?

{HUA28, 253:36} When the moral sentimentalists declare that the sentiments decide, the sentiments give their approval or disapproval, that sounds quite lovely; but does this decision by the sentiments consist simply in the occurrence of a certain sentiment called approving or disapproving? The mere occurrence of a certain psychic fact, a certain feeling, in the person who judges tells us nothing. <I have added the double emphasis on the word 'tells'. Husserl is quite in agreement with moral sentiment theories point that emotions reveal what is of great significance and can be revealed in no other way. Such theories, however, confound sentiment with moral judgment. Explicating what sentiment reveals is a complex and difficult hermeneutical task, one that usually goes awry.>

{HUA28, 254:18} Even if we disregard the problem of how the sentiments refer to something objective, the really difficult problem here is: to understand how we should get beyond the fact of a certain feeling, occurring in the person who appreciates, to a predicate claiming Objectivity. We judge not just, "that is esteemed," but "that is worthy to be esteemed". What do the sentiments contribute to this Objectivation and what the understanding? On this account — but mainly because value-predicates are a distinct "category" of predicates — we must distinguish theory of axiotic cognition from theory of other cognitions. <Husserl was being misled here, probably by Brentano's emphatic rejection of moral sentiment theories. Later he would formulate explicitly the quite correct view that every emotion, every sentiment is intuitive and so includes an infallible core of meaning: when emotions are in error, they err through errancy of the founding doxa.

Doxic positionality toward its noematic correlate is not a property belonging to the founded affective intending; it belongs instead to the founding doxic one(s). Hence, it is not the case that the mental life in which an emotional process occurs includes eo ipso a doxic consciousness of the emotive process either as correct or as incorrect or as neither. So, the liked is given to be good and is so given simply by being liked and without any reference even to the possibility that it be correctly liked.>

willing, insightful [einsichtiges Wollen]. See willing, volition [Willen]; best of what is attainable.

{HUA28, 241:27-39} Axiom: If A is something practically better than B then insightful willing of A is better than insightful willing of B. Insightful and non-insightful willing can compete with one another. Insightful willing of what is better is itself better and discredits (so to speak) the worse [das Minderer} within the unity of a single consideration of values. Accordingly, taken together with the earlier laws, the best willing is that which is directed toward the best of what is achievable; or, better, insightful willing that is directed insightfully toward the best of what is achievable is the best willing. Thus is established the highest law of willing, the absolute or ideal norm for willing, which has the characteristic of a categorical imperative.

willing, modalities of. See willing, volition [Willen].

{HUA28, 112 ff. and 468} There is a willing-question which is the analogue of a being-question <a "Shall-I-will-for-it?" is the analogue of "Shall-I-affirm-it?">. Through the willing itself there occurs the "being undecided with respect to the one or the other." "Being of different minds with respect to A or not-A..." is implicit in the willing. The end of the one sort of subjective process is the end of the will, i.e., is what the will intends. The end of the other sort of subjective process is the ontic end. In both cases, I hesitate between "A or not-A but…instead" However, in the former case, the question aims at a response by the will.

Quite as theoretical questions suppose as response either A or ~A, so the will-question supposes that I shall will for or against A, but it isn't yet decided which way I shall will. The will's response lies in a resolute decision for or against what is at issue — a positive or a negative striving.

<Husserl struck out here {HUA28, 467.} a long passage in which he seems to have confounded choosing, conative position-taking, with valuing. The passage marked for deletion included the following points.

•Such inclinations are modalities of striving, the analogues of inclinations to judge, inclinations to affirm or to withhold affirmation: "A seems to be" has its analogue in "It seems that A ought to be".
•As there can be inclination to believe that A is without there being a believing with certainty so it can seem that something practically ought to be without my performing the practical fiat — the "Let it be" ["Es soll," "Es werde"].
•The inclinations of the will which are meant are not inclinations in the sense of pre-dispositions of habitus, habits.>

When confronted with a practical, conative question, the several competing possibilities each seem as if they ought to be, each requires [fordert] equally to be willed.

willing, volition [Willen]. See interest [Interesse]; my PEA § 3a.

{ID1 (HUA3) 238 f. (m199)} In the sphere of willing [Willenssphere], there is on the one (the noetic) side the deciding that is currently being carried out [Entschlieβen] with all the subjective processes which it requires for its foundation and which it includes in itself when it is taken concretely. This includes a multiplicity of noetic moments; axiotoc theses as well as ontic theses, etc., underlie and are implicit in it. On the other (the noematic) side we find the decision [Entschluβ] as a peculiar sort of Object belonging specifically to the sphere of willing (volition), and it is obviously founded in Objects which are just as much noematic. Every phenomenon of willing, as phenomenologically pure intentional mental process, retains "what it wills as such" as that noema peculiar to willing: the positum peculiar to this willing as such [Willensmeinung], and this is retained just as it is "meant" in that willing (in its full being [Wesen]).

world, experiential. See Absurd, the.

{PP (HUA9) 66, m in E} The style of actual prior experience predelineates for every possible experience that might come into play a vague general anticipation of givennesses that would be similar in style. To clarify [Sich-anschaulich-machen] this horizon then means in fantasy to objectivate some more distinct continuation that is in character merely an illustrative possibility, a "something of the sort has to or would have to happen [muβ oder müβte kommen]". <Husserl's choice of modal auxilliary here indicates that he is still inclined favorably toward necessitarianism.>

{ibid. 67} The experiential world, however it proceeds when it frustrates our anticipations, is still individually this one world — having nonetheless, as this one world, the same sort of style.

On the one hand, the general integral-structure [Verknüpfungsgestalt] makes of the manifold individual and limitlessly ongoing realities an integral whole, a formally unitary whole, despite all worldly finitude (finitude being itself among the world's formal traits). As such an individual whole, the world has <individual> properties of its own which are not properties of its parts. Yet world-membership imparts to every partial member, however individual it may be, a correlative form, namely, the form "part of that whole". On the other hand, when considered in an all-inclusive way but in regard to the constituent real individuals, it turns out that these have their particular typifications which nevertheless holds for the entire world in all of its discriminable fields, complexes of things and their integrated systems: an all-inclusively valid typification by specification of the contents and of inner structure [Aufbau]

Each particular totality has its form into which there can be integrated only certain sorts of contents, and the all-inclusive totality, the universe, has an all-embracing form and thereby has as well a stricture as to contents so that only paarts, members of particular sorts admit of integration into the total form.

Existence of a world is the correlate of certain manifolds of experience that are delineated through certain essential structures. Yet there is no insight that actual experiences can flow only in those forms of connection; nothing of the sort can be inferred purely from the essence of perception taken universally and from the other kinds of experiential intuitions which are involved. On the contrary, it is quite conceivable not just that experience be dissolved into seeming through conflict in the single case and that some seeming not evince, as it does de facto, a more profound truth while each conflict is in its turn just what is required by more inclusive connections in order to maintain the total harmony. It is conceivable that there be in experience a host of conflicts that are irreconcilable in themselves and not just irreconcilable for us, conceivable that experience might all at once show itself to be consistently resistant to the presumption it will preserve harmoniously its positing of things, that the context of experience lose its fixed regular organization of adumbrations, apprehensions, appearances <and that it might continue so ad infinitum> — that there be no world given anymore [daβ es keine Welt mehr gibt], no world harmoniously positable and therefore existent>. It might be that, in such a case, unitary formations, to some extent raw, would nevertheless come to constitution, transient termini for intuitions which would be mere analogs of thing-intuitions.

world=horizon for whatever is. See being, absolute; world, contingency of.

World is the total horizon of what there is. Thus, I belong to it in my transcendental as well as in my mundane status. <NB: Given Husserl's way of conceiving the world, realism regarding general or universal concepts ideas is indeed an alternative to naturalism. Since such realism does conceive eide to have their being beyond Nature, yet they still exist neither beyond what is here called "the world" nor as constituents of any transcendental mind. Both they and the mind in its transcendental status belong to the world. The position that Husserl adopts moves far beyond earlier transcendentalism.> I am however able to conceive the still more universal, indeed the all-inclusive universe of objects. From the psychological point of view, this more inclusive horizon is an idea conceived by myself. Hence, psychological understanding is bound to misrepresent it as part of a part of the world, e.g., as an idea in my mind where my mind is understood to be within the world in Heidegger's sense.

Only from a non-natural attitude can I genuinely understand both myself and the world to belong to this more, even most, inclusive unity {see the entry "being, absolute"}. And only from such a standpoint is this absolute unity anything but an idea within my mind. On the contrary, the unity of all objects is an ideal in a sense that is quite analogous to the sense in which the world is itself an ideal.

The world is not all-inclusive. The world, whatever world is given, is a member of, belongs to this absolutely inclusive unity. So, too, does the unity of all possible worlds, to which I also belong at least as surely as to the given world. The possibility of transcendental illusion shows that the epistemic (gnoseological) status of my membership in the universe of objects is far more assured than is my membership in the world-unity which I take to be given. For the world as I believe it to be at any given time may (and probably will) turn out to be other than the actually given world. It would not be incorrect to assert that as an entity who belongs to this all-inclusive unity, I do not differ from any of its other members.

On the other hand, the essence, the full meaning of membership in the absolute unity can be disclosed only to an entity belonging to the given world, perhaps — as Husserl sometimes (and mistakenly, I am inclined to believe) maintained — only to an entity that practices transcendental phenomenological epoche — unless there is some other way by which the prejudice can be overcome that the world itself cannot be a phenomenon, that there can be given only phenomena belonging as limited parts either to the given world or to some possible world.

world, contingency of. See being, absolute; world=horizon for whatever is.

{ID1 (HUA3) 115 (m91-92)} The being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes whatever, would indeed be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things, yet that consciousness' own existence would not be thereby annulled albeit very modified indeed. For annihilation of the physical world need entail correlatively nothing other than that there would be excluded from every stream of mental processes (from the total stream, taken fully and therefore endlessly in both directions) certain ordered experiential contexts and, accordingly, certain contexts of theorizing reason that would be oriented toward those contexts. That does not, however, imply that other mental processes and complexes of mental processes would be excluded. Therefore, no real being that would present and legitimate itself to consciousness through appearances is necessary to the being of consciousness itself (in the broadest sense, the being of the stream of mental processes).

Immanent being is therefore indubitably absolute being  in the sense that it in principle nulla "re" indiget ad existendum. <Unless, when fitted out with scare quotes, "thing" refers only to things physical, this position seems to have been significantly modified if not altogether reversed by the time of FTL.{See the entry "being, absolute".}>

{ibid. (m92)} The world, on the other hand, including every transcendent "res", refers throughout not just to any conceivable consciousness but to actional, exigent consciousness.

world and things.

{CRISIS (HUA6) 254 f., e251} I am continually conscious of individual things in the world, as things that interest me, move me, disturb me, etc., but in doing this I always have consciousness of the world itself, as that in which I myself am, although it is not there as a thing, does not affect me as things do, is not, in a sense similar to things, an object of my dealings. If I were not conscious of the world as world, without its being capable of becoming objective in the manner of an <Object>, how could I survey the world reflectively and put knowledge of the world into play, thus lifting myself above the simple, straightforwardly directed life that always has to do with things?

world and world-appearances. See ownness, sphere of.

{CRISIS (HUA6) 258, e254f.} Each of us has her life-world, which is meant as the world for all. Each has that world with the sense of a polar unity of worlds that are subjectively relative which are transformed in the course of correction into mere appearances of the world, the life-world for all, the continuously enduring unity which is itself a universe of individuals, of things. That is the world, a different one has no meaning for us, and it becomes phenomenon through the epoche. What remains <following epoche> is no plurality of separate souls each reduced to its pure inwardness. Instead, there is a single psychic connexion, an inclusive unity of all souls, all united not externally but internally, through the intentive mutual inclusion involved in the communization of their life. Every soul, when reduced to her pure inwardness has her own being for herself and in herself. And yet each has, in its own original way its respective consciousness of world by virtue of empathic experience of others, experiential consciousness of others as souls who also have one and the same world apperceived through the respective apperceptions of each one.

{ibid.} The world-consciousness of any individual is always — and indeed with ontic certainty — the consciousness of one and the same world for all subjects known and unknown that could ever possibly be met, each of whom must be a subject in the world.

Works Cited

Husserl, Edmund. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926. Ed. Margot Fleischer. Husserliana. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1966. Xxiv, 532 pp.

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NOTES

[1]The German word was used by Kant as an equivalent to the word 'idea' as used by Locke and Berkeley. The earlier translation of Schopenhauer's main work used 'idea' as equivalent to 'Vorstellung'. A later translation of the same work used 'representation' instead. The latter would probably be a better translation than 'presentation' for the word as used by Brentano and Twardowski. But 'representation' works less well as a translation for Husserl's use of the word, as this entry goes on to indicate.

[2]Husserl usually writes as if 'necessarily' would be as appropriate here. In this he is following a hoary tradition that seems grounded on little more than an analogy (as in Hobbes) to dissipation of the force of impact upon matter.

[3]The analytical index to Biemel's version of HUA3 did not mention that the second (1922) edition of Ideas I included (as an appendix dated 1923) an analytical subject index by Gerda Walther whose entry for Idealismus: phänomenologische (pages 23-24) was divided into Pro and Contra sections. [See Walther's Zum anderen Ufer (1960) 215, cited by F. Kersten in his translation Ideas...General Introduction... p. 372 fn.]

[4]Husserl's choice of the word 'rational' here is, in my opinion, infelicitous, given that his position in axiology is quite different from that of ethical rationalists. On the other hand, a main point of this entry is to emphasize that he is here introducing an improvement over other consequentialist moral theories, especially that of Brentano. It is an improvement that acknowledges a way in which Kant's position is superior to that of most consequentialists and that acknowledges this without at all committing Husserl's consequentialism to anything closely resembling either deontological ethics or rule utilitarianism.

[5]See his Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen. Dargestellt anhand seiner Vorlesungsmanuskripte (Phaemenologica 7) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) 64. "In ethics," Roth wrote, "deciding formal correctness according to principle means at the same time deciding material correctness. The analogy with logic is wanting in a decisive point."

[6]A perceptual appearance which is itself given, he writes, "predelineates...the total...configuration along more or less indeterminate but specifically generic and typical lines." Aron Gurwitsch. Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, edited by Lester Embree (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974) 253.

[7]Note that 'foreign to consciousness' and 'transcendent' are not coordinate; another person's mental processes are transcendent so far as I am concerned but they are not 'foreign to consciousness'.

[8]As Husserl writes (op. cit. p. 24), "The universal epoche of the world...shuts out from the phenomenological field the world as it exists for the subject in simple absoluteness; its place, however, is taken by the world as given in consciousness (perceived, remembered, judged, thought, values, etc.)...individual things in the world as absolute, are replaced by the respective meaning of each in consciousness...

[9]The title for the volume is Introduction to Logic and Epistemology, Lectures of 1906/07. Its principal part reproduces mss written during that winter semester at Göttingen. The lectures show Husserl making what appears to have been the first effort at a clear-cut distinction between {§ 42c} position-taking consciousness generally, consciousness as Act [Akt], and consciousness as attentional.

[10]They are also temporal in a derivative sense insofar as they have ways of being intuited or of being otherwise intended, and these refer to events such that they must occur in time if they are to occur at all. Ortega y Gasset provides an important account of this aspect of universals; it leads him to adopt a phenomenological perspectivism (see his What is Philosophy?, chapter 1).

[11]Heidegger himself had already adopted a different and more sensible notion of what makes thinking original and creative, but he knew well that the customary standard for originality was the Hegelian one, novelty.