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Madibira Smallholder Agriculture Development Project
Madibira Smallholder Agriculture Development Project is a 3000 ha rice irrigation scheme in Southern Tanzania. It is located off the Tanzania-Zambia highway some 70 km west of Mafinga, where the tarmac ends. The scheme was constructed through a loan from the African Development Bank and done so in an environmentally friendly manner. It was built on government land and thus beneficiaries were tenants on the land with the expectation of paying rent for its use as well as water access fees. The land was allocated to the beneficiaries in one hectare plots divided into 30 ha irrigation blocks. The first season of rice production was in 1998-99 crop season. It was intended to be owned and operated by a cooperative named “The Madibira Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Society” (MAMCOS). Major donor funding with technical assistance facilitation continued until December 2000, at which point most of the 3000 ha had been developed and cultivated to rice.
Returning in the spring of 2005, 4.5 years after donor funding ended, there was clearly a very positive economic impact of the scheme in the area. The scheme was now fully subscribed with all useable land allocated and even the access road was well maintained. The economic impact was most noticeably demonstrated by the purchase of some 50 Asian built rice based power tillers for tillage and transport. Three fourths of these were individually financed with only one fourth financed via the credit union, mostly to it officers. The estimated cost of the power tillers with accessories is about US$ 8,000 per unit. Other signs of the positive economic impact of the scheme could be seen in the number of lorries and farm tractors in the area, additional shops with generators, TVs and VCRs.
However, the management might best be defined as Mafia style. MAMCOS still exists, though more by government decree than an effective participatory democratic management effort. There had been no annual meetings or elections of new executive committee members for at least three years. Instead the scheme was being managed by seconded government officials still receiving government salaries. MAMCOS now claims 3,400 members. This would represent an over subscription by 400 people, many of whom were reported to come from outside the designated 5 beneficiary villages. The understanding was that these people were waiting of someone to give up their allocation. It was also rumored that for an informal payment of TSh 500,000 (US$ 500) to the management, the management would assure quick access to the scheme. This could only be done by effectively evicting an established beneficiary, mostly for failure to pay annual fees for rent and water. A situation the management could or could not exercise flexibility with individual beneficiaries. The management was collecting annual fees of TSh 40,000 (US$ 40) from the participants, presumably to cover administrative costs including escrowing funds for future repairs of the scheme. However, while it was possible to get an account of what participants contributed, there was no accounting for expenditures. The impression left was that most of the money was diverted into management’s pocket. There was also the mandatory purchase of TSh 100,000 (US$ 100) in share capital for MAMCOS. This money was kept in a bank some three hours drive away from the scheme to earn bank interest to be paid as a dividend. The share capital appeared to have nothing to do with the financial management of the scheme. It also was expected to disappear. No dividends appear to have been paid nor any share capital refunds made to those who left the scheme. Those protesting the management would quickly find themselves on the list for replacement. This level of mafia style management was just enough to be resented, but not enough to render participation unprofitable.
There remained no formal tenant relationship statement of entitlement, inheritance rights etc. Also, there appeared no additional individual investment in land development and water management, which would be an expensive investment without assured tenancy. The only scheme maintenance being done was the annual cleaning of tunnels where water was diverted from the river into the scheme and which filled with sediment each season. This was all done by subscribed labor at no capital costs to the scheme.
While from a western perspective this appears unacceptable, in most developing countries it is accepted as the unfortunate norm.
Anonymous notes
The manner in which host personal can take advantage of donor funded projects can vary. But another example taken from a different country and different donor is expressed in the following two messages received from and individual not wishing to be identified.
I've got an update on the cooperative scheme which you will find interesting. I share this information as confidential and unconfirmed. I definitely couldn't do any sort of cost calculations because there has been suspicions of vast amounts of corruption taking place.
Recently I met a forestry consultant who had worked as head forester in the region, amongst other roles. He explained to me that the head forester of the cooperative is the most corrupt official in the zone, and exactly how the corruption works. According to the man I met, not only is there skimming from workers but also side deals on timber sales (which should operate according to an auction process, but is being corrupted by cash payoffs), stealing from reunions (feeding people cookies and charging $4 a plate for lunch, this adds up over the course of many large work reunions), etc. As the official is closely linked to a backing NGO head, no dissent is allowed from the NGO staff. Now it makes more sense why no one in the NGO seems to be worried about sustainability or community control of the resources.
This revelation was surprising because I, like many, had been convinced by the talk of NGO staff. In fact there are many people in the zone who are against the cooperative scheme, painted as villains by NGO staff, but really are local folks tired of people stealing from them, now under the guise of a cooperative scheme. These people have been forced into the cooperative scheme and now must live with the situation. The man I met is convinced that the head forester and possibly NGO staff will wind up shot one day soon.
I always was skeptical of the cooperative scheme, but never realized that cooperatives could be a straight tool of official corruption. Of course the man I met could have been lying also, in which case this message is propagating hearsay unjustly.
In either case, NGO workers who offer dissent have been fired, and for the few times that I have offered dissenting views I and another NGO have been marginalized and largely excluded from the zone.
This information is unconfirmed and can never be made public with named officials due to possible personal risk.
The questionable rumors aside, the "legal" operations are running at costs that you and I consider criminal. The simple budget calculations make me sick to my stomach (10 NGO staffers, about $1000 - 1500 / mo / per staffer), plus huge gas bills, office, computers, 4 pickups, and this just in my locality. This for a small number of timber coops that have a brute production output of some $150 to 200 K per year, and of that 75% goes to national, local, and community taxes/payments. So 25% goes to pay for mgmt costs, then the leftover to coop members! I saw one spreadsheet that showed they were operating way in the red. Others involved in local mgmt have also identified that the coop scheme operates at a loss.
International NGOs should be required to be transparent. People ask me if it's okay, if this should be allowed because any money is good for development... but is it really if the forest is being depleted for the benefit of a few... or at a financial COST to the community? It would be a great PhD but would be impossible (what NGO would willingly volunteer this info!!!) and might put one in physical harm, unfortunate but true.
Last Revised: 2 Nov. 2005 .