Epicurus: Letters, Principle Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings translated by Russel M. Geer (New York: Macmillan/Library of Liberal Arts, 1964) pp 3-34.
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Diogenes Laertius, Life of Epicurus, ## [eg., 26b], Epicurus: Letters, Principle Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings translated by Russel M. Geer (New York: Macmillan/Library of Liberal Arts, 1964) found on http://lamar.colostate.edu/~jgaughan/courses/306/Epicurus.htm (date visited).
LIFE OF EPICURUS
Diogenes Laertius' Life of Epicurus begins with a brief account of his birth in Athens in 341 B.C., his education, contacts with older philosophers, and the beginning of his school (sections 1-3). This is interrupted by some samples of the bitter attacks made upon him (3-8), after which Laertius (or his source) comes to the philosopher's defense (9-12). We are then given another account of his birth, life, and death (12-16), which is followed by his last will and testament given verbatim (16-22). Next come brief statements about some of his followers with lists of their writings (22-26). Thereafter Laertius finally turns to Epicurus' own literary activity, and it is at this point that the present translation, begins.
(26b) Epicurus was the author of very many books, surpassing all men in the
number of his works. Indeed, they fill nearly three hundred rolls; and in them
is contained no statement on the authority of another, but all are the utterances
of Epicurus himself. Chrysippus tried to emulate him in the multiplicity of
his writings, according to Carneades, who calls Chrysippus the parasite of books
and says:
For if Epicurus wrote something, Chrysippus out of rivalry
(27) also produced a work of the same volume. For this reason
he has often repeated himself and has written whatever
came into his head, failing to correct errors in his haste;
and the passages copied are so many that these alone fill
his books. This is also to be found in the works of Zeno and of Aristotle.
Of such extent and value are the works of Epicurus. The most important of, them are as follows: On Nature (thirty-seven books); On Atoms and Void; On Love; Epitome of the Works Against the Physicists; Against the Megarians; Problems; Principal Doctrines; What to Choose and What to Avoid; On the Chief Good; On the Basis of Judgment, or The Canon; Chaeredemus; On Gods; On Piety; Hegesianax; On Lives (four books); On justice in Action; Neocles, to Themista; Symposium; Eurylochus, to Metrodorus; On Sight; On the Angle in the Atom; On Contact; On Destiny; Maxims on Suffering, to Timocrates; Prophecy; Exhortation; On Idols; On Presentation to the Consciousness; Aristoboulus, On Music; On Justice and the Other Virtues; On Gifts and Gratitude; Polymedes; Timocrates (three books); Metrodorus (five books); Antidorus (two books); Maxims on. Diseases, to Mithres; Callistolas; On Kingship; Anaximenes; Letters.
(28b) The opinions that Epicurus expressed in these works I shall try to present by subjoining three of his letters in which he gives in outline his whole philosophy; and I shall add his Principle Doctrines and any other passages that seem worthy of quotaion so that you will be able to study him from all sides and reach some judgment upon him. First is the letter to Herodotus (which deals with natural science; second the letter to Pythocles,) which deals with the phenomena of the atmosphere and the heavens; third the letter to Menoeceus, in which the ethical theory is contained. We shall begin with the first letter, but before taking that up I shall speak briefly about the divisions of his philosophy.
His philosophy is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with methods of proof, with the natural physical world, and with ethics. The methods of proof, which are contained in the work called the Canon, are the means through which the other parts are approached. His belief about the physical world is presented in full in the thirty-seven books On Nature, and in an abridged form in the letters. Ethics deals with choice and rejection and is contained in the books on Lives, in the letters and in the work entitled On the Chief Good. The Epicureans usually treat the methods of proof along with physics, saying that they deal with the determination of truth and with the first principle, and that this study is basic. They say that the subject matter of physics is generation, dissolution and the natural world; and that ethics deals with things to be chosen and those to be rejected, with the manner of life, and with the purposes of living.
(31a) They reject theoretical logic on the ground that it draws the seeker after truth aside from his purpose. It is enough for the student of the natural world to make progress ' in accordance with the direct evidence of the phenomena themselves. Thus in the Canon Epicurus says that the bases on which the. truth is to be judged are the sensations, the concepts, and the feelings. To these the Epicureans add the mental apprehension of appearances. He says this himself in the epitome addressed to Herodotus and in the Principal Doctrines.
(31b) The individual sensation, he says, does not depend on the reason and does not admit the recollection of an earlier sensation. It cannot set itself in motion but must, be stirred by something external, and when so stirred it can neither add anything nor take anything away. There is nothing that can refute a sensation; (32) for the sensation received by one sense cannot refute another of the same sense since both are equally valid, nor can a sensation received by one sense refute one received by another, since their subject matter is different. Reason cannot deny the truth of sensation, for all reason depends upon sensation; nor can one sense contradict another, for we pay equal attention to all. Also, the fact that our perceptions are in agreement guarantees the reliability of the senses. Our sight and our hearing are in agreement, as is also our feeling. Since sensation is valid, we must accept from things that we can perceive indications about things beyond the reach of the senses. Indeed, all our ideas are framed from sensations as we experience and compare them, recognize their similarities, and combine them, not without the assistance of our reason. Even visions seen by madmen or in dreams are real, for they stir the mind, and that which is not real does not do so.
By "concept" they mean a mental picture, right opinion, notion, or general idea that has been stored up?in other words, the memory of something external that has often been the subject of sensation, as for example the concept that such and such is a man. As soon as you hear the word "man," the image, man, is at once mentally formed in accordance with the concept, which was originally due to sensation. The basic meaning of each word is clear. If we did not first know the thing for which we are searching, we could not search for it; when we say that this which stands before us is a horse or a cow, we must already know by means of a concept the shape of a horse or cow. We could not give a name to anything if we did not already know its form by means of a concept. Therefore, concepts are clear evidence.
Opinion depends upon something previously clearly seen to which we mentally refer when we express the opinion. For example, from what do we know that such and such is a man? They also call opinion a supposition, and they say that it may be true or false: (34a) if it is confirmed or not contradicted by evidence, it is true; but if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. From this was developed the idea of the "problem awaiting solution," as for example the problem of the distant tower that awaits our near approach and the ascertainment of its shape when seen from close by.
There are, they say, two feelings, pleasure and pain, which belong to every living creature, the former being in harmony with its nature, the latter alien to it. By the feelings we decide between acceptance and avoidance. Of investigations, some concern things, some mere words.
This is the summary of Epicurus' views on the divisions of philosophy and on the bases of judgment. We must now turn to the letter.
LETTER TO HERODOTUS
1. Introduction
A. REASONS FOR THE LETTER
This letter presents a brief compendium of the physics to refresh the memories
of those already familiar with the theories.
Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.
(35) Some, Herodotus, are not able to study carefully all my works on natural science or to examine closely the longer treatises. For them I have already written an epitome of the whole system so that they may acquire a fair grasp of at least the general principles and thereby have confidence in themselves on the chief points whenever they take up the study of physics. Those, too, who have acquired a reasonably complete view of all the parts ought to keep in mind an outline of the principles of the whole; for such a comprehensive grasp is often required, the details not so often. You must continually return to these primary principles and memorize them thoroughly enough to secure a grasp of the essential parts of the system. Accurate knowledge of the details will follow if once you have understood and memorized the outline of the whole. Even for the thoroughly trained student this is the most important result of his accurate knowledge: he is able to make immediate use of the things he perceives and of the resulting concepts by assigning them to the simple classes and calling them by their own names; for it is not possible for anyone to hold in mind in condensed form the whole interrelated system unless he is able to comprehend by means of short formulas all that might be expressed in detail. (37a) Therefore, since such a course is useful to all who are engaged with natural science, I, who recommend continuous activity in this field and am myself gaining peaceful happiness from just this life, have composed for you such a brief compendium of the chief principles of my teaching as a whole.
B. METHODS OF PROOF
Words must be used in their natural meanings. All natural science rests on
the evidence of the senses.
(37b) First, Herodotus, we must understand the meanings of words in order that by expressing our opinions, investigations, and problems in exact terms, we may reach judgments and not use empty phrases, leaving matters undecided although we argue endlessly. (38a)We must accept without further explanation the first mental image brought up by each word if we are to have any standard to which to refer a particular inquiry, problem, or opinion.
(38b)Next, we must use our sensations as the foundation of all our investigations; that is, we must base investigations on the mental apprehensions, upon the purposeful use of the several senses that furnish us with knowledge, and upon our immediate feelings. In these ways we can form judgments on those matters that can be confirmed by the senses and also on those beyond their reach.
II. The Universe
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES
Matter can be neither created nor destroyed. The universe as a whole is unchanging.
(38C) Now that this has been established we must consider the phenomena that cannot be perceived by the senses. The first principle is that nothing can be created from the non-existent; for otherwise any thing would be formed from anything without the need of seed. (39a) If all that disappears were destroyed into the non?existent, all matter would be destroyed, since that into which it would be dissolved has no existence. Truly this universe has always been such as it now is, and so it shall always be; for there is nothing into which it can change, and there is nothing outside the universal that can enter into it and bring about a change.
B. ATOMS AND THE VOID
The universe consists of matter, recognized by the senses, and void, in which
matter moves. Other conceivable things are "accidents" or "properties"
of these. Sensible objects are composed of atoms, which themselves are indestructible.
(39b) Moreover, the universe consists of material bodies and void. That the bodies exist is made clear to all by sensation itself, on which reason must base its judgment in regard to what is imperceptible, as I have said above. (40a) If that which we call "void" and "space" and "the untouchable" did not exist, the particles of matter would have no place in which to exist or through which to move, as it is clear they do move.
(40b) In addition to these two, there is nothing that we can grasp in the mind, either through concepts or through analogy with concepts, that has real existence and is not referred to merely as a property or an accident of material things or of the void.
(40c) Of material things, some are compounds, others are the simple particles from which the compounds are formed. (41a) The particles are indivisible and unchangeable, as is necessary if all is not to be dissolved to nothing, but something strong is to remain after the dissolution of the compounds, something solid, which cannot be destroyed in any way. Therefore, it is necessary that the first beginnings be indivisible particles of matter.
C. THE INFINITY OF THE UNIVERSE
i. The universe is infinite, for there is nothing to bound it, and each of
its elements is also infinite.
(41b) Moreover, the universe as a whole is infinite, for whatever is limited has an outermost edge to limit it, and such an edge is defined by something beyond. Since the universe does not have an edge, it has no limit; and since it lacks a limit, it is infinite and unbounded. Moreover, the universe is infinite both in the number of its atoms and in the extent of its void. (42a) If, on the one hand, the void were infinite and matter finite, the atoms would not remain anywhere but would be carried away and scattered through the infinite void, since there would be no atoms from without to support them and hold them together by striking them. If, on the other hand, the void were finite, there would not be room in it for an infinite number of atoms.
ii. To account for the differences in sensible objects, the atoms must exist in many forms, the number of different forms being inconceivably great but not infinite, while the number of atoms of each form is infinite.
(42b) In addition, the indivisible, solid particles of matter, from which composite bodies are formed and into which such bodies are dissolved, exist in so many different shapes that the mind cannot grasp their number; for it would not be possible for visible objects to exhibit such great variation in form and quality if they were made, by repeated use of atoms of conceivable variety. The number of atoms of each shape is infinite; but the number of varieties cannot be infinite, only inconceivably great.
D. THE MOTION OF THE ATOMS
The atoms move continuously, both freely in space, and with more limited
motion forming gases, liquids, and solids. This motion had no beginning.
(43) The atoms move without interruption through all time. Some of them (fall in a straight line; some swerve from their courses; and others move back and forth as the result of collisions, These last make up the objects that our senses recognize. Some of those that move in this way after collisions separate far from each other; the others, maintain a vibrating motion, either closely entangled with each other or confined by other atoms that have become entangled. (44) There are two reasons for this continued vibration. The nature of the void that separates each of the atoms from the next permits it, for the void is not able to offer any resistance; and the elasticity that is characteristic of the atoms causes them to rebound after each collision. The degree of entanglement of the atoms determines the extent of the recoil from the collision. These motions had no beginning, for the atoms and the void have always existed.
(45a) If all these things are remembered, a statement as brief as this provides a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of that which exists.
E. THE INFINITE NUMBER OF WORLDS
Because atoms and space are infinite, the number of worlds, like or unlike
ours, is also infinite.
Finally, the number of worlds, some like ours and some unlike, is also infinite. For the atoms are infinite in number, as has been shown above, and they move through the greatest distances. The atoms suited for the creation and maintenance of a world have not been used up in the formation of a single world, or of a limited, number of them, whether like our world or different from it. There is nothing therefore that will stand in the way of there being an infinite number of worlds.
III. Sense Perception
A. SIGHT
i. Thin films, which we call "idols," are constantly given off
by objects, retaining the form and color of the object.
(46a) Moreover, there are images of the same shape as the solid bodies from which they come but in thinness far surpassing anything that the senses can perceive. It is not impossible that emanations of this sort are formed in the air that surrounds a body, that there are opportunities for the creation of these thin, hollow films, and that the particles composing them retain as they flow from the solid object the same position and relative order that they had while on its surface. Such images we call "idols."
ii. Because their unsurpassed fineness frees them from internal and external collisions, the idols move with almost atomic speed.
(47b) Nothing in nature as we see it prevents our believing that the idols are of a texture unsurpassed in fineness. For this reason, their velocity is also unsurpassed, since they always find a proper passage, and since moreover their course is retarded by few if any collisions, while a body made up of an inconceivably large number of atoms suffers many collisions as soon as it begins to move.
iii. These films, which are replaced by new matter as soon as they leave the surfaces of bodies, usually retain their forms; but sometimes a new idol is formed in midair.
(48) Moreover, there is nothing to prevent our believing that the creation of idols is as swift as thought. They flow from the surfaces of a body in a constant stream, but this is not made evident by any decrease in the size of the body since other atoms are flooding in. For a long time the idols keep their atoms in the same relative position and order that they occupied on the surface of the solid, although sometimes the idols do become confused, and sometimes they combine in the air. This combination takes place quickly since there is no need of filling up their substance within. There are also some other ways in which idols come into being. Not one of these statements is contradicted by sensation if we examine the ways in which sensation brings us clear visions of external objects and of the relations between them.
iv. Both thought and sight are due to idols coming from objects to us.
(49) We must suppose that we see or think of the outer form of a thing when something comes to us from its surface. We could not as readily perceive the color and shape of external objects by means impressions made on the air that lies between us and them, or by means of rays or beams of some sort sent from us to them, as we can when outlines of some kind, like the objects in color and shape and of the proper size to affect either our eyes or our minds, come to us from the objects. Since these move in rapid succession they present a single uninterrupted image; and they maintain a quality in harmony with their source because their energy, which has been imparted to them by the vibrations of the atoms in the depths of the solid object, is itself proportionate to the energy of that source.
v. The mental picture from the intent look or the concentrated thought is true. Error results when opinion adds something.
(50b) When, by the purposeful use of our mind or of our organs or sense, we receive a mental picture of the shape of an object or of its concomitant qualities, this picture is true, since it is created by the continuous impact of the idols or by an impression left by one of them. Whatever is false and erroneous is due to what opinion adds (to an image that is waiting) to be confirmed, or at least not to be contradicted, by further evidence of the senses, and which then fails to be so confirmed (or is contradicted). (51) The mental pictures that we receive in the images that either come to our minds in sleep or are formed by the purposeful use of the mind or of the other instruments of judgment would not have such similarity to those things that exist and that we call true if there were not some such material effluence actually coming to us from the objects; and the errors would not occur if we did not permit in ourselves some other activity similar (to the purposeful apprehension of mental images) but yet different. From this other activity error results if its conclusions are not confirmed by further evidence or are contradicted, but truth if they are so confirmed or are not contradicted. (52a)Therefore, we must do our best to hold opinion in check in order that we may neither destroy the criteria of judgment, which depend on the clear view, nor confuse everything by placing erroneous opinion on an equality with firmly established truth.
B. HEARING
An effluence from the source of sound, splitting up into particles each like
the whole, which come in sequence to the ear, causes hearing.
(52b) Moreover, we hear when a kind of stream is carried to our ears from a person who speaks or from an object that makes a sound or noise or in any way whatever arouses in us the sense of hearing. This stream divides into particles, each of which is of the same nature as the whole, and these particles preserve a common relationship to each other and a peculiar continuity that extends back to the source of the sound and usually arouses comprehension in the hearer; or if it fails to do this, it at least makes clear that there is something outside. (53a) Without some common relationship extending out from the source, there would not be such awareness. We?must not suppose that the air itself receives an impression from the spoken word or sound, for indeed the air is far from admitting any such thing. Rather, the force that is created in us when we speak causes such a displacement of particles, capable of forming a breath-like stream, that it produces in the person to whom we are speaking the sensation of hearing.
C. SMELL
Effluences likewise rouse the sense of smell.
(53b) We must also suppose that, like sounds, smells could not produce any sensation if there were not carried from the object certain particles of a nature proper to stir the organ of this sense. Some of these are disorderly and unpleasant; some are gentle and agreeable.
IV. The Atoms
A. PROPERTIES OF THE ATOMS
i. The unchanging atoms possess no qualities save size, mass, and shape.
Other qualities result from atomic position or motion.
(54) We must suppose that the atoms possess none of the qualities of visible things except shape, mass, and size, and whatever is a necessary concomitant of shape. For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change in any way, since in the dissolution of composite things something hard and indestructible must survive that will make changes possible, not changes into nothingness and from nothingness, but changes brought about by alterations in the positions of some atoms and by the addition or removal of some. It is necessary that the particles that alter their positions and come and go be indestructible, not sharing in the nature of the visible things that are changed, but having their own peculiar shapes and masses; for this much must be unalterable. (55a) Even among sensible things, we see that those that are altered by the loss of matter on all sides still retain shape; but the other qualities do not survive in the changing object, as shape survives, but are removed from the whole body. These properties that remain are enough to cause the differences in composite things, since it is necessary that something survive and be not utterly destroyed.
ii. The atoms vary in size, but are not of every size, for if they were, some would be visible.
(55b) We must not think that there are atoms of every size lest the visible world prove us wrong; yet we must suppose that there are some differences in size. If there are some differences, it will be easier to explain our feelings and sensations. (56a) But the atoms need not be of every size in order to account for the differences in qualities; and if they were of every size, some would necessarily be large enough for us to see. It is dear that this is not the case, and it is impossible to think how an atom might become visible.
B. THE PARTS OF THE ATOM
i. We cannot assume matter to be infinitely divisible. A thing containing infinite material parts, no matter how small they were, would itself be infinitely large.
(56b) Next, we cannot suppose that in a finite body the parts, no matter how small, are infinite in number. Therefore, not only must we exclude infinite division into smaller and smaller parts lest we make everything weak, and in our conception of the parts that compose a whole be compelled to make them less and less, finally reducing real things to nothingness; but also in dealing with finite things we must not accept as possible an infinite progression to parts each smaller than the last. For if once you say that in a finite thing there are parts infinite in number even if of the least possible size, you cannot think how this can be. (57a) For how can a thing containing infinite parts be finite in size? It is dear that the infinite parts are each of some size, and however small they may be the whole must be infinite in magnitude.
ii. As in a visible thing there is a smallest part recognizable by the eye, which cannot be seen by itself and the total number of these smallest parts measures the whole, so in the atom there is also a least part recognizable by the mind, ?which cannot exist by itself, and the total number of these parts measures the atom.
(57b) Again, if in the finite body there is a part that can just be distinguished by the eye even if it is not visible by itself, we must believe that there is an adjacent part similar to this, and that if one went on in this way in his mind from one point to the next, he could not continue without end. (58) We must suppose that the smallest perceptible part is not like those bodies that are large enough that we can move our eyes from one part to another, nor yet, is it wholly unlike such bodies. Although it has some similarity to them; it does not admit division into parts. But if because of this similarity we think to mark off mentally a separate portion of the part on this side or that, we find that we are looking at the similar part adjacent to it. If, starting out from the first of these parts and not dwelling on the same one, we inspect them one after another, we find that they do not touch each other part against part, but by their own one special characteristic they measure magnitude, there being many of them in large bodies, few in small. We must suppose that the least part of the atom has the same relation to the whole as the least perceptible part has to the whole visible object. (59) It is clear that the least part of the atom is smaller than the least perceptible part, but it has the same relationship to the whole of which it is a part. We have already stated from its relationship to sensible bodies that the atom has size, although far inferior to them in this respect, Furthermore, the uncompounded least parts of the atoms must be regarded as fixed units, which offer themselves to us in our mental survey of the invisible as a means for the measurement of the atoms, both greater and smaller. The similarity between the least parts of atoms and the least perceptible parts of sensible things a is sufficient to justify our reasoning up to this point; but it is not possible that the least parts of atoms ever moved individually and came together.
C. THE MOTION OF THE ATOMS
i. Although there can be neither top nor bottom, in infinite space, the terms
up and down have meaning with respect to ourselves.
(60) Next, we cannot predicate up or down of infinite space as there were a highest or lowest. Yet if it were possible to a line from the point where we are standing upward to infinity in the space above our heads, neither this line nor one drawn downward from the observer to infinity would appear to be at the same time both up and down with reference the same spot, for this would be nonsense. Thus it is possible to think of one motion extending to infinity in the direction that we call up and one extending down, even if what from us into the spaces above our heads comes a thousand times to the feet of those above us and what moves downward comes to the heads of those below; for one of the motions is nonetheless regarded as extending as a whole to infinity in one direction, and the other motion in the other direction.
ii. The atoms, always moving in the void, always possess equal velocity, whether their motion be caused by collision or by weight. If unchecked, an atom will cross any conceivable distance in an inconceivably short time.
Moreover, it is necessary that the atoms possess equal velocity whenever they are moving through the void and nothing collides with them. For heavy bodies will not be carried more quickly than small, light ones when nothing at all op poses them, nor do the small bodies, because they all find suitable passages, excel the large ones, provided the latter are not obstructed. This is equally true of the atoms' motions upwards or to the side because of collisions and of their down ward motion because of their own weight. The atom will traverse space with the speed of thought as long as the motion caused in either of these ways maintains itself; that is, until the atom is deflected either by some external force, or by its own weight which counteracts the force of the earlier collision. (46b) Moreover, since the motion through the void takes place without any interference from colliding particles, any conceivable distance is completed in an inconceivably brief time. For it is the occurrence or nonoccurrence of collisions that gives the appearance of slow or rapid motions
iii. At any point of time the atoms of a compound body are moving in all directions with atomic speed, but because of their constant collisions and changes o f direction, the motion of the body as a whole in any appreciable time may be brought within the reach of our senses.
(62) Although all atoms have the same velocity, it will be said that in the case of compounds some atoms move faster than others. Men will say this because even in the shortest continuous period of time the compound and the atoms in it do move in one direction. However, in points of time recognized only by the reason, the atoms are not in motion in one direction but are constantly colliding with each other until the motion as a continuous whole comes within the reach of our senses. For what opinion adds about what the senses cannot perceive namely that in, times perceptible only by the reason there will be a continuity of motion, is not true in the case of the atoms. What is grasped by the purposeful use of the senses or by the mental apprehension of concepts contains the whole truth. We must not suppose that in times perceptible by the reason the whole moving compound moves in various directions, for this is unthinkable; and if this were true, when the body arrived in a perceptible time from any quarter whatever, the direction from which we observe its motion would not be that from which it originally started. The visible motion of the body will be the result of the internal collisions, even if below the visible level we leave the velocity of the atoms unaffected by the collisions. An understanding of this principle will be useful.
V. The Soul
A. COMPOSITION OF THE SOUL
A. The soul is material, composed of finely divided particles, some like breath, some like fire, and some of a third, un named kind.
(63a) Next, referring to the sensations and the feelings as the most certain foundation for belief, we must see that, in general terms, the soul is a finely divided, material thing, scattered through the whole aggregation of atoms that make up the body, most similar to breath with a certain admixture of heat, in some ways resembling the one, in some ways the other. But there is also a part of the soul that goes beyond even these two in fineness, and for this reason it is more ready to share in the feelings of the body. All this is made evident to us by the powers of the soul, that is, by its feelings, its rapidity of action, its rational faculties, and its possession of those things whose loss brings death to us.
B. THE SOUL AND THE BODY IN SENSATION
The soul experiences sensation only when enclosed in the body; and the body receives from the soul a share in this sensation. Sensation may survive the loss of parts of the body, but it ceases with the destruction of the soul or of the whole body.
(63b) Next, we must conclude that the primary cause of sensation is in the soul; (64) yet it would not have acquired sensation if it had not been in some way enclosed by the rest of the body. But the rest of the body, having given the soul the proper setting for experiencing sensation, has itself also gained from the soul a certain share in this capacity. Yet it does not fully share with the soul, and for this reason when the soul departs, the body no longer experiences sensation; for the body did not have this capacity in itself but made sensation possible for that other that had come into existence along with it, namely the soul. The soul, thanks to the power perfected init by the motions of the body, at once bringing to completion its own power to experience sensation, returned a share of this power to the body because of their dose contact and common feelings, as I have said. (65) For this reason, sensation is never lost while the soul remains, even though other parts of the body have been destroyed. Indeed, even if a portion of the soul is lost with the loss in whole or in part of that portion of the body that enclosed it, if any part at all of the soul survives, it will still experience sensation; but when the rest of the body survives both as a whole and part by part, it has no sensation if that collection of atoms, small though it be, that makes up the soul has been lost. However, if the whole body is destroyed, the soul is scattered and no longer enjoys the same powers and motions; and as a result, it no longer possesses sensation. (66) Whenever that in which the soul has existed is no longer able to confine and hold it in, we cannot think of the soul as still enjoying sensation, since it would no longer be within its proper system and would no longer have the use of the appropriate motions.
C. MATERIAL NATURE OF THE SOUL
The term "incorporeal" is properly applied only to the void, which
cannot act or be acted on. Since the soul can act and be acted upon, it is not
incorporeal.
(67) Moreover, we must clearly observe this also, that the word "incorporeal" in its common use is applied only to that which we can think of as existing by itself. Now there is no incorporeal thing that we can think of as existing by itself except the void. The void can neither act nor be acted upon; it only gives to corporeal things a space through which to move.Therefore, those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking nonsense; for in that case the soul would be unable to act or be acted upon, and we clearly see that the soul is capable of both.
D. CONCLUSION
(68a) If you refer all this discussion about the soul to your feelings and sensations, remembering what was said at the beginning of the discussion, you will find enough embraced in this outline to enable you, starting from it, to work out the details with certainty.
VI. Properties and Accidents
A. PROPERTIES
Shape, mass, etc., are properties of things. They cannot exist by themselves;
they are not separable parts of the things to which they belong; without them
the things could not be perceived.
(68b) In the next place, shapes, colors, sizes, mass, and all other things that are spoken of as belonging to a body must be thought of as properties either of bodies in general or of bodies that are perceptible and are recognized by our perception of these properties. (69) These properties are not to be regarded as having existence by themselves, for we cannot think of them apart from things of which they are properties; nor are they wholly without existence. They are not some kind of immaterial thing attached to the body, nor are they, parts of the body; but from all of them together the body as a whole receives its permanent character. We do not mean that these properties come together and form the body as happens when a large body is formed from its separate parts, either from the primary parts or from large parts that are smaller than the whole, whatever it is; we merely mean, as I have said, that the whole body receives its own, permanent character from the presence in it of these properties. Each of the properties of a body has its own appropriate way of being perceived and distinguished; and the body as a whole is perceived along with its properties, not separately from them, and is identified by this composite recognition.
B. ACCIDENTS
i. Like properties, accidents can be recognized only in connection with bodies;
but they are not permanent attributes as are the properties.
(70) It also often happens that there are qualities that do not permanently accompany bodies. [A lacuna is recognized here by most editors; some such supplement as the following seems called for: They, too, do not exist by themselves, yet they are not wholly without being.] They do not belong to the class that is below the level of perception, nor are they incorporeal. In applying to them the term "accidents" in its commonest meaning, we make it clear that they have neither the nature of the whole that we comprehend as a composite and call "body," nor the nature of the permanent properties without which a body cannot be thought of. By the appropriate senses each of them can be recognized in company with the composite body to which it belongs; (71) but, we see a particular accident only when it is present with the body, since accidents are not unchanging attendants. We must not deny the reality of this clear vision of the accidents on the ground that they neither possess the nature of the whole which they accompany and which we call body, nor share in its permanent properties; and we must not think that they exist by themselves, since this is not conceivable for the accidents or for the properties. They must all be accepted as what they appear to be, namely accidents belonging to bodies, not permanent properties nor things having any place by themselves in nature; but they are seen to have just the character that our senses ascribe to them.
ii. Time presents a special problem. We cannot visualize it, and we can recognize it only as an accident of an event, which is itself an accident.
(72) Before turning from this subject, we must carefully consider one more matter. Time is not to be sought for like other things that we seek in an underlying object by comparing them with the mental images that we look for in our own minds, but we must consider the clear data of experience by virtue of which we distinguish between a long time and a short one, regarding the empirical data as closely allied to the concept of time. We need not search for better descriptions of time, but we must use the very ones that are at hand; nor need we assert that something else is of the same nature as this unique entity, as some indeed do; but we should take into consideration as of chief importance only the things with which we associate time and the ways in which we measure it. (73a) This requires no elaborate demonstration, only a review of the facts. We associate time with days and nights and their parts, and in the same way with changes in our own feelings and with motion and rest, recognizing that the very thing that we call time is in its turn a special sort of accident of these accidents.
VII. The Worlds
A. THE CREATION OF WORLDS
Each world was formed by being separated from its own whirling mass, and
will be dissolved again.
(73b) In addition to what we have said, it is necessary to believe that the worlds and every limited complex that has a continuous similarity to the visible world have been formed from the infinite, each of them, greater and smaller, separating out from its own whirling mass. We must suppose also that these will all be dissolved again, some more quickly and some more slowly, some afflicted by one calamity and others by another.
(74a) One must not suppose that because of necessity worlds in a single pattern [were created, or in every possible pattern....
B. FORMS OF LIFE IN THE WORLDS
We may assume animal and vegetable life in the other worlds similar to that
on ours.
(74b) …Moreover, we may believe that in all the worlds there are animals, plants, and the other things we see;) for no one can show that the seeds from which grow animals, plants, and the other things we see might or might not have been included in one particular world and that in another kind of world this was impossible.
VIII. The Development of Civilization
A. THE ARTS AND CRAFTS
Instinct led men to the first developments, which reason then improved upon.
(75a)Moreover, we may assume that by the conditions that surround them, men were taught or forced by instinct to do many things of many kinds, but reason later elaborated on what had been begun by instinct and introduced new inventions. In some fields, great progress was made, in others, less; and in some times and ages reason (had more success in freeing men from their fears) of the powers above than in others.
B. LANGUAGE
Language was a natural development differing in different tribes. Later,
speech was clarified by deliberate selection.
(75b) So too we may suppose that in the beginning words did not receive meaning by design. The natural characters of men who underwent different experiences and received different impressions according to their tribes, caused them to emit air from their lips formed in harmony with each of the experiences and impressions, the men of each tribe differing in their own separate ways as the tribes differed because of their differing environments. (76a) But later in each race, by common agreement, men assigned particular meanings to particular sounds so that what they said to each other might be less ambiguous and the meaning be more quickly made clear. When men who had known them introduced certain things not previously seen, they assigned names to them, sometimes being forced instinctively to utter the word, but sometimes making their meaning clear by logically selecting the sound in accordance with the general usage.
IX. The Phenomena of the Heavens
A. CAUSES OF CELESTIAL PHENOMENA
No divinity directs the heavenly bodies, for this is inconsistent with divine happiness; nor are they themselves divine.
(76b) Now as to celestial phenomena, we must believe that these motions, periods, eclipses, risings, settings, and the like do not take place because there is some divinity in charge of them, who so arranges them in order and will maintain them in that order, and who at the same time enjoys both perfect happiness and immortality; (77) for activity and anxiety, anger and kindness are not in harmony with blessedness, but are found along with weakness, fear, and dependence on one's neighbors. We must also avoid the belief that masses of concentrated fire have attained a state of divine blessedness and undertaken these motions of their own free will. In all the terms with which we set forth our conceptions of such blessedness, we must preserve due reverence lest from irreverent words there grow opinions that deny this majesty. If we fail, this contradiction will cause the greatest confusion in our souls. Therefore we must believe that, at the time of the first formation of these bodies at the creation of the world, the law of their motions was fully ordained.
B. PURPOSES OF, AND LIMITATIONS ON, THE STUDY OF CELESTIAL PHENOMENA
i. While knowledge of the general principles governing these matters is essential to our happiness, the study of the details is vain. We must accept the possibility of multiple causes.
(78) Now we must accept the following beliefs: that to acquire exact knowledge about basic causes is the task of natural philosophy; that, as far as the heavenly bodies are concerned, our happiness depends on this basic knowledge and upon knowing the general nature of the visible phenomena of the heavens and whatever is necessary for certainty up to this point; that in these first principles there is neither multiformity nor any possibility of variation; and that in the immortal and blessed nature there is absolutely nothing that causes doubt and confusion. That these statements are true without qualification we can ascertain by reason. (79) But we must also know that whatever belongs to the investigations of settings and risings, periods and eclipses, and the like, that this is of no import for the happiness that comes from knowledge; and that those who have learned these things but are, ignorant of the original nature and the basic causes are subject to fears as great as if they knew nothing, or perhaps to even greater fears because the amazement that follows the study of these phenomena is not able to solve the problem of their relation to the essential principles. Therefore, if we find that there are many possible causes for periods, settings, risings, eclipses, and the like, just as we found many possible causes in our investigation of details, (80) we need not think that our investigation of these matters has not reached a certainty sufficient to secure for us peace of mind and happiness. We must search for the causes of celestial phenomena and in general of that which cannot be clearly perceived by first finding in how many ways similar phenomena are produced within the range of our senses; and we must pay no heed to those who, in the case of phenomena that can only be seen from a distance, fail to distinguish between that which is and remains single and that which may happen in many different ways, and who do not know under what conditions it is possible and under what conditions impossible to achieve peace of mind. If we know this, that phenomena may take place in many ways, we shall be as little disturbed if we merely think it possible that a particular phenomenon happens in some particular way as we would be if we knew this as an absolute fact.
ii. Men imagine that the celestial bodies are divine yet ascribe to them purposes inconsistent with divinity; and they anticipate eternal suffering after death. Peace of mind follows freedom from such fears, and will be gained if we trust to our immediate feelings and sensations.
(81) In addition to these general matters, we must observe this also, that there are three things that account for the major disturbances in men's minds. First, they assume that the celestial bodies are blessed and eternal yet have impulses, actions, and purposes quite inconsistent with divinity. Next, they anticipate and foresee eternal suffering as depicted in the myths, or even fear the very lack of consciousness that comes with death as if this could be of concern to them. Finally, they suffer all this, not as a result of reasonable conjecture, but through some sort of unreasoning imagination; and since in imagination they set no limit to suffering, they are beset by turmoil as great as if there were a reasonable basis for their dread, or even greater. (82a) But it is peace of mind to have been freed from all this and to have constantly in memory the essential principles of the whole system of belief. We must therefore turn our minds to immediate feelings and sensations in matters of general concern to the common feelings and sensations of mankind, in personal matters, to our own and to every immediate evidence from each of the means of judgment. If we heed these, we shall rightly track down the sources of disturbance and fear, and when we have learned the causes of celestial phenomena and of the other occasional happenings, we shall be free from what other men most dread.
X. Conclusion
This summary will be useful both for the beginner and also, as an easily remembered outline, for the more proficient.
(82b) Here then, Herodotus, you have the most important points, in regard to natural science set down in such condensed form that this discourse may be accurately held in mind. (83) I think that one who masters this, even if he does not progress to all the parts of a detailed study, will have very great strength compared with other men. He will also be able of himself to make clear many detailed points in regard to our system as a whole, and these general principles themselves will constantly aid him if he but hold them in memory. For these points are such that those who have made considerable progress and even those who are proficient in the detailed study, by solving their problems with reference to this survey, will make the greatest advances in the knowledge of the whole; and some of those who have made less progress toward perfect knowledge can, hastily and without oral instruction, run through the matters of most importance for peace of mind.