Assistant Professor, Director of Graduate Studies

Department of Philosophy

Colorado State University

Ph.D., Indiana University, 2006

970-491-5216 (phone), e-mail

Research Interests

ethics and metaethics, with special emphasis on moral realism, moral intuitionism, and the epistemology of moral judgment

“Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.

Many commentators suppose that morality, objectively construed, must possess a minimal sort of explanatory relevance if moral realism is to be plausible. To the extent that moral realists are unable to secure explanatory relevance for moral facts, moral realism faces a problem. Call this general objection an “explanatory objection” to moral realism. Despite the prevalence of explanatory objections in the literature, the connection between morality’s explanatory powers and moral realism’s truth is not clear. This paper considers several different reasons for subjecting morality to explanatory scrutiny and concludes that none of them uncover a special or compelling explanatory problem for realism. In light of these difficulties, an alternative account of the connection between moral realism and moral explanation is developed. Not only does this account make sense of explanatory objections to realism, it turns out that realists may have the resources to defend themselves against this explanatory concern, properly understood.

“Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge,” Disputatio, forthcoming.

According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a priori. Rationalists often defend their position by claiming that some moral propositions are self-evidently true. Copp has recently challenged this rationalist strategy. Copp argues that even if some moral propositions are self-evident, this is not enough to secure rationalism about moral knowledge, since it turns out that such self-evident propositions are only knowable a posteriori. This paper considers the merits of Copp’s challenge and concludes that Copp’s arguments do not threaten the aforementioned rationalist strategy. This discussion also goes some way towards clarifying the appeal to self-evidence as it figures in recent defenses of moral rationalism.

“Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” Theoria, 2012, 78 (1): 26-46, DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01118.x.

This paper raises a problem for Cornell varieties of moral realism. According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts just as we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. If this is so, it would remove any special mystery that is supposed to attach to our knowledge of objective moral facts. After clarifying the ways in which moral knowledge is to be similar to scientific knowledge, I claim that the analogy fails, but for little-noticed reasons. A preliminary conclusion of the paper will be that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the realist position. Yet, rather than spell trouble for moral realism altogether, I suggest that the apparent failure of Cornell realist moral epistemology points to a better way forward for moral realism.

“Review of Sabine Roeser’s Moral Emotions and Intuitions.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 11.27, 2011. (full text)

"Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge," Acta Analytica, 2011, 26 (4): 355-366, DOI: 10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0.

In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential.

"Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2010, 44 (1): 31-45, DOI: 10.1007/s10790-009-9173-9.

Sensibility theorists such as John McDowell have argued that once we appreciate certain similarities between moral values and secondary qualities, a new metaethical position might emerge, one that avoids the alleged difficulties with moral intuitionism and non-cognitivism. The aim of this paper is to examine the metaethical prospects of this secondary-quality analogy. Of particular concern will be the extent to which McDowell’s comparison of values to secondary qualities supports a viewpoint unique from that of the moral intuitionist. Once we disentangle the various metaphysical and epistemological strands of McDowell’s analogy, McDowell’s position might appear closer to moral intuitionism than initially supposed. This discussion will also help clarify the intended meaning of the secondary-quality analogy, as well as its significance for ethics more generally.

“Renewing Moral Intuitionism”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2009, 6 (4): 440-463. (pdf)

According to moral intuitionism, moral properties are objective, but our cognitions of them are not always based on premises. In this paper, I develop a novel version of moral intuitionism and argue that this new intuitionism is worthy of closer attention. The intuitionistic theory I propose, while inspired by the early twentieth-century intuitionism of W. D. Ross, avoids the alleged errors of his view. Furthermore, unlike Robert Audi’s contemporary formulation of intuitionism, my theory has the resources to account for the non-inferential character of particular, as opposed to merely general, moral beliefs. I achieve this result by avoiding the appeal to self-evidence to explain the possibility of non-inferential moral knowledge.

“Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 2008, 33: 163-184. (pdf)

The aim of this paper is to defend moral intuitionism, in its new formulations, against the criticism that there is something objectionably non-natural about its conception of moral properties. The force of this complaint depends crucially on what it means to be a non-natural property. I consider a number of ways of drawing the natural/non-natural distinction and argue that, once the notion of ‘non-natural property’ is sufficiently clarified, it fails to figure in a compelling argument against moral intuitionism.

Teaching

Philosophy 205—Introduction to Ethics (Spring 2012 and Fall 2012)
This course is concerned with the nature of morality. Among the questions we shall consider are the following. What does it mean for an action to be morally right or wrong, or for something to be morally good or bad? Are moral standards relative to personal belief or cultural preference? What is the connection, if any, between morality and religion, and between morality and happiness? How do we know about moral truths? Answers to these questions take the form of ethical theories and we will examine six ethical theories this semester: moral relativism, Divine Command Theory, utilitarianism, ethical pluralism, Kant’s ethics, and virtue ethics. We will critically evaluate these theories and also consider their implications for concrete ethical issues, such as the morality of famine relief and capital punishment. At the end of the course, students will be familiar with a number of philosophers, their ethical theories, and some difficulties with each theory. Students will also gain practice reading, extracting, analyzing, and evaluating arguments found in philosophical texts. The two main goals of the course are (1) to introduce students to some of the fundamental questions of ethics, and (2) to develop critical thinking skills that will enable students to read, discuss, and write effectively about contentious arguments, philosophical or otherwise.

Philosophy 447—Ethical Theory (Fall 2012)
This course examines a number of issues in contemporary ethical theory concerning the nature of morally right conduct and the proper aim and scope of moral theory. We shall pay special attention to current articulations of both consequentialism and Kantian ethics and evaluate the extent to which these new ethical theories avoid the classic objections to the views. Of specific concern will be a class of criticisms that challenge the relevance, demandingness, and consistency of moral theory. In the final part of the course, we will take up questions concerning the reason-giving force of moral considerations (e.g., is it always irrational to be immoral?) and the objectivity of moral thought (e.g., are moral facts as objective as scientific facts, and if so, how?).

Philosophy 547—Seminar in Ethical Theory: Metaethics (Spring 2012)
This seminar examines a range of topics in metaethics. Metaethical theories seek to provide a second-order accounting of first-order moral thought. Central metaethical questions include the following. Can moral claims be true or false, and if so, what makes them true? If moral claims are neither true nor false, what is the function of moral discourse? Is moral truth an objective matter, and if so, in what sense? If there are moral facts, are they natural? How do we know about such moral facts? How does alleged moral knowledge motivate us to act? In this seminar, we will consider a range of possible responses to such questions, focusing especially on those answers offered by the metaethical theories of intuitionism, emotivism, error theory, Cornell moral realism, constructivism, quasi-realist non-cognitivism, and sensibility theory.